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Abstract 
Regulation and supervision of banks has acquired a great interest over the last two 
decades in order to control banks' risks after many shocks affected banks' soundness. 
On an international level, the standards of Banking Supervision Committee of Basel have 
become the international standards for all banks in developed and developing countries. 
Basel standards were designed basically for conventional banks. Nevertheless, as Islamic 
banks are based on profit-loss-sharing (PLS) arrangements, some of these standards are 
not applicable to Islamic banks. The objective of this study is to investigate the 
foundations for regulation and supervision of Islamic banks. To achieve this objective, 
the study has adopted two methodologies. The first methodology is based on longitudinal 
data for banks in Jordan for the period 1990-2000. This methodology covers the 
effectiveness of capital regulation that aims to control banks' risk; also, credit risk, 
liquidity ratio, and loan-loss- provisions are tested. Regression of OLS, fixed and random 
effect were used. The second methodology is based on a questionnaire approach. 
Questionnaires are designed to answer seven questions relating to the general objectives 
of regulation and supervision of Islamic banks, the objectives of deposit protection, 
licensing conditions, credit risk, liquidity risk, factors determining the capital adequacy 
ratios and the information disclosures. Data is gathered from the Central Bank of Jordan, 
Islamic banks, conventional banks and external auditors in Jordan. Descriptive and 
variance analyses are used to analyze this data. 
It is declared that the characteristics of the PLS and their risks are different from 
those of conventional banks, therefore, Islamic banks are in need of special capital 
adequacy ratios, internal control systems, risk and liquidity management policies, and 
information disclosure standards appropriate for their characteristics. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
In the last three decades, there has been an increasing interest to re-newing the 
Islamic financial system. Wilson states that , an 
Islamic profit-sharing alternative to 
interest-based finance, had been used throughout the Islamic world between merchants 
and moneychangers since the time of Prophet Mohammed (SAW) (Wilson, 2002). This 
system is expected to play a pivotal role in the real current economy through facilitating 
saving, financing of projects as will as an intermediary role between surplus and deficit 
units in the economy. 
The central characteristic of the Islamic financial system is the prohibition of 
payment and receipt of a fixed predetermined interest rate as in the conventional banking 
system. This system replaces the interest rate by Profit /Loss Sharing (PLS) arrangements 
where the rate of return on financial assets held in banks is not known and not fixed prior 
to the undertaking of the transaction (Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998). 
Islamic banks in this system perform an intermediary role as in the conventional 
system; the only difference is that the former work as an agent for the holders of 
investment deposits, with the generated profit is shared between the Islamic banks and 
depositors according to a predetermined ratio, while in the case of loss it will be born by 
the holders of investment deposits. 
The main sources of funds for Islamic banks include capital, demand deposits and 
investment deposits, and the most common modes of financing are mudarabah, 
musharkah, and murabahah. These modes have some common characteristics in which the 
I 
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depositors and the investors are entitled to share in the profit /loss according to pre- 
determined rates specified in the underling contracts. Therefore, Islamic banks do not 
guarantee the capital value or the return on investment deposits except the value of 
demand deposits, which are redeemable upon demand. 
In comparison with conventional banks, Islamic banks face many challenges that 
affect their competitiveness and progress; some of these challenges are related to their 
relationship with the central banks such as lender of last resort, depositor protection, and 
liquidity management instruments. Also, Islamic banks are vulnerable to the problem of 
moral hazard and adverse selection on the lending side of bank operations (Mills and 
Presley, 1999) as a result of information asymmetry, and others are related to the nature 
of their activities such as credit risk, liquidity risk, investment risk, operational risk, and 
lack of collateral for some PLS, especially mudarabah contracts. 
Even though Islamic banks are capable of absorbing the external shocks since any 
shock in the asset side will have the same affect on the liability side of the balance sheet 
(Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998), they are still subject to systematic risk, which has severe 
effects not only on Islamic banks themselves but also on the whole financial system. 
However, the main concern of regulatory and supervisory authorities is 
maintaining the efficiency, soundness and safety of the banking system through installing 
prudential regulation and supervision standards. The essence of these regulatory and 
supervisory standards is to protect depositors and to avoid systematic risk in the banking 
system through assessment and monitoring of banks' financial performance and risks. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision of International Banks for Settlements 
provides international standards or benchmark against which the effectiveness of bank 
supervisory regimes can be assessed (Basel Committee, Core Principles Methodology, 
1999). 
Most Islamic countries nowadays adopt international standards of regulation and 
supervision established by Basle committee. Although these standards are effective for 
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improving soundness of Islamic banks, these regulations need to be modified for the 
nature and characteristics of these banks. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
There is a consensus among researchers on the importance of regulation and 
supervision norms for Islamic banks as well as for conventional banks. An effective 
regulatory framework insures the operational policies, governance, and market 
discipline. 
All these elements are essential for a sound financial system, which is also a prerequisite 
for macroeconomic stability. Qarni (1990) states that banks adhering to Islamic standards 
form part of the overall banking system are expected to come under the control of central 
banks. Errico and Farahbaksh (1998) argue that effective prudential supervision on banks 
is just as necessary and desirable for Islamic banking as it is for conventional banking. 
Also, Chapra and Khan (2000), after reviewing the Basel standards for regulation and 
supervision, conclude that these standards will be easier for Islamic banks to adopt if 
separate capital standards are set for demand deposits and investment deposits. 
Obaidullah (1998) confirms this by applying special regulation; he argues "uniform 
application of norms may result in an inequitable scenario and discrimination contrary to 
the "level playing field" objective of the regulator". Wilson (1997) when he comments on 
the Basel Committee on the requirements of applying the same requirements on all banks 
states, "given the nature of Islamic bank liabilities, it has been suggested that this 
provision is unnecessarily restrictive". In contrast, Abdul Malik -Al-Hamar, a former 
governor of the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates, suggests that Islamic banks 
need more regulation than conventional banks (Wilson, 1997). This is confirmed with the 
practices of some regulatory authorities in Islamic countries, which implement a higher 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) than Basel accord of 8% as a precautionary measure on 
both Islamic and conventional banks such as is the case for Jordan. 
To protect the economy, to avoid financial crises, and to promote financial 
institutions such as Islamic banks, the central banks in mixed financial systems should set 
3 
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adequate guidelines for regulations and supervision (Mudawi, 1986). Moreover, the 
central banks should be involved in ensuring the availability of necessary information, 
which is more important to Islamic banks than conventional banks (Errico and 
Farahbaksh, 1998). This information is necessary, particularly for the holders of 
investment accounts to enable them to monitor the banks' performance like the equity 
holders. 
This study will clarify whether the current norms of regulation and supervision of 
banks in Jordan are appropriate for Islamic banks on the one hand, and or whether there is 
a need for a set of different ones on the other. 
Reasons for the importance of this study are as follows: 
First, as in most Islamic countries which adopt mixed financial systems, Islamic 
banks in Jordan have acquired an increasing share in the financial system. Total assets of 
Islamic banks in Jordan constitute 8% on average of total assets, and 11.2 % in terms of 
credit. 
Second, the current structural and regulatory changes that took place in terms of 
capital regulations, legislations, financial reforms provide a significant chance to study 
the effectiveness of these regulations over the period of study (1990-2000), particularly as 
some of these changes were initially ratified after the banking system suffered from two 
major banking crises, the first one in 1989 and second one in 2002. 
Third, empirical studies in regulation and supervision of Islamic banks using 
questionnaires cover the main elements of regulation and supervision have rarely been 
studied in Islamic countries. Therefore, this study constitutes an initial step in this 
direction for more studies in other Islamic countries. 
Fourth, studies on the effectiveness of capital regulation on Islamic banks have 
never been seen in an Islamic context. This study will activate research in this field. 
4 
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Fifth, This study has not only implications for researchers and policy-makers in 
Jordan, but also for those in other Muslim countries particularly those who have adopted 
the mixed financial systems. 
1.3 Hypothesis 
The main objective of this dissertation is to investigate the foundations for 
regulation and supervision standards of Islamic banking and analyze the effectiveness of 
capital regulation on these banks. The hypotheses to be tested are divided into two parts, 
which are dedicated to answering the following questions: 
Part one: 
1- Do capital regulations have an effect on a banks'riskiness? 
2- Does credit risk has an effect on a banks' riskiness? 
3- Does liquidity ratio has an effect on a banks' riskiness? 
4- Do loan- loss -provisions have an effect on a banks'riskiness? 
Part two: 
1- Appropriateness of the current objectives of regulation of conventional banks 
for Islamic banks. 
2- The need for specific objectives for deposit protection of Islamic banks. 
2.1 Protection of holders of demand deposits. 
2.2 Protection of holders of investment deposits against operational risk. 
2.3 Protection of holders of investment deposits against moral hazard. 
3- Appropriateness of current licensing measures of conventional banks for 
Islamic banks. 
5 
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4- Credit risk of Islamic banks. 
4.1 Do Islamic banks face the same sources of credit risk of conventional 
banks? 
4.2 Are there special sources of credit risk facing Islamic banks? 
4.3 Are the current measures appropriate for the controlling of credit risk of 
conventional banks for those of Islamic banks? 
4.4 Is the level of credit risk in Islamic banks is higher than the counterpart of 
conventional banks? 
5- Liquidity risk of Islamic banks. 
5.1 Are the sources of liquidity risk of Islamic banks are the same as those of 
conventional banks? 
5.2 Do Islamic banks face special sources of liquidity risks? 
5.3 Is the liquidity risk of Islamic banks higher than the conventional banks? 
5.4 Should the liquidity ratio of Islamic banks be higher than the counterpart 
of conventional banks? 
6- Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 
6.1 Does the factors determine the CAR of conventional banks appropriate 
for those of Islamic banks? 
6.2 Which factors determine the CAR of Islamic banks? 
6.3 Is there a need for a different methodology and level of CAR for Islamic 
banks? 
7- Information needs to be disclosed to the public by Islamic banks 
7.1 Is there a need for external information to be disclosed by Islamic banks 
to the public? 
7.2 Is there a need for internal information disclosed by Islamic banks for 
supervisors and internal uses to be disclosed to the public? 
6 
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7.3 Are there needs for Information similar to those disclosed by mutual 
funds to be disclosed by Islamic banks to the public. 
1.4 The Objectives of the Research 
The objective of this study is to investigate the foundations for the need of 
different regulation and supervision standards for Islamic banks than those which apply 
to the conventional banks. This will be achieved through analyzing the appropriateness of 
current reg elation and supervision of Islamic banks in Jordan. The importance of this 
regulation and supervision stems from the fact that it will enhance and strengthen the 
soundness of the financial system on the one hand, and establish a solid relationship 
between the central banks and Islamic banks in mixed financial systems on the other. 
1.5 Outlines of the thesis 
Chapter 1: This chapter outlines the scope and justification of the research. It gives a 
brief introduction, statements of the problem, hypotheses, and objectives of 
the research. 
Chapter 2: This chapter presents the theoretical background for Islamic banking. It 
covers the objectives, structure, institutions, and instrments. However, the 
main characteristic of this system is that their business activities are 
performed according to profit and loss sharing instruments. The depositor 
funds are at risks. The regulations are concerned with controlling of these 
risks through adequate regulatory measures. 
Chapter 3 This chapter reviews the literature of banking regulation and supervision 
from a Western point of view, in terms of objectives, rationale, and 
instruments. As Islamic banks are intermediary institutions, which may be 
exposed to banking risk, their depositor funds need to be protected through 
appropriate regulation and supervision nouns. Comparison of 
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characteristics and nature of Islamic banks' operations and risk, initiate the 
need for different standards for regulation and supervision. The 
responsibilities of regulators in case of Islamic banks are more sophisticated 
than those of conventional banks. 
Chapter 4 This chapter presents a historical background of the Jordanian economy and 
the banking system in Jordan, in terms of characteristics, structure, and 
developments. It also covers the main elements of regulation and 
supervision standards of both conventional and Islamic banks in Jordan. 
Chapter 5 This chapter describes the research methodologies that are used to attain the 
objectives of the research. Two methodologies are used. The first one is 
based on longitudinal data; the specification of data and sources is covered. 
The aim of this methodology is to analyze the effectiveness of capital 
regulation on Islamic banks' riskiness. This methodology is covered in 
chapter six. The second methodology is based on a survey of regulators 
through data collected by the questionnaires. These questionnaires cover 
four groups of institutions concerned with regulation and supervision in 
Jordan including the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ), Islamic banks, 
conventional banks and external auditor of Islamic banks. The objective of 
this methodology is to analyze the main elements of regulation and 
supervision of Islamic banks. 
Chapter 6 This chapter analyses the effectiveness of capital regulation of Islamic banks 
in Jordan by estimating the fixed and random effect using econometric 
analysis, the variables, assumptions and the empirical analysis and finding 
will be repotted. 
Chapter 7 This chapter also examines the need for different regulation and supervision 
standards for the Islamic banks in Jordan. This analysis is based on the 
analysis of the questionnaires. The main issues covered include the 
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objectives of regulation and supervision, objectives of deposit protection for 
Islamic banks, licensing measures, credit risk, liquidity risk, capital 
adequacy, and information disclosure. The analysis methods include 
descriptive analysis as well as ANOVA analysis to investigate differences 
among the four concerned groups of respondents. 
Chapter 8 This chapter provides a summary and conclusion, which summarizes and 
gives the key conclusions of the two empirical parts of the research and the 
implications of the research. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Before addressing the regulation and supervision of Islamic banks, it is worth 
shedding some light on the main characteristics of the Islamic Financial System (IFS). 
This system has a significant affect on the structure and activities of these banks. The 
IFS has its origin in the Islamic law, which is called shari'ah. The main sources of 
shari'ah are Quran and Sunah (the action and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad). 
Economic transactions in this system are based on Profit-and-Loss Sharing (PLS) 
activities, and financial capital is entitled to claim a return only through a 
commercially productive activity, which involves the possibility of loss (Khan, 1995). 
Islamic banks play a vital role in this system. This is crystallized through its 
intermediacy and non-intermediary financial service. Also, they participate in the 
allocation of financial resources in the economy through the directing of these 
resources to the productive activities (Al Omar, 1994). However, banks work as an 
agent for savers or depositors; therefore, depositors are exposed to the risks of the 
projects, which are financed partially or fully from their funds. Although the result of 
the PLS arrangements affect both sides of banks' balance sheets, the soundness and 
systematic stability is still one of the main concerns of the central banks and 
regulatory authorities. This issue is discussed in chapter three. This chapter is 
organized as follows. Section two highlights the main features of the IFS. Section 
three describes the objectives of the IFS. Section four reviews the structure of the IFS. 
The last section analyzes the sources and uses of funds for Islamic banks. 
2.2 Features of Islamic Financial System 
The IFS is an integral part of the Islamic economy, which seeks to achieve the 
worship of God through social and economic justice, and equitable distribution of 
income as well as preserving individual freedom in the context of social welfare 
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(Chapra, 1985). The main features of the IFS can be summarized in the following 
five features: prohibition of interest, risk sharing, permissible and prohibitive 
activities, sanctity of contracts, and obliging of Zakah. 
2.2.1 Prohibition of Interest Rate 
Prohibition of Riba or Ususy is one of the most significant features of the IFS. 
Riba is defined as any positive, fixed, predetermined rate tied to maturity and amount 
of principal, it covers not only usury but also the charging of interest as widely 
practiced (Iqbal, 1997). Therefore, the interest rate is called Riba according to the 
principles of shari'ah, and its use has been prohibited. This prohibition is contained in 
the Qur'an: 
" Those who devour on Riba will not stand except as he stands who has driven to madness by 
the touch of Satan. This is because they say: trade is only like Riba. But God has permitted 
trade and forbidden Riba" (Baqara, 275). 
The prohibition of interest is based on the argument that the interest rate is 
unjustifiable because it rewards creditors regardless of the performance of the project 
that has been financed. Mills and Presley (1999) argue that production interest- 
bearing loans are deemed to involve an unjust allocation of risk between borrower and 
lender, because no real investment project under competitive conditions can be 
guaranteed to make gross profit. 
Money in the IFS perspective is used to facilitate the exchange of goods and 
services, but it does not have a time value; it has a value when it is invested in 
productive investment to generate additional wealth and capital. Siddiqi (1983) claims 
that there is no justification for obliging the entrepreneur to pay interest if there is no 
positive return on the money invested. Khan (1995) argues that Islam has nothing 
against realizing (pure) time value of money, as long as this value is not realized on 
the basis of any predetermined rate. In Islam money is not a commodity or capital, not 
even representative capital. Therefore, it requires the service of entrepreneurs to 
transform it into actual productive use (Iqbal, and Mirakhor, 1978, and Ariff, 1982). 
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2.2.2 Risk Sharing 
Risk and uncertainty of return are the basis to legitimate transactions and 
receiving profits on financial capital in the IFS. Business transactions are conducted 
according to Profit-and-Loss Sharing (PLS) arrangements. In these arrangements, 
both parties, the owner of the capital and the entrepreneur, share in the profit and loss 
of the project according to a predetermined rate. However, profit and loss cannot be 
seen before the project is terminated. Therefore, the PLS is like venture capital in the 
conventional financial system, in the sense that capital is at risk until the project is 
terminated. 
2.2.3 Permissible and Prohibitive Activities 
The IFS allows investment in all activities that don't violate shari'ah doctrines 
(Al Omar, 1994). The permissible activities include commodities, trade, stocks, and 
developmental projects. In contrast, the IFS prohibits any business that misuses the 
resources of the society and gains of wealth without suitable effort; misuse would 
include gambling and speculation, hoarding of wealth, transactions in alcohol, pork, 
arms, illicit drugs and pornographic material. Also shari'ah prohibits transactions in 
financial instruments that have an inherent interest content, such as transactions 
related to conventional banking and insurance companies. Moreover, investment in 
future contracts is considered a sort of Gharar, which is null and void (Lewis and 
Algaoud, 2001). The prohibition of the future contact is mainly due to the uncertainty 
and changing of interest of both parties in the contract when it falls due. 
2.2.4 Sanctity of Contract 
Islam gives high importance to the contract, it urges all contractors to write 
down contracts that cover all their economic relations. The contract determines the 
rights and obligations of each party in the contacts. The main purpose of these 
contracts is to maintain the rights and obligations of the contractors and eliminate any 
misconduct that may arise in the future between them. Khan and Mirakhor (1992) 
argue that the concept of the contract in Islam is not only important as the legal aspect 
of exchange, an institution necessary for the satisfaction of the legitimate human 
needs, but it is a concept upon which the whole of shari'ah is based. Some scholars 
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argue that Islam encourages contractual obligations and disclosure of information. 
This feature is intended to reduce the risk of asymmetry of information such as a 
moral hazard (Iqbal, 1997 ). 
2.2.5 Zakah 
The Muslim is obliged in his worship to God to pay a certain amount of his 
wealth yearly to the needy people in the society. This is called in Islam Zakah. In this 
respect, Islam is not only a divine service like Judasim and Christianity, but also 
incorporates a code of conduct, which regulates and organizes mankind in both 
spiritual and material life (Lewis and Algaoud, 2001). Zakah works as a mechanism to 
redistribute income and wealth among the people in the society. However, wealth in 
Islam is subject to zakah if it exceeds a certain limit. Typicaly, Zakah is a tax of 2.5% 
on net wealth, 5% on agricultural products in case of irrigation and 10% in the case of 
natural irrigation. It covers almost every kind of wealth; cash and bullion, stocks and 
inventories, agricultural produce, cattle, and mineral wealth etc. 
2.3. Objectives of Islamic Financial System 
Objectives of IFS, in general, are not different from those of the conventional 
system; they include (1) economic well-being with full employment and optimum rate 
of economic growth; (2) social and equitable distribution of income and wealth; and 
(3) stability of value of money (Iqbal and Khan, 1981). Chapra (1995) argues that 
even though there may be an apparent similarity, there is in fact a significant 
difference in emphasis arising from the divergence in the commitments of the two 
systems to spiritual values. The following section highlights the main economic 
objectives of the IFS: 
2.3.1 Economic Growth and Development 
All economic systems seek to attain a high economic growth rate and 
development through using the available factors of production, such as capital, labor, 
management and natural resources. The IFS is expected to attain economic growth 
based on the following premises: first, Islam encourages work and earning money 
through this source. Second, capital can earn profit only when it is used in productive 
14 
CHAPTER 2 ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
activities, otherwise there should be no return on it. Third, money hoarding is 
prohibited, and such money will be subject to Zakah; therefore, the only way to 
preserve the real value of money is for it to be invested in productive activities, 
otherwise it will be eroded by inflation and Zakah. PLS transfers savers from holders 
of money to equity holders in investment projects. Hence, they may attain a higher 
return in the case of profit than of a fixed rate of return in the conventional system. 
Moreover, Islam encourages money holders to finance qualified entrepreneurs, those 
who have experience, but they do not have financial capital; this is expected to have a 
significant effect on enhancing the production and economic growth. 
Achieving economic growth and development should be within morally 
accepted conditions. Chapra (1985) summarized these conditions: (1) it should not be 
attained through the production of morally questionable goods and services, (2) it 
should not widen the social gulf between the rich and the poor by promoting 
conspicuous consumption, and (3) it should not harm present or future generations in 
their moral or physical environment. Mills and Presley (1999) declare that full 
employment is to be achieved in an Islamic economy not only because it allows every 
individual to satisfy basic needs, but because it imparts to them dignity within society, 
they also declare that economic growth is acceptable if it is brought about via a 
broadly based development of economic well-being. 
2.3.2 Monetary Stability 
Monetary stability is a prerequisite for economic growth and development in 
any economy. It means control of inflation in order to preserve the value of currency. 
The main purpose of preserving the value of money is to maintain the value of income 
and wealth. Since Islam prohibits erosion of income and wealth in general, this is not 
allowed even through inflation. Fluctuations of the value of money would negatively 
affect consumer confidence, which is the main engine for saving and investment and 
consequently economic growth and development. Siddiqi (1983) stresses the need for 
maintaining the stability of money. Chapra (1985) considers it obligatory for the 
Islamic state to resort to a healthy monetary policy, fiscal and income policies and 
appropriate direct control when necessary, including wage-price controls, to minimize 
the erosion in the real value of money. 
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2.3.3 Mobilization of Savings 
Economists agree on the impotence of saving as an essential ingredient for 
economic growth, since the higher rate of saving the higher the rate of economic 
growth. In the IFS financial institutions should play an important role in mobilization 
of savings for productive investment projects. In this regard, the IFS may actively 
participate in mobilization of savings for the following reasons; first, internal 
resources of Islamic financial institutions should be higher than the counterparts of 
conventional banks, because their structure necessitates adequate capital for these 
banks, as they are supposed to finance long-term projects (Chapra, 1985). Second, 
deposits with Islamic banks are investment dominated, which should give these banks 
more stability in terms of financial resources. Third, the PLS mechanism is expected 
to encourage savings as these savings participate in the profit of the financed projects, 
if these projects attain a high return they generate returns relatively higher than the 
counterpart in conventional banks. Fourth, the financial institutions could attract 
depositors not because they offer higher returns but because of religious commitment 
of the clients (Iqbal, et, al., 1998). 
Even though, these factors are expected to activate saving in the IFS, there is 
no consensus among economists about the performance of saving under the Islamic 
system, as the IFS may lead to increased uncertainty. Khan and Mirakhor (1987) 
show that the few studies which considered the question have tended to compare the 
effect on saving of a fixed and a certain rate of return with those of an uncertain rate 
of return, implicitly assuming the same mean rate of return with greater variability, 
the result obviously shows a reduction in saving. They added that the result of the 
analysis depended on the assumption regarding the form of the utility function and its 
risk proprieties. Other studies have shown that under reasonable assumptions, in the 
face of uncertainty households will increase their saving as a precautionary measure. 
In the absence of clear-cut theoretical analysis, there is no strong theoretical reason to 
believe that on balance saving will decline as a result of the introduction of the IFS. 
In summary, there is a consensus among the economists on the general 
objectives of the IFS, but there are differences in the individual macroeconomic 
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objectives and the means for achieving these objectives (Mill and Presley, 1999). 
Lewis and Algaoud (2001) also claim that there are differences in the proper structure 
for achieving the overall objectives of the IFS. This will be the subject of the next 
section. 
2.4 Structure of the Financial System 
The structure of the IFS is not different from the conventional system, it 
consists of a central bank, commercial banks and financial markets and other financial 
institutions (A] Omer, 1994). Although, there is a consensus on the general structure 
of this system, some argue there should be a division of responsibilities among these 
institutions. Chapra (1985) argues that the objectives of the Central Bank in the 
Islamic Financial System (CBIFS) should be to ensure monetary stability in the 
Islamic economy, to achieve a healthy and sustained steady rate of growth of the 
Islamic economy and to insure socio-economic justice, while the responsibility of the 
banks as they acquire public funds should be directed to serve common interest in the 
society. In contrast, Ismail (1986) calls for more thorough division of responsibilities; 
he suggests three sectors: the government sector, which encompasses pubic finance 
and the central banking, the welfare sector, with responsibilities for administration of 
taxes, and the commercial bank sector. He argues that Islamic banks are commercial 
institutions; therefore, their responsibility should be essentially directed to 
shareholders and depositors, while society should be served by other institutions in the 
system. 
2.4.1. Central Banks: Objectives, Functions and Instruments 
The CBIFS stands at the top of the financial structure as in the conventional 
system, with provision of a framework for financial activities according to the 
principals of shari'ah. The objectives of the CBIFS are the same as the IFS. Chapra, 
(1985) argues that the CBIFS should bear the responsibility of foreclosing the 
possibility of concentration of wealth and power in the hands of vested interest 
through the financial institutions. In contrast, Ariff (1982) argues that the objectives 
of the central bank should be confined to monetary issues, while other objectives such 
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as social justice should be dealt with through other policy instruments (Ziauddin et, 
al., 1983 Siddiqi, 1983, and Choudhry and Mirakhor , 1997). 
To achieve these objectives the CBIFI will conduct the functions that are 
consistent with the ordinance of Islamic law. Siddigi (1983) argues that the functions 
of the CBIFS are similar to those of the counterpart of interest -based system. The 
main functions of the CBIFS encompass issuance of currency, bank of government, 
bank of banks, settlement of the payment system, control of credits and money in the 
economy and regulate and supervise of financial institutions (Al Omer, 1994). 
Management of monetary policy is the most significant function of the CBIFI. 
The aim of this policy is not only to maintain a stable value of the currency but also to 
promote full employment and growth (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 1987). Khan and 
Mirakhor (1994) argue that the chief role of the monetary policy in an Islamic system 
is to take the lead in evolving financial institutions and instruments that facilitate 
efficient mobilization of savings and allocation of resources consistent with the 
economic development objectives of the Islamic economy. 
In addition to monetary policy, regulatory and supervisory functions also 
should acquire a significant importance in this system. The main aim of the regulation 
and supervision function is to maintain the efficiency of the financial system and 
strengthen the soundness of the financial institutions. Khan and Mirakhor (1987) 
argue that the CBIFI is expected to use the usual regulatory, supervisory and control 
functions of the conventional system. 
To achieve the monetary and credit policy in the economy, the CBIFS can use 
all monetary instruments of the conventional system except those that incorporate any 
predetermined interest rate such as discount rate and open market-type operations 
with fixed interest- bearing securities. These instruments include the traditional 
instruments such as changes in reserve requirements, overall and selective controls on 
credit, change in the money base through management of currency issue and moral 
suasion (Choudhary and Mirakhor, 1994). Also the CBIFS could use open market 
operations with non-interest securities issued by itself and by the government. These 
instruments allow the central banks and governments to invest in the real sector on a 
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profit- sharing basis as well as taking an equity position in joint ventures along with 
other banks ( Khan and Mirakhor, 1994). The central bank can use these instruments 
to effect the allocation of financial resources in the economy. 
Monetary policy is expected to face many challenges related to the thorough 
objectives of the IFS such as achieving economic growth, equitable distribution of 
income and wealth, and unemployment, as well as facilitating financing activities for 
the financial institutions. 
2.4.2 Commercial Banks 
Commercial banks (Islamic banks) in the IFS play an essential role in 
economic development. This role is crystallized though mobilization of financial 
resources from the surplus units in the form of demand and investment deposits and 
directing these resources to deficit investment units. In addition to financing of the 
PLS, Islamic banks provide usual banking services of commercial banks like checking 
accounts, selling foreign exchange, issuing letter of credits, funding management, 
corresponding services etc (Iqbal and Khan, 1981, Al Omer and Abdel-Haq, 1996). 
Islamic banks are supposed to provide financing to productive projects according to 
the viability and the potential profits of these projects, not on the creditworthiness of 
the debtors or collateral as in the conventional banks. This puts more pressure on 
Islamic banks' managements to assess the financed projects and follow up their 
performance, particularly with the existence of symmetric information and moral 
hazard problems. 
2.4.3 Sources and Uses of Funds for Islamic Banks 
2.4.3.1 Sources of Funds 
The sources of funds for Islamic banks as in other conventional banks consist 
of internal and external sources. The internal sources are shareholders funds, 
accumulated reserves, and retained earnings. The larger the size of internal sources 
the more healthy the bank will be, this also safeguards the depositor's interests 
(Chapra, 1985). External sources of funds encompass demand deposits, saving 
deposits and investment deposits. 
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2.4.3.1.1 Demand Deposits (Current Accounts) 
Islamic banks mobilize funds through current accounts. These accounts are 
treated as cost-free interest loans from clients to banks. The banks guarantee these 
funds and are forced to fully repay them on demand like those in the conventional 
banks. Current accounts are a service offered mainly to Islamic bank depositors to 
process bank transfers and to pay cheques drawn on them through the normal national 
and international clearing systems (Presley, 1988). These deposits sometimes are 
subject to service charges. The rational behind the current accounts receiving no share 
in the profit stands on two points of view. First, as the current account is guaranteed 
funds they will not be used for PLS ventures (Lewis and Algaoud, 2001). Also, 
according to the Shari'ah a share in profit is not admissible without a share in risk. 
Second, these funds are considered as loans from depositors to the bank, and the 
banks are only obliged to return the amount loaned, as any amount over the value of 
the loans is considered Riba. Deposits are entitled to return only through sharing in 
risk. This can be attained through Mudarabah contracts, which take the form of time, 
saving, and investment deposits. 
2.4.3.1.2 Saving Deposits (Saving Accounts) 
Saving accounts are another source of funds for Islamic banks, they are similar 
to saving deposits in conventional banks, except that they do not earn any fixed return 
(Lewis and Algaoud, 2001). These accounts provide the investors with income and 
protection against unexpected future needs. Therefore, saving accounts fulfill the 
functions of current accounts as well as partially investment accounts. The bank can 
invest these deposits, but it should guarantee only their face value. Profit realized 
from saving accounts is normally less than profit of fixed investment deposit 
accounts, the reason is being that saving deposits can be withdrawn on demand 
(Presley, 1988). Some Islamic banks classify these accounts in the category of 
investment accounts (Al Omer and Abdel- Haq, 1996). In this case, the holders of 
these accounts should receive a return, which varies with the profit of the bank 
provided that they agree also to share in any losses of the bank (Lewis and Algaoud, 
2001). 
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2.4.3.1.3 Investment Deposit Accounts 
The primary purpose of investment deposit accounts is to earn income; the 
bank invests the raised funds on a basis of the PLS mechanism. Profit from the 
investment is distributed between the bank and the holders of investment deposit 
accounts according to a predetermined rate. In the case of loss the holders of the 
investment accounts may lose some or all of their funds. Therefore, the investors in 
investment accounts share in the profit and loss of the bank. These deposits are like 
shares in conventional banks or investment companies or mutual funds in the sense 
that they are exposed to potential loss of their investments. However, the shareholders 
are members of the General Assembly and they have the right to monitor the 
performance of the institution, while, the holders of investment deposits are not given 
this right. 
Investment deposit accounts takes two forms: restricted and unrestricted; the 
former oblige the bank to invest these deposits in specific sectors or projects, where 
the maturity and distribution of profits are negotiated separately for each special 
investment account (Lewis and Algaoud, 2001). Profit of these deposits is distributed 
among investors according to their shares, while the bank acts as an agent to the 
depositors and therefore it can be remunerated. In contrast, unrestricted investment 
deposits allow the banks to invest these deposits at their discretion through pooling 
these deposits with other accounts. Profit from these accounts is distributed between 
the bank and the depositors according to a predetermined ratio. Depositors are 
allowed to withdraw from their accounts if they give advance notice. 
Investment deposits constitute the principal source of funds for Islamic banks, 
they also closely resemble shares in a bank, rather than time and saving deposits, 
therefore they are subject to the bank's risks like shareholders' equity. 
2.4.3.2 Uses of Funds 
The use of funds in Islamic banks can be classified into two major groups: the 
liquidity and precautionary group, such as cash and reserves, which represents the 
first defensive line for the withdrawal of deposits. The second, investment group 
which includes the PLS and Non-PLS: 
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2.4.3.2.1 Cash 
Islamic banks like conventional banks are obliged to preserve part of their 
deposits in cash. The purpose of this cash is to cover any withdrawal of deposits, 
particularly demand deposits, and to a lesser degree saving and time deposits. This 
cash includes cash-in-vaults, cash items in process of collection, demand deposits 
with other banks and excess balance with the central bank. 
2.4.3.2.2 Required Reserves 
Islamic banks are also obliged to deposit a certain percentage of their deposits 
with the central banks. This rate is usually set according to the objectives of the 
monetary and credit policy of the central bank. Chapra (1985) suggests applying a 
percentage of required reserves only on demand deposits, while investment deposits 
should be excluded from this reserve, because it is like the bank's equity. Al Jarihi 
(1983) suggests 100 percent of reserve for demand deposits. 
2.4.3.2.3. Islamic Financing Modes 
The main pillar of conventional bank financing is the interest rate. This rate 
should be paid by the borrower regardless of the performance of the project that is 
being financed. With interest based lending, the main risk to the bank is the 
customer's default. The emphasis is often on the security or collateral offered with the 
bank receiving interest payments even when the business is making a loss (Table 2.1). 
Even in the event of bankruptcy, the bank has first call on the assets being liquidated 
(Wilson, 1997). 
In contrast, Islamic financing modes are based on the PLS mechanisms. These 
include muskarkah, mudarabah, muzar'ah, musaqat, and direct investment. The 
profitability of the projects is the main determinant of financing, not the 
creditworthiness of the customers or the collateral. This kind of financing provides a 
code of economic ethic combining the material and spiritual values for the conduct of 
its system (Mannan, 1986). 
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2.4.3.2.3.1 The PLS Financing Modes 
This part describes the major PLS modes, namely musharakah and mudarbah 
contracts, as the other modes are particular cases of the two contracts. 
2.4.3.2.3.1.1 Musharkah 
The Musharakah mode is based on both parties, the bank and the entrepreneur 
(the owner manager) agreeing to establish a new partnership, that may take the form 
of a company; the capital of this partnership will be provided by the two parties. The 
owner manager will be entitled to get a salary for his works, while the remaining 
profit will be distributed as agreed upon at the time of affecting the contact between 
the parties, which may not coincide with the ratio of financing input (Usmani, 2002). 
While, in the case of loss, there are unanimous views among Islamic scholars on the 
share of loss for each partner, which should be based on the share of each partner in 
the investment (Lewis and Algaoud, 2001). Presley (1988) argues that the musharakah 
contract is well suited for financing private or public companies and participating in 
project financing for short-, medium and long-term periods. Errico and Farahbaksh 
(1998) state that this kind of contract is usually employed in long-term investment 
projects. 
Musharakah contracts give the bank the right to participate in the management 
of the project and to monitor its performance. This form of financing enables the 
banks to get more information and enrich the experience of the management of the 
projects with financial experiences. It is like venture capital in the conventional 
system which involves a higher degree of risk, and the partners may lose in addition 
to their profit all or part of their capital. However, partners' losses are limited to their 
investment in the case of insolvency and the manager's personal assets and the bank's 
other assets will not be called upon (Wilson, 1999). On the other hand, there is no 
market for such shares; therefore, the partners may agree to terminate. If one of the 
parties wants to termination of musharakah, while the other partner or parties wish to 
continue in the business, this can be achieved by mutual agreement of the two parties, 
where the partner wants to continue to buy the share of the terminated partner. 
Musharakah may take several forms of arrangements; financing of a single 
transaction, diminishing musharakah, working capital, and fixed capital. 
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2.4.3.2.3.1.2 Mudarabah 
Mudarabah is a special kind of partnership (Usmani, 2002). It based on the 
bank (rabb- ul- mal) providing all the capital for the partnership, while the other party 
(mudarib) participates in the management, work, and expertise. The profit is 
distributed between the bank and mudrib according to a predetermined fixed ratio, 
while financial loss is incurred by the bank only, and mudarib loses his efforts only in 
the case of nonnal business conditions. But in the case of negligence and misconduct 
from mudarib, he/she will be responsible for the loss. 
For a mudarabah contract to be consistent with shari'ah principals, three 
conditions need to be met (Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998): 
1- The bank shouldn't reduce risk by requesting a collateral; it 
exclusively bears the financial risks. Collateral may be requested to 
reduce moral hazard, e. g., to prevent the entrepreneur running away. 
2- The rate of profit has to be determined strictly as a percentage and 
not as a lump sum. 
3- The entrepreneur has the absolute freedom to manage the business. 
Mudarba contracts take two forms, restricted mudarabah where the contact is 
in a particular business, and unrestricted mudarabah, where the mudarb is authorized 
to invest in any business he deems fit (Usmani, 2002). 
2.4.3.2.3.2 Non- PLS Contracts 
Mudarabah and musharakah are the basic Islamic modes of financing. They 
have been used for financing medium and long-term projects. Financing of short-term, 
small scale, and trade transactions flourishes the need for other financing techniques 
that are based on mark-up. The major kinds of these contracts are murabahah, 
leasing, salam, and istisna. 
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2.4.3.2.3.2.1 Murabahah 
Murabahah is the most commonly used financing mode in Islamic banking. It 
was originally a sale contract. In this contract the client asks the bank to buy a specific 
product for him, the bank buys and possesses the product and re-sell it to the client in 
a separate contact. The cost of the product will be disclosed and the bank adds-up in a 
form of a predetermined mark up. The mark up represents the bank profit, and a 
reward for the risk inherent in the financing; in a case where the customers refuse to 
buy the product, the bank bears the loss. However, the sale should be on the spot, 
while the repayment may be discharged by installment or on a lump sum basis 
(Presley, 1988). 
While this contract is employed predominantly in the context of trade 
financing. This technique has been adapted as a vehicle for syndication on a classical 
lead manager and comanager format, which enables other banks to participate in the 
financing (Lewis and Algaoud, 2001). 
2.4.3.2.3.2.2 Leasing Financing 
Murabahah is usually used for short-term trade financing. If the clients need a 
long-term financing then leasing is a suitable contract. There are two main forms of 
leasing: direct leasing finance, and lease and purchase (Presley, 1988). Direct leasing 
finance allows the client to use the equipment without the need to own it, which 
facilitates getting new equipment after the end of the hiring period. While a lease and 
purchase contract requires the bank to purchase the equipment on behalf of the clients 
and retain the ownership until the end of the hire purchase period. This kind of lease is 
called Ijara-wa-igtina. The rental of the leasing is pre-determined for the whole period 
of the contract. In the case of Ijara-wa-iqtina the rentals should be sufficient to 
amortize the leasing bank's investment and provide an element of profit (Lewis and 
Algaoud, 2001). 
Leasing financing has widely been used in Western institutions, but there are 
significant differences between Islamic leasing contracts based on ijara and 
conventional leasing. Under the Shari'ah law it is necessary for management, 
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maintenance and insurance of the leased assets to be the responsibility of the leasor, 
while under conventional leasing contracts these matters are usually the responsibility 
of the lessee (Wilson, 1997). 
2.4.3.2.3.2.3 Salam 
Salam is a sale contract where the seller is intended to deliver the product at a 
specific time in the future; meanwhile the price of the product must be paid in 
advance. The quantity and the quality of the product must fully be specified to 
eliminate ambiguity, which may lead to dispute (Usmani, 2002). Salam contracts are 
usually suitable for farmer, trader, handcrafts etc. The main condition of this kind of 
contract is it can not be canceled. 
2.4.3.2.3.2.4 Istisna 
Istisna is a special case of salam, this contract is convenient for manufacturing, 
where the manufacturer is asked to manufacture a specific product for the purchaser 
and deliver it a later date. The price is fixed with the consent of both parties, but the 
price may not be paid in advance like salarn. Before the manufacture starts the work, 
any one of the parties can cancel the contract. This contract is suitable for the 
financing of aircraft manufacturing, equipment for factories, constructions etc (Lewis 
and Algaoud, 2001). 
The above discussion declares the main characteristics of Islamic financing 
modes. Significant differences exist between these modes and the counterparts of 
conventional banks in terms of sources and uses of funds, risks and uncertainty of 
profits of the deposits (Table 2.1). It is clear that the structure of Islamic banks is 
similar to those of investment companies or mutual funds with respect to profit and 
loss. However, the structure of assets and liabilities of these banks give them the 
ability to absorb the risks. For example if the bank is exposed to a default risk in any 
financed project, investment deposits will decline by the same amount. However, this 
will not protect the bank from losing the trust of the customer nor the intervention of 
the supervisory authority. 
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Table 2.1 Comparison of Banking Framework 
ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
Characteristics Paradigm Version of Conventional Banking 
Islamic Banking 
Nominal value guarantee of: 
Demand Deposits Yes Yes 
Investment Deposits No Yes 
Equity-based system where 
Capital is at risk Yes No 
Rate of return on deposits Uncertain, not guaranteed Certain and guaranteed 
Mechanism to regulate final return Depending on banks' Irrespective of banks' 
on deposits performance/profits from performance/ profits from 
investment investment 
PLS principle is applied Yes No 
Use of Islamic modes of financing: 
PLS and non-PLS modes Yes N/A 
Use of discretion by banks with Possible for reducing moral 
regard to collaterals hazard in PLS modes 
Yes in non-PLS modes Yes always 
Banks' pooling of deposits' funds to 
provide depositors with professional 
investment management. Yes No 
Source: Errico, and Farahbaksh, 1998 
Summary 
This chapter has provided a background to the Islamic financial system. The 
main features, objectives, and structure have been highlighted. It is declared that 
prohibition of interest is the cornerstone of this system. Meanwhile business 
transactions are performed according to Profit- loss - sharing arrangements, where the 
owner of capital and the entrepreneur (the bank) share in the risk of the transactions. 
This entails that depositor fiends and profits being at risk until the termination of the 
projects and due date of deposits. Although, the depositors will bear the result of 
banks' performance as the banks work as an agent only, still the depositor protection 
and the bank's soundness is the responsibility of the supervisory authority, which is 
the subject of chapter three. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Before addressing banking regulation and supervision, it is worth defining 
the meaning of regulation, monitoring and supervision. Regulation is a process of 
establishing a set of rules of behavior for financial institutions. Monitoring is 
concerned with observing whether the rules governing banks are obeyed. 
Supervision is a process of oversight of financial firms' behavior (Goodhart, et 
al., 1998). 
Regulation and supervision have evolved over the past years in response to 
the developments and changes in wholesale banking, universal banking, 
securitization, and the innovations in financial engineering. Moreover, financial 
crises' have recalled the need for prudential regulation and supervision to protect 
the depositors' interests and safeguard the financial system2. As banking safety 
and soundness are essential elements for macroeconomic policy and growth, 
regulatory authorities have taken a lot of defensive and protective measures to 
strengthen the soundness of the banking structure on the one hand, and to 
minimize the possibilities of bank failures on the other. The main concern is to 
control systematic risk in the financial system. In order to control of this risk, the 
regulatory authority in favor of based financial regulation (Dhumale, 2000). 
Although countries vary considerably in their institutional structure of regulatory 
and supervisory agencies, the key issue is whether the regulatory structure has an 
impact on the overall effectiveness and efficiency of regulation and supervision 
(Llewellyn, 2002). 
This chapter consists of two parts; the first part reviews the regulation and 
supervision of Western (conventional) banks in terms of objectives, rationale, and 
instruments. Part two describes the framework for regulation and supervision of 
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Islamic banks, and the experience of both pure and mixed Islamic financial 
systems in this regard, the experience of Iran, Pakistan and Sudan represent the 
former group, while the experience of Egypt represents the second group. 
3.2 Prudential Regulation and Supervision (The Western 
View) 
Background 
Banks play a crucial role in an economy. This role is crystallized through 
their intermediary services, financial payment services, diversification of assets 
and liabilities, asset transformation, and efficient allocation of financial 
resources. Financial intermediation is the main function of banks, since they 
accept deposits from ultimate depositors and provide them to the ultimate 
borrowers (Iqbal and Llewellyn, 2002). In addition to intermediary services, 
banks are provide a set of other financial services such as facilitators of customer 
payment services, insurance, mutual funds, and portfolio management etc 
(Heffernan, 2003). Also they provide a variety of assets and liabilities with 
different characteristics (Iqbal and Llewellyn, 2002). In addition to the 
involvement in asset transformation through having assets and liabilities of 
different maturities that satisfy customer preference toward risks. Iqbal et. al., 
(1998) state that risk preference of small suppliers and large users of funds are 
different. It is often considered that small savers are risk avers and prefer safe 
placements where the fund users deploy the funds in risky projects. Moreover, 
banks perform a significant role of allocating financial capital to its most 
productive uses ( Pilbeam, 1998, and Igbal and Llewellyn, 2002). This allocation 
has a significant affect on the real economy. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) state 
that although a lot of literature demonstrate a significant correlation between 
financial development and growth, there is no empirical literature which 
establishes a causal link. 
Finance theories analyze the existence of banks as intermediary financial 
institutions. Heffernan (2003) summaries the existence of the intermediary role 
of banks according to two factors: First, the presence of information costs 
undermines the ability of potential lenders to find the most appropriate borrowers 
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in the absence of intermediation. Second, borrowers and lenders have different 
liquidity preferences, the existence of banks facilitate the way for the borrowers 
to have long- term loans, and allow the lenders to have access to liquidity, at the 
same time as attaining a reasonable return. Banks can do this through the pooling 
of a large number of deposits. 
Information cost 
In performing an intermediary role, banks usually incur four kinds of 
information costs: First, search costs, which are related to bringing together both 
borrower and lender. Second, verification costs, which are related to investigation 
of creditworthiness of the borrower before money is transferred to him. Third, 
monitoring cost, the bank starts monitoring the activities of the borrower when he 
receives the money. Last, enforcement cost, which the banks will incur to enforce 
the borrower to comply with the contract. However, banks benefit from 
economies of scale3 and scope`. Also, the banks can enforce some restrictions on 
the lender as insurance for unseen developments after the loan contract is agreed 
(Heffernan, 2003). 
Liquidity preference 
The second role of banks is provision of liquidity according to the 
preferences of depositors. As banks work to maximize their profit, they are 
involved in transforming illiquid assets into liquid liability. In performing this 
function, they base their expectations on the preference of depositors for 
withdrawing their deposits. In the case of independent shocks banks can fulfill 
their obligations toward deposits. But, in the case of dependent shocks they may 
face possibilities of bank pins. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that the banks 
can provide investors who are not sure about their preferences for liquidity with 
better pay off relative to payoff without bank intermediation (Dewatripont and 
Tirole, 1994). 
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3.2.1 Objectives of Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Objectives of banking regulation and supervision are similar in most 
countries. Llewellyna (1995) summarizes the ultimate objectives of regulation of 
the following five categories: to achieve a high level of efficiency in the financial 
system, to promote the safety and soundness of financial institutions, to insure 
systemic stability, to maintain the integrity of the payment system, and to protect 
the consumers. However, the main concern of regulatory authorities should be 
directed to protect the depositors' interests, to maintain financial stability, to 
preserve an efficient and competitive financial system and to protect consumers. 
The role of regulators is to take the necessary measures to regulate, monitor and 
supervise a bank's risks, through imposing certain measures such as minimum 
standards on capital requirements, asset quality, management and liquidity. 
3.2.1.1 Depositor Protection 
Banks' operations are usually based on a high level of leverage 5 as they 
manage a large volume of deposits relative to their capital. This structure of 
resources is expected to expose depositors' interest to a higher degree of risk. 
Since, any losses on the assets side severely effect banks' solvencies, particularly 
banks' management and shareholders have tendency toward excess risk taken to 
attain a high profit. Cole et al., (1995) document a relatively extreme case, the 
problem of " gambling on resurrection": banks choose a risky asset portfolio that 
pays out high profits or bonus if the gamble succeeds but leaves depositors, or 
insurers, with losses if the gamble fails. In contrast, Dewatripont and Tirole 
(1994) ague that a high level of leverage does not provide a ground for 
regulation, it is related to the risk of the balance sheet, besides that it is 
endogenous and banks could reduce their leverage in the absence of regulation. 
On the other hand, most depositors not have the information to assess and 
monitor the banks' risks; even if they have it, the monitoring process is not free 
of cost. Therefore, generally it is not possible for this to be done by depositors. 
These facts, especially when combined with the history of depositor losses before 
Federal Deposit Insurance (in the case of the USA), explain much of the public 
pressure for banking regulation in protecting depositors (Spong, 1994). Thus, 
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there should be a government deposit insurance agency to compensate small 
depositors in case of bank runs. Some economists suggest limiting deposit 
insurance (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994), since it may not be adequate in the 
case of large shocks to the banking system. 
However, deposit insurance leads to a moral hazard problem, since the 
deposit insurance agency encourages the owners and the management of banks to 
expose deposits to a high degree of risk in order to attain a high return on the one 
hand, and discourages the incentive of depositors to monitor the bank's 
performance on the other. 
3.2.1.2 Monetary Stability 
In addition to depositor protection, banking regulation must seek to 
provide a stable monetary framework for making payments (Spong, 1994). 
Pilbeam (1998) states that the prime objective of government regulation is to 
promote financial stability, since in the absence of these regulations the financial 
system could be prone to periodic instability. Since financial transactions through 
banks are so massive and interrelated, any shock in this system could negatively 
affect the whole economy. On the other hand, banking operations have an 
inherent high degree of risk, which may negatively affect monetary stability; 
particularly, when banks are heavily involved in asset transformation, dealing 
with a large number of borrowers, besides that they are highly connected through 
inter-bank lending and syndicated loans. Therefore, any problem in one bank may 
have a contagious effect on other banks, which may jeopardize the payment 
system and monetary stability in the economy. In this regard, the role of 
regulation is to provide a cushion against the risks, and safeguard the banking 
system. For this purpose, the regulatory authorities have established preventive 
regulatory measures such as deposit insurance agencies and lenders of last resort. 
Mishkin (2003) argues that a government safety net8 can short-circuit runs on 
banks and bank panics, and by providing protection for the depositor, it can 
overcome reluctance to put funds in the banking system. However, the role of 
these agencies is to enhance the confidence in the banking system through 
protecting depositors' interests. 
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The regulatory authorities are also concerned with controlling and 
directing credit and money in the economy. The central bank controls the 
quantity of credits and money supply, this quantity should be consistent with the 
transaction of production, consumption, and investment in the economy to keep 
inflation under certain limits (Al-Jarhi, 1983). Hence any increases in money 
supply could lead to a higher inflation rate, specially, both central bank and 
commercial banks are the source of the increase in money supply, central banks 
are responsible for currency issuance, which is the basic source of money, 
meanwhile, commercial banks increase money supply through creation of credit. 
To manage liquidity in the economy so that it is consistent with the economic 
growth rate, the central banks use some measures such as reserve requirement 
ratios, credit ceiling, liquidity ratio, open market operations, discount rate, 
collaterals, and cash margins (Ahmad, 1993). 
3.2.1.3 Efficient and Competitive Financial System 
One of the most important functions of regulatory authorities is to 
encourage financial institutions and improve their efficiency, in terms of profits, 
quality of assets, services, and prices as well as enhances healthy competition 
among these institutions (Pilbeam, 1998). This will strengthen the financial 
system and enhance the efficiency of financial institutions. Another purpose of 
banking regulation is to create a regulatory framework that encourages efficiency 
and competition and ensures an adequate level of banking services throughout the 
economy (Spong, 1994). 
3.2.1.4 Consumer Protection 
Regulatory authority must protect consumers' interests by insuring that 
they get the best services from the banking system at convenient prices. Mishkin 
(2003) argues that the existence of symmetric information was behind why 
government had chosen the current forms of banking regulation, this because 
consumers may not have enough information to protect themselves fully. Dale 
(2000) states that this protection is based on the view that depositors and 
investors can not be expected to assess the riskness of financial institutions they 
place their money with, nor to monitor effectively the standards of services 
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provided by such institutions. Dale also declares that the consumer protection 
was behind the adoption some of regulation such as of deposit insurance 
schemes, capital adequacy and conduct of business or market practice rules. This 
can be achieved through enforcing financial institutions to disclose the terms of 
deposits and credits, therefore the customers can select from various institutions, 
and avoid being abused by these institutions, and the users of the service are 
fairly treated. Muljawan (2002) argues that regulators must prevent monopoly 
practices by private sector that allows them to exploit their own interest instead of 
providing appropriate financial services. 
3.2.2. Rationale of Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Having discussed the objectives of regulation and supervision of financial 
institutions, it is essential to highlight the rationale for regulation and supervision 
of banks. The main rationale includes systematic risks, market imperfections, 
restrictions on competition and economies of scale in monitoring: 
3.2.2.1 Externalities 
Externalities or systemic risks are related to the contagious affects of 
failure of one financial institution on other financial institutions. For example, a 
failure of an insolvent bank could lead to withdrawal of deposits from other 
banks. However, the contagious effect is accentuated by the connectedness of 
banks, mismatch between assets and liabilities, and asymmetry of information. 
Thus, externality could lead to a collapse of even healthy institutions. In the 
words of a member of the board of governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(Dale, 2000): 
"It is systematic risk that fails to be control and stopped at the inception 
that is a nightmare condition... The only analogy that I can think of for the 
failure of a major international institution of great size is meltedown of a 
nuclear generating plant like Chernobyl. The ramifications of that kind of 
failure are so broad and happened with such lightening speed that you 
cannot after the fact control them. It runs the risk of bringing down 
investment banks, corporation, disrupting markets, bringing down 
investment banks along with it.... We are talking about the failure that 
could disrupt the whole system. 
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Therefore, regulators usually take preventive regulatory measures in a 
form of lender of last resort facilities, deposit insurance (Dale, 2000). 
3.2.2.2 Market Imperfection and Failure 
Lewellyn (1995b) claims the ultimate case for regulation in finance lies in 
various forms of market information. They arise when there is a problem of 
inadequate information for consumers. The existence of these imperfections in 
the market affects the interest of consumers, which is the objective of regulation. 
These imperfections lead to principal-agent problems, moral hazard and adverse 
selection. 
The principal- agent problem arises in any firm or organization when the 
principal (the owner of funds) signs a contract with an agent (entrepreneur) to 
perform business for him (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). In this contract the 
principal delegates some authority to the agent. Once the principal knows less 
about the project than the capital user (the agent) " asymmetric information" 
problems arise in insuring that the agent will act in the interests of the principal 
(Mills and Presley, 1998). To eliminate these problems, the principal will try to 
force the agent to give his best effort through giving him incentives according to 
his efforts. Partnership between the principal and agent can help solve 
information asymmetry as the entrepreneur and the investor will have the same 
information, so the entrepreneur may not have a chance to pursue his or her 
interests (Abalkhail, 1999). Partnership between the principal and the agent helps 
in eliminating the affect of these problems but does not eradicate them (section, 
3.4). 
Ex ante asymmetric information leads to adverse selection, whereby the 
form of contract offered by the principal attracts agents who will not act in the 
principal's interest, but who cannot be detected beforehand (Mills and Presley, 
1998). Mishkin (2003) claims that because of adverse selection loans might be 
made to bad credit risks, lenders may decide not to make any loans even though 
there are good credit risks in the marketplace. The bank in this case will be 
subject to probability of non-payment of loan and interest. 
36 
CHAPTER 3 BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 
In contrast, ex post asymmetric information leads to moral hazard. This 
arises whenever the incentive of the agent has changed, for example when the 
depositors enter into a contract with a bank, the incentive of the two parties 
change, such that the riskiness of the contract is altered (Heffernan, 2003). Also, 
this arises when there is a public safety net or lender of last resort. Mishkin 
(2003) argues that insured depositors have little incentive to keep banks from 
taking on too much risk. Also consumers may become less careful in selection 
of banks or may seek risky institutions to have a higher premium regardless of 
the credibility of the bank. Pilbeam (1998) claims that the existence of deposit 
insurance may encourage depositors to channel more of their funds to risky 
financial institutions. 
Goodhart, et al., (1998) show that asymmetric information may lead to 
distress selling of assets and insolvency of the bank, because the market is unable 
to assess the quality of the assets being sold. Therefore, a bank's regulation is 
concerned with the alleviation of the effect of imperfections in the market by 
enforcing regulatory measures such as minimum capital requirements, liquidity 
ratio and credit control etc. 
3.2.2.3 Restrictions on competition 
The regulatory authority through the licensing process restricts the 
competition among banks in the financial system. Increased competition can 
increase moral hazard incentives for banks to take on more risk (Mishkin, 2003). 
Over-banking may force banks to compete negatively to attract more depositors 
by paying a high premium, hence excess risk taking (Llewellyn, 2002) which 
may increase the possibilities of bank failure. On the other hand, Pilbeam (1998) 
claims that excessive licensing requirements can restrict competition and result in 
excess profits for licensed financial institutions. 
3.2.2.4 Economies of scale in monitoring 
Monitoring of financial institutions entails a variety of functions: 
screening, auditing, covenant writing, and intervention. Such functions are 
compelx, expensive, and time-consuming (Dewatripnt and Tirole, 1994). 
37 
CHAPTER 3 BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 
Goodhart et al., (1998) mention two sets of cost the consumer is required to bear 
in monitoring financial institutions: (1) substantial duplication and hence 
excessive social costs, since all consumers would be duplicating the same 
process; and (2) the loss of economies of scale that are derived through a 
specialist regulator's/ supervisor's acquiring expertise and establishing effective 
monitoring systems. These issues enforce the need for government authorities or 
a qualified agency to regulate these institutions through a public institution. 
3.3 Instruments of Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Laws, regulations, and supervisory actions provide incentives for 
regulated firms to adjust their actions, behavior and to control their own risks 
internally (Llewellyn, 2002). These regulations encompass a set of measures or 
techniques including market entry requirements, bank governance and risk 
management, quantitative supervisory tools, and market exit (Basel, 1997). 
3.3.1 Market Entry Requirements (licensing) 
Central banks or regulatory authorities set certain requirements for 
establishing new banks or financial institutions. The purpose of these 
requirements is to insure the competence and economic rationale of a new 
financial institution. The main requirement of licensing a bank includes the 
minimum initial capital, the corporate organizational ownership structure, 
qualifications of directors and senior management, operation plan and the 
viability of the financial plan, and adequate internal control system. In the case 
of the licensing of foreign institutions, home country supervision is required 
(Basel, 1997). 
The rationale of market entry is symmetry of information between 
management and shareholders on the one hand and between the bank and 
borrowers on the other ( Folkerts-Landau, et al., 1997). Since, the existence of the 
bank is highly dependent on the confidence of these banks, a new bank has no 
previous record, and this regulation is required to give more confidence in the 
competence of the new bank. 
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3.3.2 Bank governance 
Inadequate management is an important factor behind most bank failure; 
therefore, banking supervisors seek, as one of their key tasks, to enhance the 
quality of bank governance (Folkerts-Landau, et al., 1997). Chapra and Ahmad, 
2002 claim that one of the most important objectives of corporate governance is 
resolution of the principal/ agent conflict of interest with a view to promoting the 
interest of all stakeholders as well as the soundness and stability of the financial 
system. To attain this objective supervisors usually give more emphasis to 
improving the experience of the management of these banks. Since the success of 
regulatory regime requires existence of an adequate internal control, auditing 
systems and an external auditing system to assess the accuracy of accounts and 
avoid fraud and misconduct on the part of management. 
3.3.3 Management of Banks' Risks 
Banking business is a management of risks when a bank's manager take a 
decision of optimal portfolio choice, he select the risk-return combination for the 
institution without taking the potential cost spillovers (Goodhart, et al., 1998). 
These issues must be the main concern of banks' supervisors, since, they must be 
satisfied that the banks have a comprehensive risk management process in place 
to identify, measure, monitor, and control and where appropriate, to hold capital 
against these risks (Basel, Core Principles, 1997). The major types of risks facing 
a bank are credit risks, market risks, liquidity risks, operational risks and legal 
risks. However, any losses on the asset side are expected to expose the bank to a 
high degree of risk, due to the relative small size of equity to assets, moreover, 
most bank deposits are demand deposits compared to their assets, which are long- 
term. The regulatory and supervisory authorities have used some techniques for 
controlling the overall risk of banks. The main risks facing banks can be 
summarized as follows: 
3.3.3.1 Credit Risks 
Credit risk is the most important kind of risk facing nearly all banks. It 
arises whenever the borrower is unable to repay the loan when it is due together 
with the due interest throughout the life of the loan. This risk can give rise not 
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only to a liquidity crunch but also adversely affect the quality of banks' assets. 
Mishkin (2003) suggests that banks' management should follow a number of 
principles for management of credit risk: screening and monitoring, 
establishment of long-term customer relationships, loan commitments, collateral 
and compensation balance requirements, and credit rationing. The main concern 
of the Basel Committee in suggesting capital adequacy ratio in 1988 was to cover 
credit risk and quality of assets. 
However, the primary role of the regulatory authority is to ensure that 
banks' management are adequately assessing their own risk exposures, 
especially, the quality of borrowers, collateral, maturity of loans, size of over the 
counter activities, internal control systems, concentration of risk, connected 
lending and directed lending, off balance sheet commitments arising from 
guaranteed items (Folkerts-Landau, et al., 1997). Recent developments in risk 
management techniques have enabled banks to identify their losses, thereby 
enabling regulators and supervisors to require them to build adequate loan- loss 
reserves to ensure the safety of the bank (Chapra and Khan, 2000). 
3.3.3.2 Market Risks 
Market risks refer to the variability of a portfolio value to change market 
prices of portfolio components (Goodhart et al., 1998). These include interest rate 
risks, exchange risks, commodity and equity price risks. Market risks include 
both trading positions and non-trading positions (Muljawan, 2002). 
Many measures have been developed to measure market risk and facilitate 
the banks' management, internal control, external auditor and supervisors to 
assess the current position of banks' risk. To quantify risk exposure economists 
use the "value at risk" model (VaR). It is corresponds to a specific critical value 
of a portfolio's potential one-day profit and loss( Cupiec, 1995). 
3.3.3.2.1 Interest Rate Risks 
Interest rate risks arise mainly from interest rate mismatch in sensitive 
assets and liabilities (Folkerts-Landau, et at., 1997). Therefore, any volatility in 
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interest rates is expected to affect the profitability of banks and consequently 
shareholders' income. Banks usually lend in both fixed rates and floating rates, 
for example, when a bank has more assets bearing fixed interest rate than 
counterpart in liabilities, any rise in interest rate is expected to expose the bank to 
interest rate risk and vise versa, which will affect the value of the investment 
portfolio of interest bearing assets of the bank. 
A bank's management should have measures to eliminate risk exposure to 
interest rate, also a supervisory authority should be informed of the details of the 
maturity structure of the interest sensitive assets and liabilities to assess the 
interest rate risks. To eliminate the interest rate risk banks usually use derivative 
instruments? to manage their risks. 
3.3.3.2.2 Foreign Exchange Risks 
Foreign exchange risks arise when the bank has exposure to open 
positions to any currency in the case of flexible exchange rate8. Therefore, any 
fluctuation in the exchange rate will highly affect banks' returns, especially those 
with high exposure to global transactions. In the exchange market, banks that 
engage in spot, forward, future, and swap dealings are expected to be exposed to 
the volatility effects of these markets. Mismatch in terms of currency and 
maturity is the main source of risk in this market. Banking supervisors must 
ensure that bank management has set appropriate limits and implemented 
adequate internal control for their foreign exchange positions (CBP, 1997). 
3.3.3.2.3 Commodity and Equity Price Risks 
Banks usually trade in commodities, stocks, etc for their accounts as well 
as for customers. When they hold some positions for their accounts, they will be 
exposed to price risks, when there are fluctuations in the prices of these 
commodities or instruments. Fluctuations in the prices may be caused by 
government policy, growth expectations, expected inflation rate, unemployment 
rate etc. This will severely affect the value of the assets as well as the return. 
Therefore, supervisors should be informed about the risks involved in these 
instruments (Folkerts-Landau, et al., 1997). 
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3.3.3.3 Liquidity Risks 
Liquidity risks arise when a bank does not have sufficient liquidity to 
meet its normal withdrawal of deposits. This may reflect the engagement of the 
bank in long-term financing at the same time inability of the bank to raise funds 
from the markets. Maturity matching will guarantee liquidity and eliminate 
funding risk because all deposits are invested in assets that have identical 
maturities (Hellernna, 2000). But, most banks are involved in asset 
transformation, therefore, they are susceptible to liquidity risks. 
3.3.3.4 Operational Risks 
Operational risk arises when the business operations, from origination 
through execution and delivery, fail to function properly. Such a risk may arise 
from the failure of the internal control system (Folkerts-Landau, et al., 1997). The 
fall of the BBCI is one of the relatively recent examples of operational risks. 
However, there is no best practice in this area, but the regulators need to ensure 
that banks have safeguarded adequate procedures against any losses arising from 
fraud or litigation. Mishkin (2003) declares that despite the improvements in the 
regulations of international banks, fears remain that another BCC-like scandals 
could happen again. 
3.3.4 Regulation and Supervision Standards 
The regularity and supervisory authority uses a set of standards to manage 
the banking risk, and to enhance the soundness of the financial institutions. These 
tools include capital adequacy ratio, liquidity ratio, credit diversification, 
concentration ratio, connected lending, supervisory quantitative measures, 
supervision, public safety net and Exit policy (Basel, 1997). 
3.3.4.1 Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Capital adequacy has acquired a great interest in the literature of bank 
regulation (Cooper, 1992, Dale, 1996, Jorion, 2000 and Mishkin, 2003 ). Capital 
functions as a cushion against any unexpected loss that the bank may incur, 
absorbing unexpected losses in the bank's portfolio without jeopardizing the 
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depositors' interest, a permanent source of income for the shareholders, and 
financing fixed capital such as plant and equipment needed for running financial 
services. Therefore, the regulatory authority encourages banks to have adequate 
capital, since the higher the capital the more sound the bank will be. 
However, there are two main ratios to judge the capital adequacy of the 
bank, first, the ratio of owner equity to risky assets, which is called the Capital 
Adequacy Ratio (CAR), second, the ratio of owner equity to total assets or 
liabilities. The CAR was suggested by Basel Committee in 1988, at that time the 
main concern of the committee was to quantify for credit risk and asset quality of 
banks in the G-10 countries. Mishkin (2003) states that the purposes of CAR 
were (1) to promote world financial stability by coordinating supervisory 
definitions of capital, risk assessments, and standards for capital adequacy across 
countries and (2) to link a bank's capital reqiurments systematically to the 
riskiness of activities, including various off balance sheet forms of risk exposure. 
However, the work of the Basel Committee was followed by work of financial 
analysts to cover other risks such as market risk and particularly interest rate risks 
(Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). The new framework of Basel is based on three 
pillars. The first pillar is concerned with minimum capital requirements. The 
second pillar is related to the supervisory framework. Third pillar, is concerned 
with effective use of market discipline. 
3.3.4.2 Liquidity Adequacy 
Liquidity adequacy measures the ability of the bank to face any 
withdrawal of deposits when they are due. Liquidity adequacy will be assessed 
according to liquid assets on the one hand and, the ability of the bank to match 
future cash flows in both liabilities and assets of the balance sheet on the other. 
Matching assets and liabilities is a challenging issue for banks, since most banks 
are involved in transforming assets' maturity. When the bank has a temporary 
liquidity problem, it may be forced to liquidate some of the long-term 
investments, which may be achieved, but at a high discount, especially when the 
market situation is not favorable at that time. This may lead to an eroding of 
some bank assets, if the lost value of assets is more than the capital, the bank 
becomes insolvent (Mishkin, 2003). Therefore, the supervisors are concerned 
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with the availability of sufficient liquidity to meet the obligations and to protect 
the bank from the appearance of insolvent problems. 
3.3.4.3 Credit Diversification 
Credit diversification is one of the main methods that has been used to 
minimize the bank's risks. Diversification may be according to clients, sectors, 
currency, type of financing, and countries. Banking charters usually determine 
the maximum size of credit that can be provided to each client to minimize the 
degree of credit risk that the bank may encounter from concentration of credit. In 
some charters the maximum credit that the bank can provide for a client is 25% 
of the bank capital (Folkerts-Landau, et al., 1997). Diversification according to 
sectors limits the exposure to specific sectors. For example, in the United 
Kingdom up until the mid- 1980s building societies were essentially limited to 
mortgage lending. The idea for this restriction was to insure that financial 
institutions did not take excess risks with investors' funds (Pilbeam, 1998). 
3.3.4.4 Connected Lending 
The bank should monitor the lending to connected and related parties, 
individuals or companies, this kind of lending may be misused by those parties, 
since any default by one party may have a contagious effect on the other parties, 
consequently on the whole banking system. Supervisors should be informed 
about this kind of lending; they usually use certain measures to control the risk of 
lending to related parties through enforcing a limit on lending and a pre approval 
from the supervisors for such lending (Folkerts-Landau, et al., 1997). 
3.3.4.5 Supervision 
Banking supervision is concerned with efficiency of banks' risk 
management practices, and the compliance of management to regulations. To 
achieve these functions the supervisory authority should have the power and legal 
authority to perform its duties in a professional manner without interference in 
their decisions from any political party, also it should have independent financial 
resources. However, the framework of supervision is different from country to 
country. In some countries, supervision is performed by central banks, while in 
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other counties by an independent authority as in the United Kingdom, 
Scandinavia and Japan. Other countries have taken initiatives to identify a lead 
regulatory authority to coordinate the activities of other regulators and hence 
cooperation among them (Chapra and Khan, 2000). 
To assess the soundness of a bank, supervisors usually perform two kinds 
of supervision, one is called off site supervision and the other is on-site 
supervision, the former is based on information provided permanently by banks 
according to predetermined forms. This information is used for making trend and 
ratio analysis of main indicators for supervisory purposes. While, on-site 
supervision is concerned with qualitative assessment of capital, assets, 
management, liquidity etc, also it is concerned with verifying that information 
provided by banks is reliable (Folkerts-Landau, et al., 1997). 
3.3.4.6 Public Safety Net 
A public safety net becomes an integral part of the banking system. The 
role of a public safety net is to enhance the stability of the banking system by 
increasing the depositor's confidence in the financial system, particularly in the 
case of systemic risks in the financial system (Mayer, 1998). But, the problem 
with the public safety net is that it undermines the market discipline through 
moral hazard. The public safety net takes two forms, a lender of last resort and 
deposit insurance scheme (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). 
3.3.4.6.1 Deposit Insurance 
Banking supervision is an essential element in reducing the risk taking in 
the banking system, but even sufficient supervision cannot prevent bank failure. 
Therefore, to protect small depositors who cannot assess the risks and enhance 
the confidence in the banking system and mitigate systemic risks, regulatory 
authorities have established deposit insurance schemes (Folkerts-Landau, et al., 
1997). 
Deposit insurance schemes have been criticized for adverse selection 
problems. They attract borrowers who are most likely to produce the adverse 
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outcome; also protected depositors have little reason to monitor the bank's 
activities (Mishkin, 2003). 
3.3.4.6.2 Lender of Last Resort 
Lender of Last Resort (LLR) tends to provide funding to banks facing a 
short -term liquidity problem; the rescue program of a supervisory authority will 
eliminate deposits withdrawal and the bank failure where there is a contagious 
affect on the financial system, which leads to collapse of even other sound banks. 
LLR has also been criticized on the grounds that it participates in 
increasing the moral hazard problem, because it encourage banks to be aggressive 
in risk taking through investing in less liquid assets to attain a high return. 
However, LLR should be subject to certain conditions that will balance between 
enhancing discipline in bank behavior of risk management and allow an insolvent 
bank to be liquidated. 
3.3.4.7 The Exit Policy 
The exit policy is one of the most significant functions of banking 
supervision in cleaning up the financial system from banks suffering from 
insolvency problems. This policy is expected to enhance the transparency of a 
banking system by penalizing weak management and owners of the bank for 
excess risk taking. To re-activate the exit policy, it should be accompanied with 
adequate legal structure, autonomy and power to implement this policy. 
3.4 Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banks 
Regulation and supervision is essential for Islamic banks as well as for 
conventional banks to maintain the efficiency of the financial system, which is a 
basic element for macroeconomic prosperity. This section is dedicated to the 
analysis of the foundations for regulation and supervision of Islamic banks. The 
framework of this analysis covers the objectives of regulation and supervision, 
licensing conditions, risks, capital adequacy and information disclosure. Before 
addressing these issues it is worth recalling the main characteristics of assets and 
liabilities of Islamic banks and the principal agent problem facing these banks: 
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Characteristics of assets and liabilities of Islamic banks 
1- The liability side of the balance sheet of any Islamic bank consists of 
demand deposits and investment deposits; the former is guaranteed and 
should be paid on demand at face value, while the latter shares in profit 
and loss, with no guarantee of the principles or the profits( Saker, 2000). 
2- The asset side consists of PLS arrangements, and trade contracts which 
are based on mark up. The PLS operations are not guaranteed on the 
capital or the profits like the shares in investment companies9 and mutual 
funds (chapter 2). 
3- The structure of the paradigm Islamic bank balance sheet provides a 
shelter for any losses on the assets side, particularly for investment 
deposits. 
Principal Agent Problems 
Islamic finance may provide alternatives for solving principal-agent 
problems through sharing of return and risk between the two parties. Since each 
part will be informed of the quality of the projects. Sarker (2000) argues that the 
obvious advantage of Islamic banking is its greater ability to allocate risk 
optimally though the sharing of project return between owner of the capital and 
entrepreneur. Presley and Sessions (1994) confirmed this view of the 
overcoming of asymmetry information by tying the agents' compensation to the 
outcome of the project. 
Also, Mills and Presley (1999) argue that the obvious advantage of PLS 
banking is its greater ability to allocate risk optimally through sharing of project 
returns between capital supplier and user. But the problem of the PLS is that it 
may attract risky borrowers, who are not sure of the prospect of their projects. 
Also, Islamic banks are not in a position to reduce the moral hazard through 
requiring of collateral, particularly with mudarabah contracts. 
However, the principal-agent problem cannot be ruled out because of 
asymmetric infonnation and cost of monitoring: 
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1. The bank will not be involved in daily operations of the projects, and cannot 
determine the performance of its projects; therefore, the agent may have an 
incentive to report less profit unlike the self-financing owner-manager 
(Presley and Dar, 1999). 
2. The agent has inside information about the quality of the project. The bank's 
difficulty in determining the quality of the loan applicant produces various 
adverse selection problems especially when debt financing is available from 
competing sources (Mill and Presley, 1998). 
3. The PLS will attract investors with inside knowledge that their project is 
highly risky, and borrowers who inflate their declared profit expectations in 
the hope of being quoted a lower profit- sharing ratio by the bank (Nienhaus, 
1983). 
4. The risk of fraud in Islamic banks has two sources. One is the possibility of 
under reporting of profit. The second is the moral hazard problem as the 
banks will have to carry the burden of potential financial losses (Al-Harran, 
1985). 
5. A PLS banks' susceptible to moral hazard and adverse selection would 
probably make it uncompetitive with conventional rivals (Mills and Presley, 
1999, and Goodhart et al., 1998). 
On the contrary, certain Muslim economists have argued that in 
appropriate Islamic economic environment, incentive problem will not exist 
(Lewis and Algoud, 2001) which may eliminate moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems. The benefit of the PLS will outweigh the cost of monitoring. 
The experience of Islamic banks showed a significant growth in investment 
deposits (liability side) regardless the deterioration in the profit rate compared 
with the counterpart of conventional banks. This may be due to ethical and 
religious factors. On the asset side little progress has been achieved. This is 
mainly due to the unfriendly environment, lack of qualified management (Iqbal, 
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et al., 1998), in addition to underdeveloped financial markets in most Islamic 
countries, and competition from conventional banks. 
Saker (2000) suggests some solution to over come the agency problem 
including reward for cooperation, incentive mechanism to honest entrepreneur, 
long standing relation, and monitoring through credit officers. 
3.4.1 The Framework of Islamic Banks' Regulation and 
Supervision 
After describing the main element of prudential regulation and 
supervision of conventional banks according to western standards and the 
characteristics of assets and liabilities of Islamic banks, it should be noted that 
regulation and supervision of Islamic banks are more comprehensive than that of 
conventional banks. This entails a review of documentation and making sure that 
the financial performance of projects is sound also making sure that the internal 
control system is adequate. Chapra (1985) argues that supervision and 
examination should be more important in an Islamic system because of the 
greater risks that the banks would be shouldering in their business. Supervision of 
the central banks should not be confined to a formal audit of transactions but 
should encompass a material appraisal of the quality of management decisions 
(Al Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996). Moreover, a bank's management should be 
qualified for the management of the bank's assets and liabilities; also, it should 
be involved in evaluation of each expected project and follow up of its 
performance. Furthermore, it should be concerned with the assessment of 
operational risks. Although, PLS contracts minimize the principal-agent problem, 
moral hazard and adverse, these problems will not be eradicated. Therefore, they 
may require qualified management in terms of the assessment of projects and the 
designing of contracts and follow up of the performance of these projects 
(Chapra, 1985 ). The supervisory authority will also be under higher pressure to 
maintain the stability and soundness of the financial system. Accordingly, this 
section will extract the main foundations for regulation and supervision of 
Islamic banks. 
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3.4.1.1 Objectives of Regulation and Supervision 
The objectives of regulation and supervisions of Islamic banks are similar 
to the counterparts of conventional banks (section two), except in those related to 
the protection of investment deposits. These deposits participate in profit and loss 
of the financed projects, therefore, they are not subject to protection according to 
Islamic law. However, the bank is responsible only in the case of misconduct or 
negligence (Sundararajan, 2000). 
3.4.1.2 Licensing conditions 
Licensing conditions of new banks in the conventional banking system 
usually include capital requirements, "qualifications of equity holders, directors, 
and senior management", business plan, feasibility study, licensing fees, 
provision of internal control and external audit, permissible activities, branch net 
work, "relation with associate and affiliate companies" and transparency in 
application of regulation (Folkerts-Landau, et al., 1997, and Saker, 2000). It is 
expected that licensing conditions for Islamic banks, in general, are similar to the 
counterparts of conventional banks. 
3.4.1.3 Banks' risk 
Islamic banks, like conventional banks are exposed to risks in both the 
PLS and trade based contracts; these risks include credit risk, market risk, 
liquidity risk, operational risk, and legal risk (Table 3.2). Sundarajan (2000) 
claims that the broad asset transactions (of Islamic banks) display distinctive risk 
characteristics. For example in mudarabah the user of the funds dose not bear any 
portion of the losses except if due to his misconduct or negligence where there is 
no guarantee of principal or profit, also the banks is exposed to entrepreneurs' 
doubtful integrity. Although in musharaka, the banks and entrepreneur share in 
the return there is also no guarantee of payment of the principal or profit like 
venture capital. While in a salam contract the bank will be subject to commodity 
risk until the product is disposed off. In contrast, in murabahah contracts, the 
bank will be subject to two risks, uninsured risk and any defect in the commodity 
under contract. 
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As in the case of conventional banks, Islamic banks are engaged in asset 
transformation, through using demand deposits for financing long-term deposits, 
therefore any shock may force the banks to liquidate some of their investments at 
high cost and the market cannot assess the adequacy of assets (Llewellyn, 1997), 
particularly if it is accompanied with difficulty in raising funds from the market, 
which may lead to bank runs. 
In general the paradigm version of Islamic banks provides a better 
protection of risks for these banks, as it is dominated by the PLS, than the current 
practice of most Islamic banks. Therefore, Islamic banks become risk averse 
through concentration on trade-based contracts. On the other hand, Islamic banks 
face problems related to the unavailability of LLR and difficulty in raising funds 
from the markets. 
Table 3.1 A Comparison of Financial Risks Facing Conventional and Islamic 
Banks 
Type of financial risk Items to be concerned with 
Western banks Islamic banks 
I Credit risk Defaults value at risk Default value at risk 
Income expectation for 
sharing-based assets 
2 Market risk Volatility of market variables Volatility of market variables 
3 Liquidity risk Maturity mismatches and 
alternatives funding sources 
Maturity mismatches and 
alternatives funding sources 
4 Operational risk Hardware/system problem and 
fraud 
Hardware/system problem and 
fraud 
5 Legal risk Compliance with local legal 
framework 
Compliance with local legal 
framework 
Compliance with shari'ah 
rules 
6 Capital structure Level of capitalization Level of capitalization 
(Solvency risk) Composition of capital, 
including investment deposits 
Source: Maljawan, Dadang (2002) 
3.4.1.4 Capital Adequacy 
Prudential management of banks'risk necessitates the need for appropriate 
capital structure consistent with the nature of risk, at the same time it does not 
affect the competitiveness of the banks. Chapra and Khan (2000) call for higher 
capital to prevent the risk of investment deposits from being transferred to 
demand deposits. 
51 
CHAPTER 3 BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 
The Basel accord provides a significant step toward quantifying risks of 
conventional banks and requires banks to have appropriate capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR) consistent with level of risk. Although the CAR quantifies the risk on the 
asset side, the nature of the sources of funds has been ignored, for example, 
investment deposits with Islamic banks have special characteristics different from 
the ordinary deposits of conventional banks. These deposits are subject to losses 
similar to those facing the banks' equity. Therefore, the CAR of Basel is not 
convenient for Islamic banks. This was behind the efforts made by the 
Accounting and Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). The 
AAOIFI standards suggested a scheme for the sharing of risks between 
investment deposits and shareholders of the banks (AAOIFI, 1999a). 
3.4.1.5 Information disclosure 
Information disclosure plays a vital role in eliminating asymmetry of the 
information problem. This information will be more significant for the clients of 
Islamic banks, particularly those who have restricted and unrestricted investment 
accounts. Although, the owners of investment accounts participate in banks' risk 
like shareholders, the latter have access to the information of the concerned 
institutions, which enables them to monitor a bank's performance, while the 
former do not have the access to this information. 
3.4.2 Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banks in Pure and 
Mixed Financial Systems 
Since the 1980s three Islamic countries have announced the adoption of 
shari'ah principles in banking operations. The experience of these countries in 
transforming their financial systems into systems is based on Islamic Principles. 
However, these systems are different in terms of economic condition, speed of 
transforming process and commitment to Islamic principles. The experience of 
the three Islamic financial systems in regulation and supervision will be 
discussed: Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan. 
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However, most Islamic banks adopt international standards of regulation 
and supervision such as the CAR, and CAMEL. Little progress has been attained 
in some countries in applying the AAOIFI standards of regulation and 
accounting. 
3.4.2.1 Regulation and Supervision of Banks in Iran 
After the revolution in 1979 Iran had the initiative to transfer its financial 
system into an interest free-financial system. At that time, the banking system 
was suffering from some drawbacks, as it was overbanked, and the number of 
financial institutions reached 36 institutions, with over eight thousand branches. 
Banks were also suffering from a shortage of qualified management, which 
negatively effected the assets' quality and therefore the confidence of banking 
sector. In 1981, the Parliament abolished the interest rate from the banking 
system (Shirazi, 1990). The interest rate was replaced by a service charge and a 
profit of 4%-8% depending on the type of economic activity. Also interest on 
deposits was converted into guaranteed minimum profit (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 
1987). 
A comprehensive work to legislate the banking operations was underway. 
In 1983 the parliament ratified the Law of Usury Free Banking, the main features 
of this law prevented banks from engaging in any activities encompassing interest 
rate. In 1984 the banking system was re-organized through mergers. The structure 
of the banking system consisted of central bank, six commercial banks, three 
specialized banks, twenty two regional banks and a bank for each district or 
proven( Al Ghareep, 1996). 
3.4.2.1.1 Sources and Usage of Funds 
Sources of funds are similar to the counterparts in other Islamic countries; 
they include Qaradal - hasanah deposits, and time investment deposits1°, which 
consist of short-term and long-term investment. The short-term investment period 
is three months with a minimum of Rls 2000, while the long- term investment 
period is at least one year with a minimum value of Rls 50,000. 
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The law of Usury Free Banking defines various modes of financing; 
equity participation, partnership, modarabah, hire-purchase, installment 
transactions, joaalah, mozaraah, mosaqat, direct investment, and forward delivery 
transactions (Shirazi, 1990). 
3.4.2.1.2. Instruments of Banking Regulation and Supervision 
The central bank of Iran is in charge of monetary and credit policies as 
well as regulatory matters. The main instruments of regulation and supervision of 
banks can be summarized as follows (Ahmad, 1993) and (Al Ghareep, 1996): 
1- Designation of various fields for investment and partnership within the 
framework of the approved economic policies. 
2- Fixing a minimum and maximum rate of profit for various investment and 
partnership projects. This profit may vary with respect to different activities. 
3- Fixing a minimum and/or maximum margin of profit for installment and hire 
purchase transactions as a proportion of cost price of the transacted goods. 
4- Determination of the minimum and maximum ratio for each type of facilities, 
fields and total facilities to be granted to each customer. Also, determination 
of a credit ceiling for each bank. This ceiling is determined as a ratio of total 
capital. 
5- Determination of the types and the minimum and maximum amounts of 
commissions for various banking services on a basis of the volume of task 
performed in respect of such services. 
6- Determination of the types, amount, minimum and maximum bonuses to 
different kinds of deposits. 
7- Determination of Legal reserves requirement of various types of bank's 
deposits, the ratio of legal reserve requirements according to the Money and 
Banking Law should be ten to thirteen percent. 
8- Determination of a minimum rate of liquid assets to short term liabilities. 
The Central Bank facilitates the management of banks' liquidity 
though issuance of participation bonds (Sundararajan, 2000). In addition to its 
role as a liquidity instrument, it was a significant source for financing the 
government's operations. Although, the Central Bank help the commercial 
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banks to manage their liquidity, its extensive involvement in credit market 
may have negatively affected the efficiency of credit allocation in the 
economy. 
3.4.2.2. Regulation and Supervision of Banks in Pakistan 
The Islamization of the banking system in Pakistan started in 1978/1980. 
The process of Islamization proceeded gradually and in cautious steps. The 
transforming of the system is not a revolutionary process as in the case of Iran, it 
is based on modifying the existing system to the need of the new system. The 
financial system in Pakistan consists of 41 commercial banks, 6 development 
finance institutions and two micro finance banks whose operations supervise by 
the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP)' I. 
3.4.2.2.1 Financing Modes 
The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) determined twelve modes of financing 
and investment that are distributed into three groups, loan financing, trade 
financing, and investment financing (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 1987). Loan financing 
consists of loans free of interest, where the maximum service charge on this loan 
is determined by the SBP on a basis of actual cost. The second is qarad hasanah 
provided for special purposes without an interest charge, particularly for poor 
people in a promise to be paid when the borrowers have the ability to re-pay the 
value of the loans. The second group encompasses murabahah and differed 
payments, buying commercial papers. The banks buy commercial papers such as 
treasury bonds with discount, repurchase agreement of commodities, leasing, hire 
- purchase, and financing of real sector, where the maximum and minimum rates 
are derived by the banks. The third group of Investment financing includes: 
musharakah, equity finanacing, investment in certificates of participation and 
participation in leasing real estate. 
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3.4.2.2.2 Instruments of Banking Regulation and Supervision (Ghareep, 
1996 and State Bank of Pakistan, 2004) 
1- Commercial banks are required to deposit 5% of total deposits with 
the SBP as a legal reserve requirement. 
2- The SBP urges banks to have minimum liquid assets of total demand 
and saving deposits; the aim of this ratio is to make sure that the banks 
can face unexpected withdrawal of deposits. The liquidity ratio now is 
15 %. 
3- The SBP applied capital adequacy requirements of Basel accord of 
8% of risk-weighted assets effective from January 2003. 
4- The SBP uses a credit ceiling for total, quality, and regional credits. 
5- Special credit targets for financing of priority sectors. 
6- Quality control on credit, such as commitment ratio from clients, in 
musharkah contracts, advances payments in trade financing, 
collaterals, and acceptable guarantees. 
7- The SBP determines the minimum and maximum mark up for 
deferred payments, leasing and hire purchase. 
8- The SBP determines the service charge for providing loans. 
9- The SBP works as a lender of last resort, it provides funds to banks 
when they get in temporary liquidity problems. 
10-The SBP determines the minimum and maximum profit rate for 
musharakah contracts, also the maximum service charge rate, the 
charge is not expected to exceed the cost of funds and provision for 
bad and doubtful debt. 
11- The SBP determines the minimum and maximum profit rate on saving 
and musharkah deposits. 
12- Penalty and correction actions are enforced on banks that do not 
follow the regulation and instructions of the SBP. 
Although the State of Pakistan applies shari'ah principles in the financial system, 
it follows the essence of international regulation and supervision standards such 
as capital adequacy ratio, CAMEL, and the rating system. 
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3.4.2.3 Regulation and Supervision of Banks in Sudan 
The first Islamic bank established in Sudan was Fisal Islamic Bank in 
1978 (Wilson, 1997); thereafter five other Islamic banks were established. 
Islamic banks used to work under a dual system. In 1984 the law of the Bank of 
Sudan was amended to be compatible with Islamic laws after the adoption of 
shari'ah principles (Hasan, 2001). In the aftermath, all banks were required to 
perform all of their activities according to Islamic principles, while before 1984 
only Islamic banks were working according to shari'ah principles. The structure 
of the banking system in Sudan consists in addition to the Bank of Sudan of four 
groups of banks, which can be classified as follows: four government commercial 
banks, five foreign banks, four mixed ownership banks, three specialized banks, 
two saving banks, and six Islamic banks. 
The Bank of Sudan is in charge by law, to regulate and supervise the 
banking activities. It required from all banks to develop the use of Islamic modes 
of financing and abolish the interest rate from their operations. The main 
instruments of monetary management and regulation include (Hasan, 2001, ): 
1- The credit ceiling has been the most widely used instrument in Sudan. 
The purpose of this instrument is to control the total value of credit in the 
economy and to direct the credit facilities to certain sectors that have 
priority in the monetary and credit policy. 
2- Demand deposits with banks are subject to the legal reserves ratio. This 
rate was in the last decade between 10%-30%. Investment deposits are 
exempted from this ratio. 
3- The Credit Investment Committee was established to approve the credit 
decisions for credit exceeding certain limits in order to limit the 
concentration of credit for certain clients. 
4- Directives and direct instructions: The Bank of Sudan issued instructions 
to the banks to fulfill the target of the credit policy. These instructions 
determined the priority sectors such as export, working capital for 
established industries, developmental projects. These instructions also 
prohibit financing unnecessary imported products through asking banks to 
put a cash margin for the letter of credit of 100%. 
57 
CHAPTER 3 BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 
5- Banks are required to keep a certain percentage of their assets in the form 
of liquidity to face unexpected withdrawal of deposits. 
6- The Bank of Sudan uses open market operations to affect the quantity of 
money to be consistent with potential economic growth in the economy. 
Since the financial instruments should be consistent with the principles of 
shari'ah. However, the Bank of Sudan has developed a Participation 
Certificate called SHAMAM. These certificates are based on pooling the 
shares of the Banks of Sudan in commercial banks in a fund, in contrast, 
the shares of this fund sell to the public, the holders of these shares 
participate with the Bank of Sudan in the profit of those shares, the Bank 
of Sudan guarantees the repurchase of these shares at a pre- determined 
price. In addition to these certificates, the Ministry of Finance issued 
similar certificates called "SHAHAMI-I" which represents the share of 
ministry of finance in some projects, the holder of these certificates share 
with the governments' return according to their shares in the fund. 
7- The Bank of Sudan as other central banks uses on-site and off site 
supervision standards to insure that the banks comply with the law and the 
instructions. 
3.4.2.4 Regulation and Supervision in Mixed Financial Systems: 
A Case of Egypt 
Regulation and Supervision in Pure Islamic systems has been reviewed. 
This section is dedicated to the regulation and supervision of mixed financial 
systems, where the conventional banks work side by side with Islamic banks. 
Many Islamic financial institutions work in mixed financial systems such as 
Jordan, Egypt, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, Bangladesh, and some Western countries 
such as the UK. This section discuses the regulation and supervision of Islamic 
banks in one of the mixed financial systems: the case of Egypt. 
The banking system in Egypt consists, in addition to the Central Bank of 
Egypt (CBE), of 57 banks. This number includes 28 commercial banks of which 
4 banks are state-owned banks, 26 investment banks of which 11 are joint- 
venture banks of which two are Islamic banks, and 15 branches of foreign banks, 
in addition to 3 specialized banks of which two are state-owned banks. Islamic 
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banks in Egypt follow the same regulation of commercial banks. The main 
instruments of regulation that govern Islamic banks are summarized as follows 
(Ahmad, 1993 and Al-Gareeb, 1996): 
1- Islamic banks are required to hold liquid assets not less than 25% of their 
liabilities. 
2- Commercial banks are required to deposit with the central bank 15% of 
their deposits. 
3- Commercial banks also are required to deposit with the central bank 25% 
of foreign deposits, while these banks get return for their deposits, the 
central bank agreed to consider mudarabah contracts for Islamic banks 
according to exchange of deposits between the central bank and Islamic 
banks. 
4- Credit of Islamic banks should not exceed 60% of their sources of funds. 
5- The total credit to one customer should not exceed 25% of the capital and 
reserves. 
6- Equity financing in any company should not exceed 25% of the initial 
capital. Also the total face value of equities should not exceed 100% of 
the capital and reserves. 
7- LLR is not available for Islamic banks as this tool is based on interest 
rate. 
8- The CBE complied with most of Basel Core principles (the CBE, 2004). 
All banks are required to have a minimum- capital adequacy ratio of 10 
%. 
3.4.3 A Brief Assessment of Banks' Regulation and Supervision in 
Pure and Mixed Financial Systems 
The relationship between the central banks and Islamic banks in pure 
Islamic countries are supposed to be different from that which prevails in a nixed 
financial system. Shihadeh (1995) argues that the relationship between the former 
is complementary as the central banks are confined to the rules and regulations 
which are not supposed to hinder the activities of Islamic banks and insure that 
their activities are in compliance with the regulations set for governing the 
activities of all banks equally. It is worth noting that Iran and Sudan have 
developed financial instruments to help commercial banks manage their liquidity. 
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Sundararajan (2000) shows that the development of participation bonds in Iran 
and the mudarabah and musharakah certificates in Sudan are good opportunities 
for management of liquidity of Islamic banks in these countries, but they are still 
short-term instruments. Also these banks benefit from the existence of lender of 
last resort. In contrast, the central banks in the latter generally apply the same 
regulation and supervision standards to both conventional and Islamic banks. 
Nevertheless, Islamic banks in these countries are susceptible to liquidity 
problems as a result of unavailability of lender of last resort. 
In general, most Islamic countries have adopted international standards of 
regulation and supervision of Basel Accord and the international accounting 
standards. In contrast, a little effort has been made in applying AAOIFI's 
standards of regulation and accounting. 
3.5 Summary 
Regulation and supervision play a pivotal role in enhancing the safety and 
soundness of the financial system, which is an essential element of 
macroeconomic policies. Since banking business is inherent with many kinds of 
risk, such as credit, market, operational and legal risks, the role of regulatory and 
supervisory authority is to quantify these risks and suggest the appropriate 
regulatory capital and provisions consistent with these risks. The importance of 
capital is that it works as a cushion for the bank' risk and prevents the problem of 
one bank spilling over to other banks. For this purpose, many techniques and 
measures have been used such as licensing conditions, and management of risk. 
As most Islamic banks are created in an environment where conventional 
banks practice is prevailed, these banks have become subject to the standards of 
conventional banks. Some efforts have been made to identify the nature of 
operations of Islamic banks and to quantify some standards for regulation and 
supervision of Islamic banks such as the work of AAOIFI, but few Islamic 
countries adopt these standards. 
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Notes: 
Norton (1991) declared that the Banking Act 1979 came to be drafted against 
the backdrop of the secondary banking crises and EC's harmonization efforts. 
2 Hall (1999) revealed that the failing of Johnson Matthey Banker was the 
catalyst for the reform of the Banking Act 1979. 
3 The reduction in transaction costs per dollar of transactions as the size (scale) of 
transaction increase. 
4 Means that the banks can pool funds, which have the same return with lower 
default ratio. 
5 Measured by the amount of capital divided by the bank's total assets. 
6 The licensing requirements are different from one banking system to another 
according to the objectives of credit and monetary policy in the financial 
system. In the United States, if a bank has adequate capital, competent 
management, and well designed operating plan it will be allowed to enter the 
market, while in the UK entry of a new bank is restricted to bank showing 
prudential conduct of business, capital adequacy, adequate liquidity, and 
potential profit. 
These instruments include forward, option and future or swap contracts. 
7 
8 The bank may be exposed to foreign exchange risk if it has foreign currency 
claims on borrowers that do not have foreign currency earnings. 
9 See Errico and Farahbaksh (1998). 
10 The Law for Usury- Free Banking, Chapter two, Iran. 
The State Bank of Pakistan, Banking Sector Supervision in Pakistan, 
www. sbp. org. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted the main features of the Islamic financial 
system, the regulation and supervision standards in international perspective, and the 
experiences of some pure Islamic and mixed financial systems. This chapter is 
dedicated to reviewing the main characteristics of the Jordanian economy, and to 
examining the development and the structure of the financial system and banking 
regulation and supervision in Jordan. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a 
background for the empirical analysis of the Islamic banking regulation and 
supervision standards that appears in the following chapters. This chapter is 
organized as follows. Section two presents the country profile. Section three sheds 
some light on the main characteristics of the Jordanian economy including the 
economic growth, resource gaps, prices, employment, and the external sources of 
foreign exchange earnings. Section four discusses the financial system in Jordan, 
which includes the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ), licensed banks (conventional and 
Islamic banks), Specialized Credit Institutions, Loan Guarantee Corporation, Jordan 
Mortgage Refinancing Company, Deposits Insurance Corporation, money market 
and financial market. Section five reviews the practice of regulation and supervision 
in Jordan for both conventional banks and Islamic banks. The last section 
summarizes the chapter. 
4.2 Country Profile 
Under the British mandate, Jordan emerged as a political entity in 1921 from 
parts of the Ottoman Empire under the name of Transjordan. In 1946 Jordan became 
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an independent monarchy when Emir Abdullah was proclaimed king of a sovereign 
state. 
The borders and population of Jordan have been susceptible to political 
developments in the region. In 1950 the West Bankers (Palestinians) voted to join 
Transjordan after the occupation of the coastal parts of Palestine by Israeli forces in 
1948, the new entity became known as "The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan". In 
1967 Israeli forces occupied the remaining portions of the West Bank. During these 
periods, the population of Jordan showed the highest growth rate in the world, it 
increased at an average annual growth rate of 4.3 percent during 1979-1994 (The 
DOS, 2002). This high growth rate is due to natural growth and waves of migration 
from Palestine: 400 thousand (1948), 300 thousand (1967), and 300 thousand from 
Gulf States in the aftermath of the 1990 Gulf crisis2. Although the population growth 
rate has decreased in the last few years to 2.8 percent, it still is one of the highest in 
the world. 
To facilitate the way for Palestinian people to find a solution for their cause, 
the government of Jordan decided in 1984 to disconnect all ties with the West Bank. 
In 1990 negotiation between Arab countries and Israel started to reach a peace 
agreement in Madrid. In October 1994, Jordan and Israel signed a peace agreement. 
The Kingdom covers an area of 89.2 thousands square kilometers of which 
7.8% is agricultural land, while the remaining is semi-arid. The climate of Jordan is 
of a Mediterranean type, hot and dry in summer, and rainy in winter. 
4.3 The Jordanian Economy 
Jordan is a small, lower middle-income country, the annual per capita income 
is estimated around US $1,745 in 2002 (the CBJ, Monthly bulletin, June 2003). 
Since it emerged as a political state, it has been susceptible to political and economic 
events in the region. The Arab-Israel conflict, and their consequences constituted 
one of the major challenges that faced the Jordanian economy. In addition to high 
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spending on military forces, it was forced to deal with the migration of a large 
number of Palestinian people from West Bank, which has created a high demand on 
public services such as education, health, water etc. This has augmented the 
challenge facing the Jordanian economy, particularly those related to limited natural 
resources and a weak production base. On the other hand the Jordanian economy has 
benefited from the boom in the oil price in forms of grants, loans, and worker's 
remittances from Arab oil-producing countries. 
In the 1970s the Jordanian economy, achieved high rates of economic 
growth, measured by real GDP (Figure 4.1). External aid and loans from Gulf States 
as well as worker's remittances in the Gulf States are the main sources for this 
growth (World Bank, 2003). 
Figure 4.1 Real GDP Growth Rates 
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Source: Central Bank of Jordan. 
By the mid 80s economic growth started to decelerate as a result of the 
collapse in oil prices, which severely affected worker's remittances and Arab aid to 
Jordan. Average annual growth rate during the period 1983-1989 stood at less than 
one percent, three percentage points lower than the population growth rate resulting 
in a deterioration of per capita income. To keep economic growth at the same 
previous levels, and to compensate for the short fall in foreign exchange earnings, 
the government financed the budget deficit through foreign borrowing. This policy 
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led to an accumulation of a high level of external debt, and thereafter a debt service 
problem. 
In 1989, the Jordanian economy faced internal and external imbalances and 
was unable to meet its external obligations. The ratio of foreign debt to GDP 
exceeded 180 percent, the Jordanian Dinar (JD) was devaluated, inflation jumped to 
25 percent, and fiscal deficit to 14 percent of GDP. The government was forced to 
adopt Economic Adjustment Programs in cooperation with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the first one commenced in 1989. These programs were 
designed to reestablish internal and external balances, to help reschedule external 
debt and debt services, to initiate market-oriented policies aiming to improve the 
efficiency of public institutions, and to expand the role of the private sector. These 
programs availed more financing from international institutions such as the IMF and 
World Bank for Reconstruction and Development (WBRD) and foreign 
governments. Also, it benefited from returnees' funds after the Gulf war of 1990, 
concessional loans and assistances, rescheduling of external debt, and inflow of 
external funds after structural reform of public institutions (world Bank, 2003). 
Therefore, Jordan's economy had achieved an average growth rate of four percent 
during 1992-2002 (Figure 4.1). This growth was achieved in an environment of price 
stability, and control of fiscal deficit and external debt. 
With regard to the structure of Jordanian economy, it is dominated by the 
service sector, since the relative share of this sector to GDP accounts for 69.5 percent 
of GDP, at current basic prices, in 2002 (CBJ, 2002). The main reasons for this 
dominance are: a large well developed financial sector and an important tourist 
industry. In contrast, the relative share of the production sector, which includes 
manufacturing, mining, agriculture and construction, has declined continuously from 
37.7% in 1973 to 31.5 percent in 2002. 
A narrow production base and shortages of natural resources render local 
production unable to adequately satisfy the local demand. Consumption has 
witnessed concessive increases over the last years. It exceeds the GDP in most years 
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(Figure 4.2) as a reflection of a weak performance of savings, which are necessary 
for financing investment needs. In contrast, investment continuously increased, 
which led to expanding financing needs. 
Figure 4.2 Consumption and Saving Ratios of GDP 
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As savings were not sufficient to cover the investment needs, the financing 
gap expanded further since 1991 (Figure 4.3). This has initiated the need for more 
financing through foreign sources such as aid, loans and, investment. 
Figure 4.3 Resource Gap: Saving- Investment 
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The financing gap can be depicted also through the difference between 
exports and imports of goods and services (Table 4.4). Since Jordan is an open 
economy, where its imports account for more than 54 percent of GDP during the 
period 1995-2002, and its exports about 30 percent of GDP in 2002, it suffers from a 
severe trade deficit. With regard to components of exports, the main traditional 
exports are mining-based such as phosphates, potash, fertilizers, and chemicals, 
which constitute about 41.7 % of domestic exports. However, the exports of clothes 
have been significantly increased over the last two years to reach JD343 million, 22 
percent of domestic exports after the establishment of the Qualified Industrial Zones 
(QIZ), which facilitated the exports to the U. S. A. Although, the economy faces a 
trade deficit, workers' remittances and service sector surpluses offset this deficit. 
Therefore, current account balance shows surpluses over these years (CBJ, 2002). 
Figure 4.4 Resource Gap: Exports-Imports 
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Because of the involvement of the government in providing most basic 
services such as health, education, water, electricity, communications, transportation 
and irrigation, the public sector has expanded, since the ratio of government 
expenditure to GDP has risen from 38.5% in 1973 to 50% in 1977. It declined to 
35% in 2002 after adopting privatization programs in 1996. Large government 
expenditures are mainly military, wages and salaries, pensions, and interest 
68 
CHAPTER 4 THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
payments. Since most of these expenditures are inelastic, and difficult to curtail, any 
shortfall of financing source crowds out capital investments. In contrast, the revenue 
ratio measured by total revenues to GDP rose from 36.8% in 1973 to 50% in 1977, 
and then declined to 31 % in 2002. Fiscal measures have concentrated on improving 
tax revenues and rationalizing non-tax revenues, increasing energy prices and 
reducing tax exemption. The development in both revenues and expenditures has 
been reflected in the fiscal balance, which registered a persistence deficit, where its 
ratio to GDP accounts of around 4 in 2002 (CBJ, 2002). This rate of deficit is 
considered a disincentive for private sector investments and sustainable growth. 
Figure 4.5 Government's Fiscal Position as a% of GDP 
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In addition, external aid has been a basic source for the financing government 
budget deficit. It has been related to the occupation of West Bank by Israel and the 
presence of more than one million Palestinian refugees, which has initiated a need 
from Arab oil exporting countries to help Jordan to carry out its responsibilities. The 
size of foreign aid increased from JD 45 million, 4.7% of GDP in 1973 to JDIOO 
million, 23% of GDP in 1977, it then jumped in 1989 to JD 262 million, about 11 % 
of GDP, but it declined in 2002 to 227 million or 4% of GDP. 
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Limited natural resources led Jordan to concentrate on human capital as a 
source of growth on the one hand, and a source of foreign currencies through 
workers' remittances on the other. Education indicators are on average among the 
highest in the region (the WBRD, 2002). Because of limited vacancies for workers, 
one-third of the labor force migrates to oil-producing Arab countries. The 
remittances of those workers constitute major sources of foreign earnings; that 
increased from JD 14.7 million in 1973 to JD1,514 million in 2002, as a ratio to 
GDP, it increased from 4.7% to reach 23 % during the same period (the CBJ, 2003). 
Table 4.6 Workers' Remittances and External Aid as %of GDP 
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In, general, Jordan has achieved significant progress over the previous years 
in terms of economic growth, stabilization of the prices, building of financial 
reserves, maintaining foreign exchange, lowering interest rates, giving a greater role 
to the private sector in the economy, in addition to adopting ambitious privatization 
and legislative reform programs. But, the economy still faces some challenges 
related to the high unemployment rate and the worsening of poverty level in the 
country (WBRD, 2003). 
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4.4. Financial System 
Financial institutions acquired a greater interest in their role in the economy, 
in tenns of mobilizing savings, financing of investment projects, facilitate trading, 
hedging etc. This role is essential for economic development in developed countries 
as well as developing countries. 
In Jordan, the financial system is not different from those in other developing 
countries in terms of functions and operations. This system has experienced a 
considerable development in the last three decades in terms of the number of 
institutions, size of financial assets and deposits, and financial services. 
4.4.1 Banking System 
The intermediary role of the banking system in mobilizing savings has 
grown substantially. Total assets of the banking system have increased from JD 
267.8 million in 1973 to JD 3,477.7 million in 1984; it then soared, especially after 
the Gulf war in 1991 to reach JD 20,377 million in 2002. However, the relative 
shares of the financial institutions have changed considerably over the previous 
years; the share of licensed banks has increased from 42% in 1973 to 74% in 2002, 
this rise is mainly due to improving the intermediary role of commercial banks in the 
economy. In contrast, the share of the CBJ decreased from 38% in 1976 to 23% in 
2002. As well, the share of specialized credit institutions increased from 9% in 1973 
to reach 18% in 1987, after that it has declined to 3% in 2002. This decline is mainly 
due to the transference of one of the major specialized credit institutions into a 
commercial bank (the Housing Bank) and decline the role of government in 
financing prioritized sectors in the economy which mainly go through these 
institutions. 
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Figure 4.7 Compostion of Assets of Banking System 
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4.4.1.1 Structure of the Banking System 
The banking system in Jordan consists of the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) 
licensed banks, specialized credit institutions, saving and contractual financial 
institutions, money exchangers, insurance companies, the Loan Guarantee 
Corporation, the Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Jordan Mortgage Refinancing 
Company and other financial institutions. 
4.4.1.1.1 Central Bank of Jordan 
The CBJ was established in October 1964 to replace Jordan's Currency 
Board, which was established in 1950. The functions of the board were limited to 
maintaining sterling assets to cover the currency issued according to "Sterling 
Exchange Standard", but it had no role in money supply or credit control nor did it 
have any role in banking regulation and supervision (CBJ, 1989). 
The government was aware of the need for a Central Bank to carry out the 
monetary responsibilities in the newly established economy. The Central Bank Law 
of 1964 had given the CBJ an autonomous body to perform its objectives (Article 3). 
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In addition to the CBJ's law, there were other laws which assisted the CBJ to achieve 
its objectives, which included Banking, Foreign Exchange, Pubic Debt, and 
Company Laws. 
The main objectives of the CBJ were to maintain the monetary stability in the 
kingdom, to insure the convertibility of the Jordanian Dinar and to promote 
economic growth in the Kingdom in accordance with the general economic policy of 
the government (CBJ, 1994). To achieve these objectives the CBJ stipulates the 
following functions: currency issuance, management of foreign reserves, "regulate 
the quantity, quality and the cost of credits", dealing with economic and financial 
problems, acting as advisor to the government on financial and economic issues, 
government bank, bank of banks and the Specialized Credits Institutions, supervising 
Licensed Banks, and implementing of monetary policy. 
To achieve these objectives the CBJ used the usual credit and monetary 
instatements of the central banks including required reserves, credit ceilings, and 
concessionary loans to prioritized sectors, discount rates, liquidity ratio, and open 
market operations. Since 1990, the CBJ has adopted market oriented measures such 
as floating interest rates on both deposits and loans, abolished credit ceilings of 
licensed banks after adoption of indirect monetary management in 1993, which is 
based on issuance of Certificate of Deposits (CD's). Also banking regulation and 
supervision acquired a high interest from the CBJ to maintain and strengthen the 
soundness of the financial institutions (this issue will be covered in the next part). 
However, the main concern of the Central Bank is management of the 
monetary policy, which entails control of money and credit expansion according to 
monetary policy targets and economic growth rates. To attain these objectives, the 
CBJ uses a set of tools including discount rate, open market operations, liquidity and 
required reserve ratios, and Certificates of Deposits (CDs). Also the CBJ uses 
qualitative tools to affect the quality of credit such as preferable discount rates, and 
limits on the size of credit to certain sectors. 
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4.4.1.1.2. Licensed Banks 
Licensed banks play a dominant financial role in the economy. This role has 
grown substantially in terms of the number of institutions and the volume of 
financial assets, mobilizing savings, and loans. The number of banks operating in 
Jordan increased substantially from three banks in the 1950s to 21 banks by 2002. 
These banks can be classified as follows: fourteen commercial banks, two Islamic 
banks, and five foreign banks (CBJ, 2002). The number of branches of these banks 
account now for more than 503 inside and outside the Kingdom (Table 4.1). With 
regard to mobilizing savings, the deposits in these banks have grown from JD 169 
million in 1975 to reach JD 9,368 million in 2002 or 142 percent of GDP in 2002. 
At the same time, the size of loans has grown from JD 127 million in 1975 or 37 
percent of GDP to JD 5,130 million in 2002 or 78 percent of GDP (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 Indicators of Licensed Banks, 1975-2002 
1975 1985 1996 2002 
Number of banks 10 14 21 21 
Number of banks' branches 77 243 445 503 
Total Assets (in million of JD) 226 2392 8858 15119 
Total Deposits (in million of JD) 169 1747 5989 9368 
Total Credit (in million of JD) 127 1274 3920 5130 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan 
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Figure 4.8 Development of Deposits and Credit Facilities of 
Licensed Banks 
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With regard to banking services, the Banking Law of 20003 expands the 
financial services of banks. In addition to the normal banking services, they are 
allowed to perform financial consultancies, management of client's portfolios, 
leasing, and dealing with derivatives. In addition, the law permits the banks to 
establish affiliate insurance companies (Article 37, Banking Law, 2000). 
It's worth mentioning that three small banks faced difficulties over the last 
years as a result of fraud and violations of regulations. To tackle these difficulties the 
CBJ has taken some measures to strengthen the soundness of banks such as raising 
the minimum capital requirements, building of provision for non-performing loans, 
activating the penalties, and making supervision more active (CBJ, 2002 ). 
4.4.1.1.3 Specialized Credit Institutions 
Specialized credit institutions have been established by the government to 
provide credit facilities for prioritized sectors in the economy such as agriculture, 
industrial, and construction activities. Credits provided by these institutions were on 
concessional terms. The main specialized credits institutions are the Agricultural 
Credit Institution (1959), the Industrial Development Bank (1965), the Cities and 
Villages Development Bank (1979), the Jordan Cooperation Organization (1968), 
and the Housing Corporation (1965). 
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4.4.1.1.4 The Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation 
The Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation was established in 1994 in 
cooperation with the CBJ and the licensed banks. The objective of the company is to 
guarantee the risk of loans extended to small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) by 
licensed banks. The company also provides an export credit guarantee program, 
which includes both pre and post-shipment export credit guarantees. The loan 
guaranteed value for the SMEs accounted for JD 32.6 million in 2002, distributed in 
1118 enterprises and those for export credit Guarantee JD29.7 million, distributed on 
24 contracts (the CBJ, 2002). 
4.4.1.1.5 The Jordan Mortgage Refinance Company 
The Jordan Mortgage Refinance Company (JMRC) was established in 1996 
to provide house loan refinance services. The JMRC deals with banks and financial 
institutions. The niche that the JMRC fills in the economy is providing medium and 
long-tern financing, which is not easily accessible through licensed banks. The total 
value of refinancing reached in 2002 JD 66 million distributed between 8000 loans. 
With regard to sources of funds, the JMRC raises funds through issuance of bonds 
through the capital market. Total funds raised reached in 2002 to JD 95.8 million 
(the CBJ, 2002). 
4.4.1.1.5 Deposit Insurance Corporation 
The corporation was established in 2000 in cooperation with the CBJ and 
licensed banks. The aim of the corporation is to protect small depositors by insuring 
their deposits with the banks, thereby encouraging savings and strengthening 
confidence in the Jordanian banking system. The Corporation's guarantee fully 
covers small deposits, which are lower than JD 10,000, and partially covers JD 
10,000 of those deposits exceeding this figure. The insurance coverage covers all 
licensing banks except the two Islamic banks. The main reason for excluding Islamic 
banks is due to the fact Islamic banks need special insurance coverage taking into 
account the nature of their deposits. The accumulated funds account for JD 26.5 
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million, where the participating fees are the main source of funding for this 
institution, which reached 24 million in 2002 (CBJ, 2002). 
4.4.2 Money and Capital Market 
In addition to the financial role of banking institutions in the economy, the 
money market and capital markets play an important role in mobilizing savings and 
direct them towards projects in the economy. However, the role of these markets in 
the economy is still evolving. 
4.4.2.1 Money Market 
The money market consists of securities with less than one-year maturity. 
The main instruments of the money market are Treasury Bills (TBs), Treasury 
Bonds, and Certificate of Deposits (CDs). TBs are issued in accordance with the 
Public Debt Law of 2001 to finance the short-term needs of the government. 
Financial institutions usually hold the TBs. However, the size of government debt 
instruments was not adequate to be used as a monetary instrument, therefore, the 
CBJ was forced to introduce the CDs in 1993. The main purpose of the CDs are to 
absorb the excess reserves in the system. The CDs are auctioned bi- weekly at one, 
two, three, six and twelve - months maturity, the volume of the auction depends on 
the value of excess reserves in the system and as a signal to manage the reserves of 
the banking system on regular basis. The outstanding value of the CDs is about JD 
1,613 million at the end of April 2003. 
The CBJ has worked to develop the money market, through initiating 
Overnight Deposit Facility (ODF). The purpose of ODF is to allow the licensed 
banks to place any surplus funds in interest bearing accounts in the CBJ. The aims 
of ODF were to set a floor for rates in the interbank market, organize the rate 
structure in the interbank, and establish a benchmark rate. 
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4.4.2.2 The Capital Market 
Capital markets play a major role in raising finance for investment projects in 
the economy. It is worth shedding some light on the structure and capability of the 
capital market in Jordan. This market consists of the bonds market and the stock 
market. 
4.4.2.2.1 The Bonds Market 
Bonds traded in the market include government's bonds and corporate bonds. 
The Public Debt Law of 1971 regulated issuance of government bonds. This law 
restricted the ability of the government to issue an adequate quantity of bonds. To 
overcome the shortcomings of this law and expand the capability of the government 
as well as to develop the capital market, the government passed the Public Debt Law 
of 2001. This law specifies ceilings on public debt, as a percentage of GDP at 
current market prices. This ceiling is 60 percent for each internal debt and external 
public debt, 80 percent for both. It is expected that the size of government bonds will 
expand, particularly after the commitment of the government to comply with these 
ceilings by the year 2006 (CBJ, 2001). 
In addition to government bonds, independent government entities and public 
shareholding companies issue corporate bonds. 
However, the debt securities market is still a juvenile market in terms of size 
of issues and trading. Since the market value of total traded bonds for both 
government and corporate companies did not exceed JD 10 million in 2002 (the ASE, 
2002). 
4.4.2.2.2 The Stock Market 
The Amman Financial Market (AFM) was established in 1978 as a public 
independent financial institution. The aim of the AMF is to encourage mobilizing 
saving and investment in financial papers, to organize and control the issues of 
financial instruments. However, the globalization and advancement in information 
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and communication technologies led to issuance of new Securities Law in mid 1997. 
The new law separated the regulatory body from the role of execution of market 
operations. For this purpose three independent entities were established, namely, the 
Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) and the 
Securities Depository Center (SDC). 
Although, the ASE is very small and less sophisticated than those of 
developed countries, it has wintnessed a significant improvement over the past years 
inspite of politcal regional problems. The market capitalization of companies listed 
at the ASE by end of 2002 amounted to JD 5,076 million or 80.4 percent of GDP 
compared with 4156.6 million in 1998 or 73.6 % of GDP (ASE, 2002). 
Table 4.2 Market Capitalization of Listed Companies at the ASE by Sector 
(JD Million) 
Year Banks Insurance Services Industry Total 
1998 2621.9 88.5 442.1 1004.2 4156.6 
1999 2346.6 95.6 470.2 1225.4 4137.7 
2000 1859.4 97.1 561.3 991.9 3509.6 
2001 2527.3 100.7 631.1 1217.3 4476.4 
2002 2347.1 109.4 1204.9 1367.6 5076.0 
Figure 4.9: Market Capitalization of the Listed 
Companies at the ASE 
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Banks and service sectors dominate the market with 73 percent of market 
capitalization. Moreover, the market is highly concentrated, as the largest ten 
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companies constituted 68.7 percent of market capitalization of the companies listed 
at the ASE. 
The ASE has attained a relatively good performance over the last two years. 
The share price index stood at 170 point by the end of 2002, higher than its level in 
2000 by about 37 points. The leading sectors for this performance are banks, 
insurance, and industry (Table, 4.2, and Figure, 5.9). 
Table 4.3 Share Price Index of Listed Companies at ASE 
1991=100 
Year Banks Insurance Services Industry General 
1998 281.7 124.7 109 76.9 170.1 
1999 251.9 123.7 110.6 96.2 167.4 
2000 198.7 119.7 99.8 75.2 133.1 
2001 275.2 133.2 109.4 91.7 172.7 
2002 255.7 149.9 106 101.6 170 
Figure 5.10: Share Price Index of Amman Stock Exchange 
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1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
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4.5 BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 
After reviewing the structure and evolution of the financial system in Jordan, 
it is essential to shed some light on prudential regulations and supervision that have 
been adopted by the regulatory authority (the CBJ) to accommodate this system. As 
the banking system in Jordan consists of both conventional banks and Islamic banks, 
the CBJ regulates and supervises both kinds of banks. In general, the CBJ applies 
international standards of regulation and supervision such as capital adequacy 
regulations, provisioning and CAMEL4 rating. These standards are applied to 
conventional banks as well as on Islamic banks. However, the CBJ considers the 
supervision as an evolving process, it is subject to continuous modifications 
according to the innovations of financial services on the one hand and emerging 
banking problems on the other. 
This part is organized as follows: First section presents the framework of 
banking supervision in Jordan. Second section underlines the main elements of 
regulation and supervision including licensing conditions, legal lending limits, 
insider regulations, restrictions of investment in some sectors, loan classifications 
and provisioning, liquidity and reserve requirement ratios, capital adequacy 
regulation and on site and off site supervision. The evolution of Islamic banks in 
Jordan is discussed in section three. The last section highlights the supervision 
framework of Islamic banks and their supervision standards. 
4.5.1 Framework of Banking Supervision in Jordan 
Banking supervision in Jordan comes under the framework of three main 
bodies, namely, internal control, external auditors and the CBJ's supervision; internal 
control is performed within a bank by an internal body to examine the adequacy of 
Internal Audit System (IAS) and the compliance of management with laws and 
regulations (Banking Law, 2000). Because of the essential role of IAS as a defensive 
measure to safeguard licensed banks, the CBJ requires all banks to have adequate, 
comprehensive and effective JAS. The CBJ's supervisors should be convinced of the 
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availability of policies and objectives within this system according to the level of the 
bank's risks. Also they provide suggestions for its improvement (the CBJ, 
Memorandum No. 10/4794, March, 2002). 
Moreover, the Banking Law of 2000, article 32, gives higher emphasis to the 
internal banking oversight through requiring each bank to form a high level auditing 
committee. The members of the committee should be selected from the members of a 
board of directors who are not in charge of executive responsibilities within the 
bank. This committee has comprehensive responsibilities including monitoring, 
coordinating with supervisors and external auditors, reviewing annual internal 
auditing plans, ascertaining the accuracy and soundness of accounting and control 
procedures, and ensuring full compliance with laws, regulations, and orders 
governing bank's activities (Banking Law, 2000, Article No. 32). 
Chart 4.1: Framework of Banking Supervision In Jordan 
Supervision 
Framework 
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External auditors also play an important role in overseeing of banks through 
examining the accuracy of the bank's operations and financial statements. Given that 
they are appointed by the general assembly of the bank, they are relatively 
independent institutions, which give their reports more credibility. Because of the 
important role of external auditors in banking overseeing, the CBJ intervenes in the 
selection of external auditors by the banks through determining a list of qualified 
external auditors, and banks are obliged to select from this list. After examining the 
banks' operations and statements, external auditors write a report of their findings 
and their opinion on these statements. This report should be directed to the general 
assembly and a copy of it to the CBJ (Banking Law, 2000, Article No. 61). 
The CBJ's supervisors examine the banks' operations, assess risks, capital 
adequacy, provisions, appropriateness of internal control policies and procedures to 
insure that the bank's operations are performed according to Banking Law and 
instructions of the CBJ; they also should be convinced that corrective measures have 
been taken by management according to the comments of internal and external 
auditors. 
The next part discusses the main elements of banking regulation and 
supervision in Jordan. 
4.5.2 Review of Prudential Regulations and Banking Supervision in 
Jordan 
Prudential regulations and supervision mean laws, instructions and processes 
followed to ensure the soundness of banks in order to maintain confidence of the 
financial system, protect depositors, control credit expansion, and mobilize savings. 
In performing their activities, banks are exposed to many kinds of risks such as credit 
risk, liquidity risk, market risk, and operational risk (Basel, 1997). These risks may 
negatively affect the soundness of banks on the one hand, and may result in raising a 
systematic risk on the other. Dale (2000) argues that the main concern of supervisors 
is usually given to systematic risk that is, the risk that failure of one or more troubled 
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financial institutions could trigger a contagious collapse of otherwise healthy firms. 
To overcome these risks, the CBJ adopts the following prudential regulation and 
supervision: 
4.5.2.1 Prudential Regulations 
Prudential regulations of banks in Jordan encompass a set of conditions, 
tools, and ratios, which can be classified into seven groups namely, licensing 
conditions, legal lending limits, inside regulations, restrictions on investment in some 
sectors, loan classification and provisions, liquidity and reserve ratios, and capital 
adequacy. 
4.5.2.1.1 Licensing conditions 
The Banking Law of 2000 sets certain licensing conditions and a timetable 
for licensing new banks. The licensing conditions aim to ensure the soundness and 
viability of the new banks; the main conditions inter alia minimum capital 
requirements, qualifications and experience of owners and senior management, 
appropriate feasibility study and operating plan, and pro forma statements for the 
first three years, also these licensing conditions cover licensing of foreign banks. The 
timetable for licensing of new banks that was introduced in the new Banking Law 
(2000) aims to create transparency and eliminate undue delays in licensing banks. 
With regard to capital requirements, a licensed Jordanian bank must have at least JD 
40 million in capital, while a branch of a foreign bank must have at least JD 10 
million in capital (the CBJ's memorandum No. 17/2003, August, 2003). 
4.5.2.1.2 Legal Lending Limits 
The CBJ's regulations aim to eliminate the possibilities of exposure of banks 
to high risks by enforcing a limit on the size of credit. This can be attained through 
designing lending limits to eliminate the concentration of credit with individual 
borrowers and/or related groups. The regulator considers 10 percent of credit of a 
bank's regulatory capital as an excessive concentration ratio, and the total 
concentration ratio eight times of bank's regulatory capital (the CBJ's memorandom 
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No. 9/2001, August 2001). However, the maximum limit of credit granted from a 
bank in Jordan for a borrower and/or related groups is 25 percent. These limits are 
consitant with international standards of Basel Committees. In the case the credit is 
provided from both inside and outside branches of Jordanian banks the limit 
increases to 40 percent. In addition to these limits the CBJ puts a limit on direct 
credit to the largest ten borrowers of total credit. This ratio should not exceed 35 
percent for the Jordanian bank and 70 percent for the foreign banks (the CBJ's 
memorandom No. 9/2001, August 2001). 
4.5.2.1.3 Insider Regulations 
Insiders mean members of the board of directors of a bank and members of 
the board of directors of affiliated companies, and management. It is noted that 
lending to these groups constitutes a significant source of risk and bank failure. 
Therefore, the CBJ puts certain limits on lending to these groups. The maximum 
credit limit to a member of the board of directors of a bank or a member of the board 
of affiliated company is 5 percent of a bank's regulatory capital, and the total credit 
to all members of the board of directors should not exceed 25 percent. Also, the CBJ 
puts a ceiling on credit to any member of the board and related groups of banks or 
affiliated companies of 10 percent. However, the maximum credit limit for all related 
groups should not exceed 50 percent of the bank's regulatory capital (the CBJ's 
memorandum No. 9/2001, Sept. 2002). 
Also, the CBJ puts a ceiling on credit to the banks' management, which 
should not exceed JD 300 thousands for each general manager and their deputies, 
assistants, advisors, and executive managers or the counterparts of affiliated 
companies (the CBJ's memorandum No. 9/2001, Sept. 2002). 
4.5.2.1.4 Restriction of Investment in Some Sectors 
The Banking Law of 2000 expands the range of financial services of licensed 
banks to include, in addition to traditional services, dealing in forward markets, 
providing management and consultative services for investment portfolios, 
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investment trustee services, financial agent, and leasing. In contrast, the law prohibits 
and restricts involvement of banks in certain sectors. Since, banks are prohibited 
from attaining control ownership on financial, monetary and foreign exchange 
markets, also engagement in industrial, trade, and service activities. For example, a 
bank is restricted from engagement in real estate of more than 20 percent of clients' 
deposits, and holding of more than 10 percent of a company's subscribed capital, 
and the total holdings in all companies shall not exceed 50 percent of the total 
subscribed capital. Moreover, overdraft accounts should not exceed 20 percent of 
direct credits, and the total credit for affiliated company 20 percent of bank's 
subscribed capital. However, the international standards do not explicitly advise 
supervisors to limit nonbank activities but do not advocate that the scope of activities 
governed by banking liceneses be clearly defined (Folkerts-Landau, et al., 1997). 
4.5.2.1.5 Loan Classification and Provisioning 
To improve banks' asset quality, the CBJ applies the international standards 
of loan classification (the CBJs'memorandum No. 1/2000, Sept. 2000). This 
memorandum distinguishes between performing loans and non-performing loans. 
Performing loans are divided into standard loans and special mention loans. The 
standard loans carry the normal credit risk. Strong borrower's creditworthiness, 
acceptable collateral, regular servicing of the loans and availability of financial 
sources for servicing loans characterize these loans. While, loans with special 
mention are these loans that have some deterioration of borrower's creditworthiness 
and irregular payment of principals or interests or both. Although, these loans are not 
yet classified as non-performing loans, they require special monitoring, rescheduled 
loans also are classified in this group. 
However, the performing loans are subject to general provisions at 2 percent 
of direct credit and 0.5 percent of indirect credit except government loans and those 
covered by cash deposits, or by government guarantees, or first - rate bank 
guarantee, credits guarantee by Jordan Loan Guarantee Corp, mortgage loans 
refinance by Jordan Refinancing Mortgage Company, and export financing for post- 
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shipment and automobile financing insured by insurance companies (the 
CBJs'memorandum No. 1/2000, Sept. 2000 ). 
Non-Performing loans are classified into three subgroups according to the 
possibility of repayment of the principals of these loans and their interests, namely 
sub-standard loans, Doubtful loans, and loss loans. Loans are rated as sub- 
standard when the original loans or one of their principals or irregular payments of 
loans or interest or both or squeezing of overdraft accounts are past due greater than 
90 days, but less than 180 days. Loans are rated Doubtful loans when the original 
loans or one of their principals or irregular payments of loans or interests or both or 
squeezing of overdraft accounts are past due greater than 180 days. Loans are 
classified as loss loans when the loans or one of their principals or irregular payment 
of loans or interest or both or squeezing of over draft accounts are past due greater 
than 360 days, reschedule loans for twice times and there is no commitments for 
payments are classified in this group. 
Non-performing loans are subject to special provision according to the types 
of loan collateral. Loans not covered by acceptable cash, real estate, or in-kind 
guarantees are required to have provision during the first year of suspending of loan 
services of 100 percent of loss loans, 50 percent of doubtful loans and 25 percent of 
substandard loans. After the first year the provision has to be increased gradually for 
the last two kinds to a 100 percent within four years. On the other hand, loans 
covered by acceptable guarantees are subject to special provisions. The acceptable 
guarantee accounts for 75 percent of the estimated value of real state and or market 
value of security collaterals. The provisions shall be increased to 100 percent within 
five years. With regard to registered collateral such as cars, machines and others, the 
acceptable guarantee for provisions account for 50 percent and the provision has to 
be increased to 100 percent over four years. 
4.5.2.1.6 Liquidity and Reserve Requirement Ratios 
Liquidity risk arises as a result of mismatch between assets and liabilities. 
This risk may be affected by asset quality which may lead to difficulty in liquidation 
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of some assets without high cost. Therefore, banks are required to have adequate 
liquidity to face their obligations as they fall due. However, the CBJ requires the 
banks to maintain a sufficient liquidity ratio and diversify their assets to reduce the 
level of expected risks. The current minimum liquidity ratio is 100 percent of total 
weighted claims, and 70 percent of weighted claims in Jordanian Dinar. In addition 
of the liquidity ratio, banks are required to have a reserve requirement, the current 
required reserve ratio (RRR) stands at 8 percent (CBJ's memorandom, No. 
309/2000, July 2000). This ratio plays an important role in controlling credit 
expansion on the one hand and as a source of temporary liquidity if the bank faces a 
shortage of liquidity on the other. Although, liquidity ratio currently seems to be 
adequately high, the CBJ insists on bank's sound management of assets more than 
the ratio of liquidity itself (Tuqan, 2003). 
4.5.2.1.7 Capital Adequacy Regulation 
Capital is a prime source of funds for a bank, it is usually used to absorb 
credit and market risks that the bank may face in its operations, while depositors' 
funds are used for credits. Since banks are required to repay the full value of deposit 
irrespective to the performance of their credits, it should have a adequate capital 
consistant with the level of credit and market risks. 
The Banking law ( 2000) gives the CBJ the power to determine the minimum 
capital requirements. In 1992 the CBJ applied the Basel accord of 1988 of capital 
adequacy. To accommodate the Basel accord, the CBJ requires licensed banks to 
increase their capital from a minimum of JD 5 million to JD 10 million then to JD 
20 million in 1995, thereafter to JD 40 million in September 2003. Banks whose 
capital is lower than this limit are given permission to the end of 2007 to increase 
their capital. The CBJ also requires banks to have a minimum leverage ratio 
(shareholders'equity to assets) of 6 perecent (the CBJ's momorandom, Sept. 2003), 
while the capital adequacy ratio based on capital risk-weighted assets was first 
introduced in 1992, since the CBJ required banks, at that time, to have at least 8%. 
This ratio was raised to 10% in 1995, then to 12% in 1997 (the CBJ's memorandom 
No. 11/2001, Dec. 2001), which is higher than the Basel requirements of 8 %. 
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4.5.2.2 Prudential Supervision 
The supervisory authority aims to insure the compliance of bank's activities 
with the regulations on the one hand, and insure the soundness of banking system is 
maintained on the other. This can be attained through off site and on-site supervision. 
An effective supervisory system should adapt both means of banking supervision 
(Basel, 1997) 
4.5.2.2.1 Off Site-Supervision 
Off-site supervision is a process performed to confirm the compliance of 
banks with regulatory measures. This process deals with quantitative matters 
regarding all regulatory measures. To attain the aim of this process, the regulatory 
authority requires banks to provide it a daily report of over-draft accounts, total 
credit and total deposits, a weekly report of liquidity, monthly, bi-annual, and annual 
reserve requirements, balance sheets as well as income statements, bi-annual reports 
of classification of loans, provisions and capital adequacy ratio. 
The CBJ uses this information to perform the financial analysis for each 
bank. For this purpose, many ratios are usually prepared as supervisory tools such as 
liquidity ratio, legal reserve ratio, capital to deposit ratio, capital and reserve to 
liability ratio, capital adequacy ratio, non-performing loans to credit ratio, and 
provisions to credit ratio. 
4.5.2.2.2 On-Site Supervision 
The CBJ performs annual on-site inspections on all banks, domestic batiks 
and foreign branches. The purposes of these inspections is to check whether the 
regulations have been properly applied and to ensure that the information provided 
to the CBJ is highly accurate, if not corrective actions should be taken. The main 
corrective actions include a written warning, instructing the bank to submit a 
satisfacory program to eliminate the violation, imposing a fine, suspension or 
dismissal of the adminstrators from service, the chairman or any board of directors, 
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and revoking the license of the bank (Banking Law of 2000). Before taking, any 
penalty corrective measures for deficiencies or misconduct the CBJ usually uses 
moral suasion to convince banks to adhere to regulations through special meetings 
with the bank's management. 
However, on-site inspection is usually concerned with qualitative assessment 
through CAMEL rating, which represents capital, assets, management, earning, and 
liquidity in addition of internal control system, accounting standards, adequacy of 
information. Each of these elements is evaluated on a scale of 1-4, with I being very 
staisfied. After inspection, a detailed report is written, with a summary of the 
findings and is sent to the bank (Directory of Banking Regulation in Jordan, 1999). 
The report usually covers all the above factors. 
4.5.3 Evolution of Islamic banks in Jordan 
4.5.3.1 Background 
The concept of Islamic banking was first introduced into Jordan in 1978 
when Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB) was established under a provisional law. The bank 
is part of Dallah Al-Baraka group but it is locally incorporated with majority 
Jordanian ownership (Wilson, 1997). The JIB shows a considerable expansion over 
these years in terms of mobilizing of financial resources, services and financing 
modes. Also, it has attained a respectable share in the banking system to become one 
of the five largest in the kingdom in terms of assets, deposits and credits. The 
services of JIB cover most of the cities through its 53 branches and 14 offices. 
In addition, of JIB three Islamic financial institutions since the end of the 
1970s have been established. Islamic Finance House was established in 1981 as a 
. public shareholding company to work according Shari'ah precepts with a capital of 
JD 4 million (the CBJ, 1989). Total assets reached in 1985 JD 18 million, total 
financing JD 14 million and total deposits JD10 million (Altamini, 1998). In 1986, 
the supervisors discovered that financial and managerial problems as well as a lack 
of documentation, collateral, accounting, and follow up process ( the CBJ, 1989). 
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These measures did not overcome the financial problems, the CBJ decided in 
September 1986 to discharge the board of directors and appoint a management 
committee with a controller from the CBJ to direct the operations of the house. To 
protect the depositor funds, the Economic Security Committee decided to license a 
new Islamic bank called National Islamic Bank (NIB). This bank inherited all the 
assets and liabilities of the house (the CBJ, 1989) with a capital of JD 7 Million. The 
CBJ provided a financial advance to the NIB to cover the financial loss of the house; 
they also allow depositors of the house to withdraw their deposits according to a 
timetable. However, the experience of the NIB was not successful, which may 
have led to its liquidation after a few months of establishment. The other Islamic 
financial experience is Jordan Finance House. It was established to work according 
to Islamic precepts, it merged with conventional financial institution (Altamimi, 
1998). The third financial institution is called Beitna, which is still working as a 
contractual financial institution in the housing sector. 
Until 1998 the experience of Islamic banking in Jordan was limited to a one 
successful financial institution (the JIB) and the regulatory authority become more 
cautious and abandoned the establishment of new Islamic financial institutions, 
which limited the experience of Islamic financial institutions in Jordan. This 
experience was strengthened with the establishment of Islamic International Arab 
Bank (IIAB) in 1998, which is an affiliate of Arab Bank Ltd, the largest bank in 
Jordan. This bank has attained 2.7 percent of the market share. Consequently the 
share of Islamic banks has relatively increased. 
Although the JIB was established under a provisional law, it does not gain 
any privilege by virtue of this law as did the Housing bank at that time, (Shihadeh, 
1995). Moreover, even the law contains some regulations particular to the JIB, it 
came under the umbrella of conventional banking laws. 
The Banking Law of 2000 succeeds the provisional law of Islamic banks by 
incorporating a chapter for all Islamic banks. This chapter highlights the objectives 
of Islamic banks, supervision and activities. The objectives of Islamic banks include 
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providing banking services and practicing financing and investment on a basis of 
excluding interest in all forms, developing means of attracting funds and savings, 
and allocating them to sharing in investment in a banking system founded on a basis 
other than interest. They also incorporate providing services aimed at reviving social 
solidarity. With regard to supervision, the law, Article 51, allows the CBJ to set 
special restrictions and ratios to be adhered to by Islamic banks upon practicing their 
activities and business. With respect to financial services, the law put in place 
general guidelines for these activities to allow Islamic banks to provide 
comprehensive financial services consistent with the nature of these banks. In 
addition to all traditional or innovated interest -free banking activities, Islamic banks 
are allowed to incorporate companies in various fields, acquiring, selling, investing 
in, leasing and renting movable and immovable properties. 
4.5.3.2 Performance of Islamic Banks 
The main purpose of this part is to examine the performance of Islamic banks 
over time through ratio, trend analysis and a comparative analysis with conventional 
banks in Jordan. 
4.5.3.2.1 Sources of Funds 
The Banking Law of 2000 allows Islamic banks to accept deposits in various 
forms including credit accounts, private investment accounts, and mutual fund 
accounts. It also allows Islamic banks to issue mutual mugharada bonds and set up 
investment portfolios or investment funds. Therfore Islamic banks can participate in 
mobilizing a significant portion of financial resources. The major source of these 
resources are deposits, which account of about 85 percent of total sources of funds, 
while the remaining portion comes from raising capital and profits. The deposits of 
Islamic banks grew at an annual rate of 14.6 percent during 1991-2001 to reach JD 
820 million, in contrast to a 12.7 percent growth in conventional banks. This led to 
an increase in their relative share to total deposits of licensed banks to 8.2 percent in 
2001 compared with 6.91% in 1990. With respect to distribution of deposits 
according to sources, investment deposits account for about 83 percent, while 
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currents account constitute the remainder. This structure of deposits gives the Islamic 
banks more stability in terms of sources of funds which encourage these banks to 
engage in long term investments (Wilson, 1997). 
Figure 4.11 Development of Sources of Funds of 
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Similarly, shareholders' equities of Islamic banks increased at an annual 
growth rate of 28.8 percent during the period 1991-2001 to reach about JD 100 
million. This increase is mainly due to raising of paid up capital of JIB in 1997 to 
comply with the CBJ's requirement and the establishment of the IIAB in 1998. 
93 
CHAPTER 4 THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
-10 
Figure: 4.12 Annual Growth Rates of Conventional and 
Islamic Banks 'Deposits 
N c+') 'V- Lf) (0 fl- 00 0 (D T-- 
Q) O (3) O) 6) 0) 0) 0) 0) CD O 
O) (3) (3) (1) 0) (M 0) (n 0) CD O 
s- ý- r- ý .-r "- r- ý- NN 
--* Islamic Banks f-- Con entional Banks 
In addition to these funds, Islamic banks in Jordan were successful in 
innovating for mobilizing funds through restricted investment accounts and portfolio 
investments. For example, the JIB uses the concept of portfolio investment to issue 
Muqharada bonds (MBs) since 1997. It identifies the possible investment 
opportunities from existing or new business clients and invites existing account 
holders to subscribe to specific projects. Instead of sharing in the bank profit the 
investors gain a share in the profit of the enterprise in which the funds are placed 
(Wilson, 2000). In the case of profit, the JIB gets a pre-declared ratio, while the 
remaining ratio is distributed among the holders of these bonds. In contrast, if the 
project witnesses a loss, the bondholders share in it, while the JIB loses any reward 
for management (the JIB's report, 2001). The portfolio of MBs is like an open- 
ended fund, where the investors can buy/ sell MBs any time, but the profit is due on 
selling of the financed projects. It is worth noting that the balance of the MBs with 
the JIB reached JD 114.9 million in 2002. 
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Figure 4.13 Annual Growth Rates of Conventional and Islamic 
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The Banking Law (2000) allows Islamic banks to engage in various activities 
including mudarabah, musharakah, murabahah, and other financing methods 
approved by committee within the bank. Also, the law allows Islamic banks to invest 
funds as requested by depositors with the resources available to the Islamic banks in 
accordance with the joint mudarabah system. Moreover, the law allows Islamic 
banks to undertake a specified investment under a special agreement (Banking Law, 
2000, Article, 52). Total assets of Islamic banks attained a continous growth, it grew 
at an annual 15 percent during 1991- 2001 to reach JD 957 million. This rate of 
growth exceeds the rate of growth of conventional banks during the same period 
which acount for 12.9%. When adding off balance sheet items such as restricted 
mudarabah deposits and mugaradah bonds the total assets of Islamic banks exceeded 
JD1317.9 million in 2001. 
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Figure 4.14 Annual Growth Rates of Conventional and 
Islamic Banks' Assets 
Similarly, financing of Islamic banks grew at an annual 14 percent during the 
period 1991-2001 compared to an annual a verge of 9.7 percent for conventional 
banks. This increased the relative share of Islamic banks to total credits of licensed 
banks to 11.2 percent. With regard to the distribution of credit, the stake of 
murabahah contracts account for 35.2 percent of total financing, while the mudarbah 
and musharkah account of only 2 percent. However, the performance of financing 
has been affected by the slow down in the region. 
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The effective liquidity ratio of Islamic banks used to be relatively high, 
reaching about 43 percent of total assets in 2001, as most Islamic banks have 
problems of management of liquid assets. This problem is related to limited 
instruments for liquidity management and unavailability of lender of last resort 
facilities. Consequently, Islamic banks used to hold a high proportion of cash and 
deposits. This high ratio is expected to have a severe effect on bank profitability. In 
contrast conventional banks extensively used Certificates of Deposits (CDs) and the 
Over Night Window at the CBJ. While these instruments are prohibited by Islamic 
banks. 
4.5.4 Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banks in Jordan 
After reviewing the regulations and performance of Islamic banks in Jordan, 
the framework of supervision of these banks and their supervision standards will be 
now be considered. 
4.5.4.1 Framework of Supervision of Islamic Banks in Jordan 
The supervisory framework of Islamic banks in Jordan is not different from 
that of the counterpart of conventional banks except that the former are required to 
have an Islamic Jurisprudence Supervisory Board (IJSB). Banking Law (2000), 
article 58 determines the responsibilities of the IJSB as follows: 
1. Monitoring the compliance of operations and activities of the Islamic banks 
with jurisprudence piles. 
2. Giving opinions on the text of contracts required for the operations and 
activities of the bank. 
3. Considering any matters referred there to pursuant to specific orders of the 
CBJ. 
The Banking Law (2000) determines the manner of appointment of IJSB' s 
members. The IJSB shall be appointed by general assembly of shareholders, which 
gives the board the required independency from the board of director. Also the bank 
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must notify the CBJ of any decision in appointing or discharging of the IJSB or any 
of its members. 
Table 4.4 Framework of Islamic Banking Supervision in Jordan 
Type Authority of Objectives 
Enforcement 
Regular supervision Central Bank of Jordan/ Maintain stability of financial 
Monetary authority system, depositors protection, 
. etc. External Auditors General Assembly, Protection of bank's assets, 
Banking Law, and shareholders' interest, and 
Company Law financial stability 
Internal control/ Internal Board of directors/ Protection of bank's assets, 
Control Committee Internal control insuring of compliance of 
committee regulation and checking the 
sources of internal 
misconducts... etc. 
Islamic Jurisprudence Shareholders and the Ensuring the application of 
supervisory Board CBJ policies and procedures within 
a bank according to Islamic 
shari'ah. 
4.5.4.2 Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banking 
The CBJ recognize the special nature Islamic banks' operations, and 
activities since the establishment of the first Islamic bank in Jordan in 1978 and the 
need for a special law or regulations governing Islamic banking. This was behind the 
issuance of a provisional law for the establishment of Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB). 
This law gave the CBJ the right to regulate and supervise the activities of the JIB 
unless the regulations are not contradicted by Islamic precepts. The new banking 
Law (2000) article (51) gave the CBJ the right to issue orders and lay down special 
restrictions and ratios to be adhered to by Islamic banks in practicing their activities 
and business pursuant to this law. 
Although the new Banking Law gives the CBJ the right to issue special 
restrictions and ratios for Islamic banks, it keeps on applying the same conditions, 
tools and ratios of conventional banks on Islamic banks such as licensing conditions, 
legal lending limits, liquidity ratio, required reserve ratio, insider regulation, and 
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capital adequacy ratio. Also Islamic banks are required to adhere to the instructions 
of the CBJ concerning the control of quantity and quality of credit. 
However, four significant exceptions from banking instructions have been 
given for Islamic banks, namely exempting of special/ restrictive investment deposits 
with Islamic banks from required reserve ratios as these deposits are dedicated to 
special projects and there are no negative effects on banks' asset quality of these 
deposits (the CBJ's Memorandum No. 2000/206,27 July). Second, the CBJ requires 
all banks to build provisions consistent with the risk level of these assets. Islamic 
banks do not apply the instructions of the CBJ concerning the provisions. The 
Banking Law (2000) article (55) requires Islamic banks to have an Investment Risk 
Fund for the provisions. The purpose of this fund is to cover any losses in mutual 
investment accounts that exceed the total investment earnings in a given year. This 
account should be financed through deduction of not less than 10 percent of the net 
investment earnings realized by various operations carried out during a given year. 
This rate may be increased by the order of the CBJ, the deduction shall cease when 
the total amount in the account becomes twice the amount of paid -in capital or 
reaches, such amount as may be determined by the CBJ. Also, it considers 
investments in shares and contributions in companies as liquid assets in calculation 
of the liquidity ratio of Islamic banks like shares and bonds of conventional banks. 
The last exception concerns the accounting standards, the CBJ allowed Islamic banks 
to prepare their financial statements and data required for its purposes according to 
Accounting and Auditing of Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). 
It is worth noting that the nature of sources and uses of funds of Islamic 
banks are different from the counterparts of conventional banks. With regard to 
sources of funds, Islamic banks are not obliged to pay back for example investment 
deposits except in the case of misconduct, while demand deposits are paid fully on 
demand, therefore, the nature of both kinds of deposits should be taken into 
consideration when calculating required reserve ratios (Wilson, 1997) and liquidity 
ratio. Financing modes such as mudaraba, salam, muskaraka involve a high degree of 
risks compared to conventional bank's counterparts, which may create a rise of 
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systematic risk which may lead to negative consequences on the whole financial 
system. 
In general, the CBJ acknowledges the special nature of Islamic banks' 
sources and uses of funds compared to conventional banks, but it does not take 
particular supervisory measures consistent with the nature of Islamic banks. 
However, any supervisory system for Islamic banks should be comprehensive and 
sophisticated more than the counter part of conventional banks; particularly, it has 
deep consequences on depositors and shareholders compared to those of the 
counterparts of conventional banks. Also it must tackle the main issues facing 
Islamic banks including liquidity risk, credit risk, market risk, and operational risk. 
Also, the system should ensure training of internal auditors and external auditors on 
activities of Islamic banks and how to improve their culture on risk management and 
information disclosure. 
Summary: 
This chapter examined the main characteristics of Jordanian economy at a 
macroeconomic level, particularly those related to GDP structure and growth, 
resource gaps, employment, prices, fiscal position of government, and the main 
sources of foreign exchanges such as foreign aid and workers' remittances etc. As 
the economy has been exposed to external political and economic shocks, also, it 
suffers from the persistence of a financing gap, in terms of saving and investment, 
and exports and import as well as production and internal demand. Although the 
economy has suffered from these problems it has a prospect for growth, the main 
sources of this growth are human resources and service sector. 
Also, the chapter reviewed the financial system in Jordan from the early stage 
of development of this system in the early 1970s. This review is essential for 
understanding the foundations of economic and financial system in Jordan. The 
growth of the banking system as well as the sophistication of financial services have 
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initiated the need for strengthening banking supervision and a greater focus on the 
framework for sound banking, particularly after the emergence of problem banks. 
Moreover, This chapter reviewed regulation and supervision of licensed 
banks, in general, and Islamic banks in particular. The framework and main elements 
of regulation and supervision were discussed. It is noted that the CBJ adopts 
international standards of licensing, liquidity and reserve requirement ratios, inside 
regulation, loan classification and provisioning, and capital regulation. 
The evolution of Islamic banks in Jordan is examined through development 
of sources and uses of funds, also comparative analysis with conventional banks. 
This analysis shows that Islamic banks have attained a significant progress over the 
last few years in terms of assets and deposits. Also, the market share of Islamic is 
evolving; its relative share in the market is more than 8 percent and more than 11 
percent in terms of deposits and credits, respectively. Although, Banking Law gives 
the CBJ a right to issue special ratios and measures for Islamic banks, but it still 
applies the same standards of conventional banks on Islamic banks, such an attitude 
may discriminate against Islamic banks. However, any effort to improve Islamic 
banking on the one hand, and to increase their soundness and their competitiveness 
may necessitate the need for issuing new supervision tools consistent with special 
nature of these banks particularly, concerning capital adequacy, information 
disclosure on the other. 
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I This gap is measured by the difference between saving and investment, and the 
difference between exports and imports. 
2 World Bank, Country Assistance Evaluation, May 1,2003. 
3 This law passed by the Parliament in 2000. It inherited the Banking Law (1971). 
The main purpose of law is to modernized the banking system and improve the 
competence of financial institutions. The main elements of this law were expanded 
the financial services of banks through enabling them to work as universal banks, it 
also incorporate the Islamic banking regulations within Banking Law for the first 
time, moreover, it allows the Islamic banks to provide a wide range of financial 
services. 
The acronym is referring to capital, assets, management, earning, and liquidity. 
5 The Basel Committee has called for a limit of 25 percent of regulatory capital. 
(Basel, 1991). 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters reviewed the literature of the research. It was clear that 
Islamic banks have special characteristics different from the conventional banks counter 
parts, in terms of operations and risks. This raise the question related to the need for 
special standards to regulate and supervise these banks. The aim of this chapter is to 
design the framework for achieving the objectives of the research. As the objectives are 
directly related to investigating the foundations for regulation and supervision of Islamic 
banks, the research proceeds by developing appropriate methodology/or methodologies 
for achieving these objectives. For this purpose two methodologies are used. The first 
methodology is based on secondary data gathered for the 21 licensed banks in Jordan 
during the period 1990-2000. This methodology is an attempt to investigate the 
relationship between capital regulation and banks' riskiness. The data is called 
longitudinal data or panel data. Three analytical methods are used: pooled ordinary least 
squares, the fixed effects model and random effects model. The second methodology is 
based on cross-sectional data gathered from primary sources; this data is collected 
through questionnaires. However, the questionnaires are designed to answer the basic 
questions related to the hypotheses of the study. The hypotheses cover the foundations for 
adopting special regulations and supervisions for Islamic banks including the objectives, 
licensing conditions, credit risks, liquidity risks, capital adequacy ratio, and information 
disclosure. However, this chapter covers mainly the methodology of primary data 
analysis, while the methodology of analysis of the panel data is covered in the next 
chapter. 
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section two presents the methodologies of 
the research. Section two briefly describes the methodology that is used to analyze the 
panel data. The last section analyses the survey design, techniques of collecting the 
information and analysis methods. 
5.2 Research Methods 
Having described the nature of the phenomena of the research, which is related to 
the need for different regulation and supervision standards for Islamic banks, and 
establishing the hypotheses of the research which includes the objectives of regulation 
and supervision, objectives of deposit protection for Islamic banks, licensing measures, 
credit risk, liquidity risk, capital adequacy and information disclosure. It is also likely at 
this stage to re-raise the following questions: 
l- Are the operations of Islamic banks different from their counterparts in 
conventional batiks? 
2- If so, are the risk factors facing Islamic banks different from those of their 
counterparts in conventional banks? 
3- If so, should regulation and supervision standards of Islamic banks be 
different? 
To answer these questions the research proceeds to formulate the appropriate 
methodology/ methodologies. The design of the methodologies depends on the way in 
which data are collected. Sekaran (2003) states that data can be obtained from primary or 
secondary sources. Primary source refers to information obtained firsthand by the 
researcher on the variables of interest for a specific purpose of study (Emory and Cooper, 
1991). While secondary source refers to data gathered by bodies other than the researcher 
such as government publications, books, journals, media, annual reports of companies etc 
(Sekaran, 2003). To answer these questions two methodologies are formulated. The first 
methodology is based on secondary data available from the banking system. The second 
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methodology is based on primary data, where the information is gathered from primary 
sources through the questionnaires. Figure 6.1 illustrates the research design. 
Chart 5.1 Research Design 
Analytical study and 
hypothesis testing 
Investigating process: 
causality, group 
differences etc. 
Population/ 
Banking 
System 
1 
Primary data/stratified 
sample/questionnaires 
V 
Analysis methods: 
Mean, variance, ANOVA etc. 
Analysis methods: / OLS, fixed 
effects and random effects 
5.3 Secondary Data (Longitudinal or panel data analysis) 
Secondary data refers to information gathered by bodies other than the researcher, 
from sources that already exist. There are several sources for secondary data such as 
books, periodicals, government publications etc. Secondary data can quickly be collected 
with relatively low cost compared to primary data. Although, secondary data has these 
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advantages, Sakaran (2003) marks out the drawbacks of these data, of not meeting the 
specific needs of a particular situation and it becoming absolute. Emory and Cooper 
(1991) show that secondary data still has many advantages such as the need for a specific 
reference, it is an integral part of a large study, and it may be used as the sole reference 
for a research study; the classic example is the historical method. Moreover, secondary 
data are a major source for most researchers, as it saves time and cost compared to 
obtaining data from the primary sources, also it becomes indispensable for most research 
that needs follow-up by further research (Sakaran, 2003). 
However, the secondary data, and the analysis methods are covered in the next 
chapter. The data collection from primary sources and the analysis methods will be 
considered. 
5.4 Survey (Primary Source) 
Primary sources are important sources of data for conducting a research. The 
significance of the primary source is that it answers the specific questions of a special 
study. Emory and Cooper (1991) state that with primary sources a person can collect 
precisely the information he or she wants. With regard to the time horizon of the study, 
data can be gathered just once, which is called cross-sectional, or at different points of 
time, which is called longitudinal (Sakarna, 2003). The selection of the data from any of 
these two kinds depends on the purpose of the study and the constraints such as time and 
cost. However, this research adopts the former because it is appropriate in terms of time 
and cost. Researchers usually use different strategies to obtain the primary data from 
respondents to achieve the objective of the research. Durrani (2002) summarizes the main 
source of primary data of the following: 
(1) Observations; 
(2) Case studies; 
(3) Personal/Telephone interviews; 
(4) Questionnaires 
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Two sources of primary data, namely personal interview and questionnaires are 
covered in this research because they are directly related to the subject of this research. 
5.4.1 Personal Interviews 
A face-to-face interview is a two way conversation initiated by interviewer to 
obtain information concerning certain questions. The crucial part of the interview rests on 
the interviewer (Ferber, 1970). Emory and Cooper (1991) state that the great value of 
interview lies in the depth and detail of information that can be secured. Sekaran (2003) 
shows that this method enables the interviewer to explore and understand complex issues, 
and many ideas difficult to articulate can also be brought to the surface and discussed 
during such interviews. Robin and Babbie (1989) argue that this method increases the 
rate of response and eliminates `don't know ' questions, also the interviewer can observe 
non-verbal language from respondents. Although this method has several advantages it 
is expensive in terms of money and time, particularly when the geographic area covered 
is very large, that is why researchers usually prefer to use the questionnaires. 
5.4.2 Questionnaires 
A questionnaire is a pre-formulated written set of questions to which respondents 
record their answers usually within rather closely defined alternatives (Sekaran, 2003). 
Others use it as a more general term to include interviews that are administered either 
face to face or by telephone (Saunders, Lewis and Thrnhill, 2000). Sekaran, (2003) states 
that questionnaires are an efficient data collection mechanism when the researcher knows 
exactly what is required and how to measure the variables of interest. The questions of 
the questionnaires may be open-ended or close-ended. In this survey, the study adopted 
close-ended questions with a multiple-choice format. The purpose of this format is to 
eliminate misunderstanding and misinterpretations, on the one hand, and to get 
standardized answers that are easily interpreted and sorted on the other. 
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Questionnaires can be distributed by mail or electrically or administered 
personally. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages. Mail or electronically 
distributed- questionnaires could be used with large geographic areas. But the retain rates 
of mail are typically low, with about 30% being considered acceptable, but any doubts 
the respondents might have can not be clarified (Sakarna, 2003). Personally administered 
questionnaires are usually delivered and returned by hand to each respondent and 
collected later (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2000), the advantage of these 
questionnaires is that they allow the researcher to acquire the information within a short 
period of time and to clarify any questions. They also give an opportunity for the 
researcher to introduce the research topic. Moreover, it increases the rate of response 
from respondents. Because the population of this research is concentrated in one 
geographic area (the Capital of Jordan, Amman) most of the respondents have been 
interviewed, therefore, the author had a general discussion with them to explain the main 
objectives of the research, and to clarify questions through interview. To avoid the 
influence of the researcher on respondents, the questionnaires were lift with them to give 
the respondents enough time to consider their answers to the questions without being 
pressurized. After two weeks, a follow up process with the respondents via telephone was 
made to clarify if there had been problems in understanding any of the questions and to 
arrange collection of the questionnaires. 
5.4.2.1 Context of the Questionnaires 
The questionnaires address the basic need for different regulations and 
supervision methods for Islamic banks compared to those applied to conventional banks. 
This is attained through testing the differences among the views of the Central Bank (the 
regulator), Islamic banks, external auditors of Islamic banks and conventional banks in 
Jordan. These institutions are involved directly with regulation and supervision of banks 
in general and Islamic banks in particular. For example, the CBJ is the regularity 
authority, which designs and implements the regulatory process, it is also involved in the 
follow up of compliant of banks with their directives and instructions. Because the 
Islamic banks are the institutions that implement these directions and instructions of the 
CBJ, their points of views should be significant for this research. External auditors of 
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Islamic banks have been included in this study, because they are involved in auditing 
Islamic bank accounts, and presenting their views on these accounts, this includes capital 
adequacy ratios, risk management, and information disclosure. On the other hand, 
conventional banks were included in this study to investigate the points of view of the 
competitor part for the Islamic banks. 
To insure a high response rate accompanied with a degree of credibility, the 
respondents were assured of confidentiality of their responses. On the other hand to 
minimize "don't know" questions, personal questions were kept optional. 
With regard to the structure of the questionnaires, they contained six parts, 
according to the main hypotheses of this study with a front page containing an 
introduction and the purpose of the research. The first section addressed the personal 
background of the respondents, particularly age, qualifications, field, and current and pre- 
experience. The second section highlighted the objectives of regulation and supervision 
of Islamic banks, particularly those related to depositor protection. Section three 
addressed the questions related to the licensing process of Islamic banks, while section 
four, section five, and section six were dedicated to credit risks, liquidity risks, and 
capital adequacy ratio, respectively. The last section addressed information disclosure, 
see Appendix (B-1). 
5.4.2.2 Pre-testing of the questionnaires 
Pre-testing is a process performed to ensure that the questionnaires are well 
structured and the questions are easily understood. This is usually achieved through 
distribution of the questionnaire to a limited group of respondents. However, Malhotra 
(1996) assures that the pre-test should be extensive; it includes content, wording, 
sequence and layout, question difficulty and instruction. 
To ensure that the questions of the questionnaires are well understood, first they 
were translated into Arabic (Appendix B-2). For pre-testing the questionnaire, a sample 
was distributed among a number of colleagues at the Central Bank of Jordan to make sure 
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that it was adequately translated into the Arabic language on the one hand, and to ensure 
that questions were clearly able to be understood by the respondents on the other. 
Malhotra, 1996 states that even the best questionnaire can be improved by pre-testing. 
5.4.2.3 Sampling Design 
Researchers use sampling processes because of difficulties accompanied with 
studying the whole population. Durrani (2002) summarizes the reasons behind the 
sampling process related to time, money and logistical constraints. Sekaran (2003) states 
that selecting a significant number of elements from the population through a sample and 
understanding its properties or characteristics would make it possible to generalize these 
characteristics to the population. Therefore, researchers perform sampling as an 
alternative to the whole population of the study, since the results of the sample can be 
generalized to the whole population. 
Selection of the right sample from the whole population is an essential element for 
successful research. Sakaran (2003) states that there are two types of sampling design: 
probability and non-probability sampling. In probability sampling, each element in the 
population has a non-zero chance to be chosen in the subject sample. While on non- 
probability, the elements of population do not have any probabilities attached to their 
being chosen as a sample. Emory and Cooper (1991) classify probability sampling into 
five types: simple random, where each element has a know and an equal chance of being 
selected, systematic, where the sample is drawn from every nth element in the population, 
restricted (stratified) sampling, where several probabilities are used in designing a 
sample, cluster, where the population is divided into homogeneous subgroups, and double 
sampling, where primary data is also obtained through a sub-sample for further study. 
Sekaran (2003) illustrates that stratified random sampling offer a more viable sample, the 
efficiency is also improved in that more information can be obtained. Emory and Cooper 
(1991) declare the superiority of probability over non-probability as the former can 
reduce the sampling bias. Therefore the sample should represent the population. 
111 
CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND REGULATOR PROFILE 
Fortunately, the population of this study is the banking system and external 
auditors in Jordan; the banking system includes the regulatory authority (the Central 
Bank of Jordan), Islamic banks, conventional banks and external auditors of Islamic 
banks. The reason for the inclusion of all these institutions in the survey is to investigate 
the views of different institutions that are concerned with regulation and supervision. 
However, the selection of the institutions within the sample depends on the nature and the 
number of institutions in each group. In the case of a limited number of institutions in the 
group, all the concerned institutions are selected, like the case of Islamic banks and 
external auditors of Islamic banks, while in the case of a large number of institutions such 
as the case of conventional banks a sample is selected. The population of this study was 
about 13,500 distributed on commercial banks of about 12,750 (Ahmad, 2000), while the 
employees at the CBJ accounted for 608 (the CBJ, 2002) and remainder were workers at 
the external auditors. The number of respondents accounted for 59. 
Because the questions of the survey were quite specialized, they required the use 
of stratified sampling to select the respondents from employees in these institutions who 
were well informed about the subject of this study. With regard to the Central Bank of 
Jordan, the sample was randomly selected from the employees in the Banking 
Supervision Department. Also the sample of Islamic banks included the two Islamic 
banks in Jordan, namely, Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment (JIB) and 
Islamic International Arab Bank PLC and the questionnaires were distributed at the head 
quarter of the two banks. In contrast, the sample of conventional banks was selected to 
expand the analysis and include the views of other related institutions in regulation and 
supervision; particularly some conventional banks are concerned with Islamic financing 
modes and regulation. The sample covered four banks out of nine Jordanian commercial 
banks. These banks represented 62 percent of Jordanian commercial banks in terms of 
total assets. External auditors were incorporated in the sample because they were 
concerned with supervision of banks. However, the three external auditors who 
incorporated in the samples were auditors of the Islamic banks. 
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The author judged the sample to be comprehensive and that it incorporated most 
of the institutions concerned with this subject in Jordan. Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(DIC) was not covered, because it was still a relatively new institution as it came into 
forces in 2000, and its services did not cover deposits in the Islamic banks. 
Sample size is one of the most important elements in the survey, since the larger 
the number of the elements in the sample the lower is likely to be the error. Roscoe 
(1975) provides a nile of thumb for determining sample size (Sekaran, 2003): 
1- Sample sizes larger than 30 and less than 500 are appropriate for most 
research. 
2- Where samples are to be broken into sub-samples; (males/females, 
juniors/seniors etc. ), a minimum sample size of 30 for each category is 
necessary. 
3- In a multivariate research (including multiple regression analysis), the sample 
size should be several times (preferably 10 times or more) as large as the 
number of variables in the study. 
4- For simple experimental research with tight experiment control (matched pairs 
etc. ), successful research is possible with samples as small as 10 to 20 in size. 
5.4.2.4 Response Rate 
The response rate was significantly higher than other surveys (see Durani, 2002). 
This may be due to use of the managed questionnaire method, with a follow up process. 
Table 5.1 shows that the rate of response of selected groups reached about 70 percent of 
the distributed questionnaires. This rate was different according to the groups of 
respondents. The highest rate was registered for Islamic banks, which exceeds 83 percent, 
while the response rates for the Central Bank and conventional banks registered 70 
percent for each group. The lowest response rate came form external auditors, which did 
not exceed 64 percent. 
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Table: 5.1 Response Rates* of the Respondent Groups 
Number of 
Distributed 
Questionnaires 
Number of Received 
Questionnaires 
Response Rates* 
entral Bank 30 21 70.0 
Islamic Banks 17 14 83.0 
External Auditors 17 11 64.0 
onventional banks 20 13 70.0 
Total 84 59 70.02 
* The response rate represents the number of received questionnaires to the number of distributed 
questionnaires. 
With regard to the frequency distribution of respondent groups, the response of 
institutions concerned directly with regulation and supervision of Islamic banks 
constituted a major part of institutions covered in the survey. Table 5.2 shows that the 
frequency distribution of the Central Bank and Islamic banks (include the external 
auditors) account for 78 percent of total responses, while the remaining part represented 
the share of conventional banks. 
Table 5.2 Frequencv Distribution of Respondent Groups 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
entral Bank 21 35.6 35.6 35.6 
Islamic Banks 14 23.7 23.7 59.3 
External Auditors 11 18.6 18.6 78.0 
Commercial banks 13 22.0 22.0 100.0 
Total 59 100.0 100.0 
5.4.2.5 Data Analysis Methods 
Data is analyzed using several statistical techniques including frequency, 
descriptive, and ANOVA. Frequency analysis was used mainly to describe the profile of 
regulators, particularly age, experience, level of education etc. Descriptive analysis was 
used to summarize the respondent's responses in teens of mean, standard deviation of 
each question. ANOVA test was used to analyze the sources of differences among the 
four respondent groups. Durrani (2002) states that ANOVA is used to test the difference 
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in the means of population. Emory and Cooper (1991) summarize the condition that 
should be met for applying this analysis: the sample must be randomly selected from a 
normal population, and the error term is normally distributed with zero mean and a 
constant variance. 
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EFFECTIVENESS OF BANKING REGULATION: 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter determined the methodologies that have been adopted to 
examine the regulation and supervision standards for Islamic banks in Jordan. The 
first methodology is used in this chapter, while the second methodology is applied in 
the next chapter. 
This chapter is dedicated to the use of longitudinal data' for the banks in 
Jordan during the period 1990-2000. The aim of this chapter is basically to examine 
the effectiveness of capital regulation on the behavior of Islamic banks toward risks. 
It is worth noting that capital now acquires greater attention in banking regulation in 
developed and developing countries. The importance of capital stems from its role in 
banking business. According to Lewellyn (1997) capital is central for all aspects of 
banking business2, one of the major aspects is banking regulation. In this regard, it 
absorbs credit, market and operational risks of banking business; it also gives more 
confidence to depositors as well as a source of financing for long-term operations. 
Dhumale (2000) states that the emphasis on capital regulation comes from the fact 
that it provides appropriate incentives for banks to act prudently while promoting 
systematic stability in the financial system. 
The effectiveness and magnitude of the relationship between capital 
requirements, liquidity ratio, credit ratio, and loan-loss-provisions, and riskiness of 
Islamic banks in Jordan was tested using OLS and fixed effect and random effect 
models. The main purpose of this analysis is to investigate the differences between the 
Islamic banks and conventional banks in Jordan towards risk taking behavior. The 
structure of this chapter is as follows. Section two provides a brief review of the 
literature of the effectiveness of capital regulation. Section three sheds some light on 
the performance of some financial indicators of both groups of banks in Jordan. 
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Section four describes the methodology and data. Section five details the 
econometrics methods and results. Concluding remarks are highlighted in the last 
section. 
6.2 Literature Review 
There is widespread evidence that the development of financial markets and 
institutions plays a crucial role in economic growth and development (Brownbridge 
and Kirkpatrick, 2000). Robert and Levine (1993) find that higher levels of financial 
development are significantly and robustly correlated with faster current and future 
rates of economic growth. Moreover, this empirical literature does not establish a 
casual link (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). In contrast, Arestis and Demetriades 
(1997) attempt to show that the casual link between finance and growth is determined 
by the nature and operation of the financial institutions and policies pursued in each 
country. 
Although there is no solid evidence on the casualty between growth and 
financial development there is a widespread consistency on the importance of the 
prudential regulation and supervision for the stability and soundness of financial 
systems in developed and developing countries. For this purpose, most regulators 
want banks to hold a higher capital level to give more protection to depositors of 
individual banks and reduce potential systemic risks in the banking industry 
(Muljawan, 2002). However, increasing capital should not have an adverse 
consequence on banking competitiveness (Llewellyn, 2002, see chapter 3). 
Developments and innovations in the financial system over the last two 
decades such as securitization, derivatives, and technology have placed more pressure 
on regulatory and supervisory authorities to keep up with these developments. 
Hellmann, Thomas, Murdock, Kevin, and Stiglitz, Joseph (2000) summarized the 
changes in the systems of prudential regulation over the last two decades as the 
following. First, given the increased number and complexity of transactions, there has 
been greater emphasis on monitoring banks' risk-management systems, and less 
emphasis on monitoring individual transactions. Second, in a wave of financial- 
market liberalization, interest rates become deregulated, and restrictions on asset 
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choice of banks have been lifted. Third, greater emphasis has been placed on capital 
requirements, typically using the Bank for International Settlements standards of the 
Basel Accord. 
In the literature, the justification for prudential regulation and supervision is 
concentrated on two main issues, systemic risk and asymmetry of information. 
6.2.1 Systematic Risk 
One of the major concerns of the regulatory authority is to contain systematic 
risk in the financial sectors. This risk appears as a result of losing the depositor's 
confidence. Goodhart et al. (1998) state that the probability that the failure of a single 
bank will induce a systemic problem may be low, but, if systemic failure were to 
occur, it could be serious and the costs could be high. Wall and Peterson (1996) argue 
that equity capital provides a cushion to absorb what would otherwise cause a bank to 
fail. Also, Llewellyn (1997) claims that systemic hazard in the system could be 
countered by capital adequacy rules and active use of lender of last resort facilities. 
However, the systematic problem can be dealt with through designing 
appropriate capital regulation that is consistent with the regulators' objectives of 
reducing the number of bank failures and, at the same time not damaging the 
efficiency of the concerned financial institutions. 
Dhumle (2000) assumes that the same risk encountered by the supervisory 
authorities in emerging markets are even greater due to, in some part, to the small and 
often more concentrated nature of their economies, where the market's ability to 
monitor banks is hampered by poor information. He also suggests the following 
measures for containing the systematic risk: erecting entry barriers, minimum capital 
requirements, forcing market discipline in money and capital market and being 
supervised by regulatory agencies. 
The major concern of the regulator is to control the banks' risks through 
regulation. The main tool of this regulation is capital adequacy. Several studies have 
addressed the effect of capital adequacy regulation on banks' risks, since banks may 
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respond to the increase in regulatory capital by increasing their risks. This is the 
subject of last part of this section. 
6.2.2 Information asymmetry 
Banks are subject to adverse selection and moral hazard because of the 
asymmetry of information (chapter 3). Some researchers argue that activation of these 
problems is due to deregulation. Hellmann and Thomas (2000) declare that the 
deregulation of the financial market increases competition, which erodes profits, 
lower profits imply lower franchise values (i. e., the capitalized value of expected 
future profits); and the lower the franchise value the lower incentives for making good 
loans thus increasing moral hazard. Also they affirm that with sufficient competition, 
banks will have desirable interests to gamble. Thus there is no consistency between 
interest rate liberalization and the prudential behavior of banks. 
Researchers agree that the financial crises have become more apparent in the 
last two decades; the main cause of this crisis is moral hazard3, which plays an 
important role in the failures. The challenge facing regulators is to design a regulatory 
policy that affects the behavior of banks subject to the moral hazard problem. 
Dliumale (2000) argues that prudential regulation and supervision as incentive 
mechanisms encourage the potential monitoring groups to curb excess risk taking 
activities by banks. 
In summary, financial crises have become more frequent, while observers 
agree that moral hazard plays an important role in the bank failures (Hellmann, et al., 
2000). 
The next part is dedicated to illustrating the capital regulation and its 
relationship with banks' riskiness. 
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6.2.3 Capital Regulation and Banks' Riskiness 
In the last two decades much research has been conducted to the study of the 
effectiveness of capital regulation and bank risks. A good summary of these studies 
can be found in a study conducted by Wall and Peterson (1996). Most of these studies 
are based on modern finance theories to study the relationship between capital 
structure of banks and its relationship with risks. 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) state that the main concern of prudential 
regulation is the solvency of banks, namely the relationship between equity, debt, and 
asset riskness, also as equity is an external source of financing owned by shareholders, 
the solvency is mainly related to the determination of the debt-equity ratio or the 
capital structure of banks. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) illustrate in their seminal paper that the value of 
a company is independent from its financial structure4. Llewellyn (1997) summarizes 
the work of Modigliani and Miller as follows: 
" 
.... any 
investment project and its concomitant financing plan must pass 
only the following test: will the project, as financed, raise the market value 
of the firm's shares? If so, it is worth undertaking: if not, its' return is less 
than the cost of capital of the firm". 
Llewellyn considers the created market value as positive when the return on 
invested capital exceeds the weighted average cost of capital. 
Many researchers study the effectiveness of capital regulation on controlling 
banks' incentive to undertake risks, particularly with the existence of deposit 
insurance schemes and the existence of the hypotheses principal-agent and moral 
hazard argument. Most literature analyzes the influence of capital structure on 
shareholders' and managers' risk-taking incentives. The following brief review of 
literature sheds some light on research on this issue. 
Koehn and Santomero (1980) studied the portfolio reaction to capital 
requirements by investigating the effect of capital regulation on the portfolio behavior 
of commercial banks. They found that imposing a minimum capital assets ratio may 
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not achieve the objectives of the supervisory authority; the opposite result can be 
expected. 
Also Rochet (1992) studied the consequences of capital regulation on the 
portfolio choice of commercial banks using future perspective toward profits. As the 
objective of the commercial banks is the maximization of the market value of their 
future profits, the capital regulation can not prevent banks from choosing very 
specialized and very risky portfolio. 
Kim and Santomero (1988) studied the role of capital adequacy regulations in 
controlling banks' risk using the single-period mean-variance model, they found that 
the traditional uniform capital ratio regulation is an ineffective way to control risk and 
maintain a safe and sound banking system because it ignores the individual banks' 
different preferences structures and allows risky banks to circumvent the restrictions 
via financial leverage and /or business activities. On the other hand, Blum (1999) 
studied the effect of capital adequacy rules on banks' risk taking behavior using a 
dynamic framework, he found a new intertemporal effect can arise which leads to an 
increase in risk. The intuition behind this result is that under binding capital 
requirement an additional unit of equity tomorrow is more valuable to a bank. If 
raising equity is excessively costly, the only possibility to increase equity tomorrow is 
to increase risk today. Also, Blum (1999), using the dynamic framework model, found 
that capital adequacy might increase a bank's riskiness. 
Flannery (1998) used the concept of agency cost to determine banks' capital 
structure. He found that lower capital ratio imposes desirable limits on management 
and reduces the need for shareholder monitoring, this increases the incentives of 
shareholders to have management undertake riskier projects. 
Keeley and Furlong (1990) and Dhumale (2000) concluded the stringent 
capital as an incentive mechanism may increase risk, which may lead to high 
probability of banks' failure. These regulations may not be accurate because it has 
mischaracterized the banks' investment opportunity set by neglecting the existence of 
deposit insurance system. 
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In summary, all these studies declare that capital restrictions increase banks' 
riskiness, and thereafter increase the probability of bank failure. On the other hand, 
the result of other studies is ambiguous ( Llewellyn, 1997). 
The question is whether the banks can offset the adverse effect of moral 
hazard by placement of sufficient capital requirements. Hellmann, et al. (2000) found 
that if banks hold more capital they will internalize the adverse consequence of 
gambling and thus will choose to invest prudently. But the bank must be forced to 
hold an inefficiently high amount of capital, also he argues that capital requirements 
alone are not sufficient because with freely determined interest rates, banks have an 
excess incentive to compete for deposits by offering higher interest rates. Capital 
requirement becomes effective when they raise banks' costs sufficiently to impact the 
willingness of banks to pay out high deposit rates. 
Also, Flannery (1989), using portfolio analysis for banks' holding, claims that 
the bank examination process and capital regulation tend to affect the attitude toward 
risk taken, which leads insured banks to prefer relatively low-risk individual loans, 
even while they pursue high portfolio risk in order to maximize their benefits from 
deposit insurance system. 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) view capital rules as a means to efficiently 
allocate control rights between different groups of claim holders, therefore indirectly 
influencing the incentives of managers toward risk. 
In contrast, to the assumptions of other literature on the impact capital 
regulation, which assume capital regulation are hard wired into the decision making of 
banks. Milne (2002) argues that capital requirements are monitored ex-post and a 
penalty is imposed on the shareholders of the bank in the event of a breach. Milne 
concludes that the impact of capital regulation on a banks' portfolio depends upon 
both the net worth and the expected profitability of the banks. He distinguishes among 
three, situations. Over the medium term the healthy banks with sufficiently high 
expected profits will aim to increase their capitalization to the level where the threat 
of regulatory capital breach is small. In the short run, however, the threat of infringing 
regulatory capital requirements may have a significant impact on portfolio decision. 
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Finally, for "walking dead" institutions, for which insolvency can be only postponed 
not avoided, regulatory capital requirements will no longer be an effective restraint on 
behavior. 
Do banks respond to capital regulation? Wall and Peterson (1996) indicate 
that the regulators should care whether banks meet the regulations by reducing the 
volume of their risky activities or not. However, regulators do not have many options 
except putting up the appropriate regulatory framework inter alia banking entry 
requirements, capital regulation and examining the compliance of banks to these 
regulations. Taking into consideration, these regulations should not reduce the 
efficiency and competition in the market. 
6.2.4 Capital Regulation of Islamic Banks 
Islamic finance provides a different banking system than that of conventional 
banks. The main element of this system is sharing of profit and loss between 
shareholders and the holders of investment accounts (chapter 2). Therefore, the 
relationship between risk and capital structure in an Islamic perspective is different 
from that of conventional banks. 
Some researchers argue that the conventional capital structure does not apply 
to Islamic banks. Al Deehani et al., (1999) argue that the concept of financial risk, in 
which modem capital structure theories are built, is inadequate to tie down the capital 
structure of Islamic banks. This analysis is based on an empirical test of annual 
accounts of a panel data of 12 Islamic banks. It shows that deposit accounts financing 
may enable an Islamic bank to increase market value and its shareholders' rates of 
return without incurring extra financial risk. This result contradicts the Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) theory of capital structure. In contrast, Vogel and Samuel (1998) claim 
that although Islamic finance is often described as "equity-based, " the use of debt-like 
contracts is widespread. Therefore, the cost of funds is not fully defined by the cost of 
equity alone. 
Muljawan (2002) discusses the contract choice of Islamic banks in terms of 
two objective functions: minimizing risk and maximizing religious utility. The 
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contracting parties will always try to maximize their utility subject to the level of 
certainty of the outcomes. However, Muljawan identifies four possible contractual 
problems in Islamic banking: Unobservable effort (Moral Hazard); hidden 
productivity (adverse selection); poor accounting standards; and price disparities. 
In contrast, Elhiraika (1999) argues that information asymmetry will be lower 
in PLS systems as opposed to the conventional systems, as all parties share the risk in 
investment activities, and returns depend on the investment's performance, and moral 
hazard and incentive effect may be reduced by PLS mechanisms (this issue is 
discussed in chapter 3). 
Wilson (1998) elaborates on the East Asia financial crisis, he states that the 
isolation of the ultimate fund provider from the fund users was behind the crises in 
East Aias (Elhiraika, 1999). While the PLS provides a mechanism where both parties 
of the contract are tied to the investment risks of the project. Moreover, in the PLS 
both parties are more informed about the performance of the projects. 
6.3 Some Descriptive Statistics of Conventional Banks and 
Islamic Banks In Jordan: 
The banking system in Jordan is used to over-regulation in terms of market 
entry and capital requirements. Since the end of 1980s a new wave of deregulation has 
taken place by allowing some financial institutions to restructure as banks. Al- 
Kasaneh, et al. (1997) states that the banking system was heavily regulated until the 
end of 1980s. 
Before analyzing the effectiveness of banking regulation in Jordan in the 
1990s on both Islamic banks and conventional banks, it is worth shedding some light 
on the performance of the main financial indicators of conventional banks and Islamic 
banks that are used in the analysis in this chapter. Table 6.1 shows five variables, 
namely capital to deposit ratio (CAPDEP), return to asset ratio before taxes (ROA), 
credit to asset ratio (CRAS), loan-loss-provisions to credit ratio (PRCR), and variance 
of return (DEVROA2) (measured by the square deviation of ROA from the mean 
value for each bank). It is also worth noting the strong correlation between Islamic 
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banks and conventional banks on two variables (CAPDEP and ROE). The reason for 
the former is due to the fact that the capital regulation applies equally to both Islamic 
banks and conventional banks' with regard to ROE, it is mainly due to the 
competition between both groups in maintaining their current depositors by paying a 
relatively similar ratio of profit to the equity holders. With regard to credit to asset 
ratio (CRAS), loan-loss-provisions to credit ratio (PRCR), and the variance 
DEVROA2 they show a correlation between the two groups. But a weak relation can 
be found between them concerning liquidity to deposit ratio (LIQDEP), this is due to 
the lack of instruments for liquidity management, particularly for Islamic banks, 
where the Islamic banks hold relatively higher idle liquidity ratio compared to 
conventional banks. 
Figure 6.1 confirms the result concerning the capital to deposit ratio, it also 
declares that Islamic banks have had higher capital to deposit ratios than conventional 
banks since 1998; this reflects the caution of the regulatory authority for the risk of 
banks in general, and Islamic banks in particular on the one hand, and the willingness 
of the shareholder to increase the capital of the banks on the other. It is worth noting 
that the capital of the JIB rose 5.5 times5 during the period 1990-2002. However, this 
rise did not coincide with other financial indicators, such as assets, which only 
increased by 2.3 times during the same period 
Table 6.1 Correlation Matrix of Some Indicators of Islamic Banks and Conventional 
Banks 
--- [C-onventional Banks 
Islamic ROA DEVROA2 ROE CAPDEP CRAS LIQDEP PRCR 
Banks ROA -0.2 
DEVROA2 -0.5 
ROE 0.8 
CAPDEP 0.9 
CRAS 0.6 
LIQDEP 0.4 
PRCR 0.6 
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Figure 6.1: Capital to Deposit Ratio of Islam ic(IBCAPDEP) 
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Islamic banks have more capital than conventional banks; this should work to 
lower the level of their risks, but their risks seem to be higher. Figure 6.2 depicts the 
volatility of the performance of risk (measured by variance of return DEVROA2) of 
Islamic banks and conventional banks, it is clear that Islamic banks' risk is higher 
than the counterpart of conventional banks. The main reasons for this volatility of the 
return are due to the fact that Islamic banks are exposed to unfriendly environments 
over the last years from regulatory authority compared to the conventional banks. 
Also, due to deterioration of the performance of the economy as a result of regional 
instability, the economy witnessed a sluggish economic performance 1996-1999 with 
GDP lower than the growth rate in the population (Chapter 4). As a result of this, 
banks lowered their credit exposure through rationalizing credit to creditworthy 
borrowers; at the same time, they depended more on the CBJ's CDs, which gave 
respectively a higher interest rate and were free of risk. However, Islamic banks did 
not benefit from this instrument, even though they had excess liquidity at the CBJ. 
This negatively affected the performance of these banks, particularly the net income 
and its ratio to assets and equity. 
The fact that Islamic banks usually have a relatively better affect on the real 
economy compared with conventional banks, particularly when it faces temporary 
shocks has been confirmed in the case of Islamic banks in Jordan. This can be seen 
through the higher ratio of their credit to total credit of banks in Jordan during the 
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period 1997-2000, which accounted more than 11 percent of total banks' credits, 
even their ratio of banks' capital represented 7.8 percent. This asserts the 
commitments of these banks to financing even in averse circumstances. In contrast 
with the conventional banks, which lowered their credit growth rate significantly 
during the same period. 
Figure 6.2 Variance of Return of Islamic Banks 
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The following section describes the methodology for estimating these 
relationships using econometric analysis. 
6.4 Methodology and Data 
After reviewing the literature concerning capital regulation and the responses 
of banks to these regulations, this section is dedicated to describing the methodology 
that is used to achieve the objective of this chapter including the model, choice of 
variables, data, the hypotheses and testing methods. 
6.4.1 Lackman Model 
Lackman (1986) developed a mathematical model for capital constraints and 
risk taking behavior of management. This model is based on earlier work of 
Michaelson and Goshay (MG). They indicate that the traditional financial objective of 
maximizing stockholders' wealth leads to indeterminate assets and liability structure 
for financial intermediary. This argument relies in part on the work of Modigliani and 
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Miller (1958), which is discussed in section 2; they demonstrate that in a perfect 
capital market and in the absence of taxes shareholders can substitute `home made 
leverage' for corporate leverage, thereby making the capital structure of the firm 
indeterminate. MG use similar reasoning to demonstrate that the use of ` homemade' 
diversification by shareholders can offset corporate diversification, thereby making 
the asset structure of the financial intermediary indeterminate, also, they postulate the 
existence of an institutional utility function that is common to all fines in a given 
financial industry. Lackman (1986) builds his model based on their argument; he 
claims that there is empirical evidence of existence of a leaner relationship between 
expected return and variance of return on capital. Lackman based his model on a 
portfolio theory approach; he tested the effect of three different types of capital 
adequacy constraints on the bank's portfolio. These constraints included 
capital/deposits ratio, capital/risky assets ratio and capital /adjusted risky assets ratio. 
Lackuran concluded that the first ratio induces banks to shift from safe assets to risky 
assets, which may not be the intention of regulators; this may increase the probability 
of losses and consequently bank failure. In the second and third ratios there will be a 
shift in the bank portfolio toward less risky assets and reduce the variance of return on 
capital. 
Mohammad (1994) states three reasons for using Lackman model: 
1- It is free of restrictive assumptions, a fact that makes it applicable to 
different banking market. 
2- The model is based on the pure mathematical derivation of 
relationships between capital, and profitability and riskiness. This 
indicates that the model is basically scientific, and is isolated from 
any orientation or attitude toward capital adequacy issues. 
Because of unavailability of data on capital to risky assets and capital adjusted 
risky asset ratio, only one case of Lackman's model is examined in this study, which 
is related to the first case of this model. 
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6.4.2 Choice of Variables 
The choice of financial variables in this chapter is based on the theory 
underling previous explanations and model specification as well as data availability. 
For the dependent variable of banks' risk factor, DEVROA2 is used as a proxy for the 
variance of return on assets of each bank. Also, the basic model adopts variance of 
return on assets. Mohammad (1994) also used the variance of return on assets'. For 
independent variables, four variables were adopted. For capital, the ratio of capital to 
deposits (CAPDEP) was used to test the sensitivity of capital regulation constraints on 
the Islamic banks' riskiness. In Jordan, banks were forced to have capital to deposit 
ratio of at least 6% (chapter 4). Mohammad (1994) also used this ratio. Therefore, this 
variable is adopted in this study as a regulatory constraint. With regard to credit risk, 
credit to assets ratio (CRAS) is used. This ratio is a good indicator of vulnerability of 
banks to the size of credit to total assets, as credit risk is a major risk facing banks 
(Elgari, 2003). Liquidity ratio is measured by liquid asset to deposit (LIQDEP). This 
ratio is used to test the sensitivity of risk to the change in the composition of the liquid 
assets to deposit ratio; Also, this ratio is also used by Mohammad (1994). As no 
information is available on non-performing loans in the banking system, which 
represent the quality of the bank's portfolio loans, loan-loss-provisions to credit ratio 
is used (PRCR) as a proxy for quality of the loans. 
Is the magnitude of Islamic banks' risk higher than the counterpart of 
conventional banks? To answer this question Lackman's panel regression model8 is 
used to estimate the relationship between capital constraint, credit, liquidity and 
provisions on the one hand, and bank's risks on the other. For this purpose a panel 
data analysis for the licensed banks in Jordan is carried out. The software used is 
LIMDEB. 
6.4.3 Data 
The source of data is the Central Bank of Jordan. This data is extracted from 
the annual balance sheets and income statements of licensed banks in Jordan. They 
consist of 21 batiks, where 16 are commercial banks and 5 foreign commercial banks, 
where two banks operating on the basis of Islamic financial principles. Data were 
gathered for the period 1990-2000. The main reason for selecting this period is the 
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availability of information, and because it came after the appearance of economic 
crisis and collapse of two major banks in Jordan. Thereafter the government adopted 
an economic restructuring program (chapter 4) with cooperation from the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Moreover, this period witnessed a 
relaxation of regulation conditions, particularly those related to bank entry by 
allowing some financial institutions to register as banks. 
The study deals with pool panel data. Greene (2003) states the analysis of 
panel data or longitudinal data as the subject of one of the most active and innovative 
bodies in literature in economics, partly because panel data provide such a rich 
environment for the development of estimation techniques and theoretical results. 
Arellano (2003) states that panel data provided the possibility of following the same 
individual over time, which facilitates the analysis of dynamic responses and control 
of unobserved heterogeneity, given that we are dealing with different units. The 
advantage of panel data is that it gives more informative data, more variability, less 
collinearity among variables, a greater degrees of freedom and more efficiency 
(Gujarati, 2003). However, the fundamental advantage of a panel data set over a cross 
section is that it allows the researcher great flexibility in modeling differences in 
behavior across individuals (Greene, 2003). Since the basic aim of this chapter is to 
investigate the magnitude of Islamic banks risks compared to other conventional 
banks, panel data constitutes a significant source in achieving this aim. 
6.4.4 The Null Hypotheses 
The null hypotheses to be tested are as follows: 
6.4.4.1 Capital Adequacy 
The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the capital 
adequacy of banks and their riskiness. 
H0 : b1=0 
Where bi is the coefficient describing the relationship between the 
aforementioned variables. While the alternative hypothesis will be that there is 
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a relationship between the two variables, and the coefficient is significantly 
different than zero. 
Hl: b100 
6.4.4.2 Credit Ratio 
The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the credit extended 
by the banks and their riskiness. 
Ho: b2=0 
6.4.4.3: Liquidity Ratio 
The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the liquidity ratio 
of banks and their riskiness. 
Ho : b3=0 
6.4.4.4: Loan Loss Provisions 
The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the loan- loss- 
provision ratio of banks and their riskiness 
Ha : b4=O 
Where b4 is the coefficient describing the relationship between loan loss 
provisions to credit ratio of banks and their riskiness 
In summary, the null hypothesis is that, for example, there is no relationship 
between capital adequacy of bank i and its riskiness. The alternative hypothesis is that 
there is a relationship between the above-mentioned variables, which means that the 
coefficient is statistically significant. 
6.5 Econometric Estimations 
The hypotheses of the study are tested by two methods, ordinary least squares 
(OLS) used to estimate the relationships for all banks in Jordan (as one group) and 
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fixed effects and random effects; the latter is used to show the differences in 
magnitude toward risk for Islamic banks and conventional banks. 
6.5.1 Ordinary Least Square Model 
Ordinary least square model is used to verify the differences in magnitude 
toward risks of all banks. The model to be tested is as follows: 
DEVROA2 it =a +01 CAPDEP 1t+ 02 CRAS ; t+ 03 LIQDEP; t + 04 PRCRI, + Ell (6.1) 
The main variables are: 
DEVROA21t: The variance of returns on assets of bank i in year t. 
CAPDEP it: The capital to deposits ratio of banks i in year t, 
CRAS it : The credit to total assets ratio of bank i in year t, 
LIQDEP it: The liquidity to total deposits ratio of bank i in year t, 
PRCR it: The loan loss provisions to total credit ratio. 
Eit: The error terms, 
a, b1, b 2, b3, b4, are the estimation coefficients. 
In the light of Lackman's model there is a negative relationship between risk 
(measured by square deviation of ROA from the mean value for the corresponding 
years of the study) and banks' capital. It is also hypothesized that the relationship 
between risk and credit to assets ratio (PRCR) is positive. The higher the ratio of 
credit to total assets the higher will be the exposure of a bank to borrowers' default. 
With regard to liquidity ratio, it is expected that liquidity to deposit ratio (LIQDEP), 
as a proxy for liquidity strength, has a negative relationship with risk, this means the 
higher the liquidity ratio the less risky the bank will be and visa a visa. Depositors' 
trust to bank is enhanced when a bank maintains a higher cash deposit ratio. This 
study incorporates a new variable to test for the quality of loans (loan-loss-provisions 
to credit ratio). It is expected the higher the ratio of provisions the more weak the loan 
quality, because these provisions are usually built as part of regulatory requirements 
(Chapter 4). Therefore, it is expected to see a positive relationship between PRCR 
and banks' riskiness. 
133 
CHAPTER 6 EFFECTIVENESS OF BANKING REGULATION 
6.5.1.1 Empirical Regression Results 
The empirical model was estimated with panel data for eleven years 1990 to 
2000 on twenty-one banks in Jordan. This analysis was done in two stages. The first 
stage was done using ordinary least squire (OLS) for all banks in Jordan as one group 
to demonstrate the magnitude of the dependent variables for all banks. The hypothesis 
tests the influence of capital to deposit ratio, credit risk and liquidity ratio and loan- 
loss-provisions to credit ratio on adding pressures on the risks of banks in Jordan. The 
second stage tested the hypothesis through fixed effect and random effect. This was 
done to investigate the differences between Islamic banks and conventional banks 
toward risk. 
6.5.1.2 Ordinary Least Square Results 
The estimation of the coefficient of the concerned variables was run using 
equation 6.1. The results of regression of the OLS estimation are reported in Table 
(6.2). These results declare that all dependent variables are statistically significant. 
These results are relatively similar to the results of Mohammad (1994), who studied a 
similar equation using the first three indicators for the period (1979-1992). 
Capital to deposit ratio of licensed banks shows a positive relationship with 
bank's risk at the one percent level. The response coefficient of this variable was 
0.116 and is significant at the one percent level. This means that the higher the capital 
to deposit ratio the higher the variance of return on assets (riskiness). However, this 
result contradicts the result of the Lackuran mode (section 6.4.1), which assumes the 
variance will be negatively correlated with capital to deposits. The reason for the 
positive relationship between capital and riskness may be due to the reaction of banks' 
management to capital constraints. However, this result is consistent with the findings 
of some studies discussed in section two (Koehn and Santomero, 1980, Lan and Chen, 
1985, Rochet, 1992, Kim and Santomero, 1988, Blum, 1999, Fennery, 1994, and 
Keely and Furlong, 1990). 
The case of banks in Jordan is also related to the slow down in economic 
activities toward the second half of the last decade as a result of the instability in the 
region, which severely affected banking activities and therefore, banks' profitability. 
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Also, it is related to asymmetry of information toward the quality of the borrowers, 
particularly during a period of slow down of the economy, where banks are expected 
to increase their liquidity at the expense of credit. On the other hand, banks may end 
up with an adverse selection problem, and thereafter lower their quality of borrowers 
bringing a higher level of bad debt. 
On the other hand, banks are forced by regulation to maintain capital to 
deposit ratios at a certain level (7.5%). Mohammad states they are required either to 
raise capital or to restrict deposits. Since the latter is an irrational decision, the only 
alternative is to raise internal funds through Tier 1 or Tier 2. Llewellyn (1992) argues 
that raising funds through Tier 2 is limited to not exceeding Tier 1, taking into 
consideration the lack of bond market in Jordan, the only strategic option available is 
to raise Tier 1 because raising funds through this may dilute earnings per share for 
existing shareholders. Therefore, the only way to raise capital is through increasing 
profits, which may lead to higher risk taking by the banks' management. 
Table 6.2 DEVROA2 Regression results for testing the effectiveness 
of banking regulation (All banks) 
Variable Coefficient 
Estimates 
Standard 
Deviation 
T- Ratio P- value 
Constant 8.6085 2.9968 2.873* . 0045 CAPDEP 0.116 
. 3017E-01 
3.849* . 0002 
CRAS -. 8822E-01 . 4033E-01 -2.188** . 0298 LIQDEP -. 1005 . 2736E-01 -3.675* . 
0003 
PRCR 
. 
8421 E-01 . 1379E-01 
6.106 * . 
0000 
R -square 21.4% 
DW 1.86 
F- ratio 14.06 
" Denote significant atl% level 
** Denote significant at 5% level 
With regard to the liquidity ratio, the result of regression indicates an inverse 
relationship between the liquidity ratio and the riskiness. The coefficient of this 
variable is 0.1 and is significant at one percent level. The interpretation of this is that 
an increase in liquidity ratio lowers the probability of banks' riskiness. This result 
seems to be consistent with what is expected as banks a have higher liquidity ratio the 
more the depositors' trust is. This is behind the intuition of regulatory authority in 
enforcing the liquidity ratio; it is worth noting that the liquidity ratio should not be 
lower than 30 % in Jordan (chapter 4). As banks have higher liquidity ratios the 
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relative exposures to default will be lower, therefore diminishing the probability to 
liquidity risk. Moreover, conventional banks in Jordan invest a large portion of their 
assets in Certificates of Deposit (CDs) issued by the CBJ, since the interest rate on 
the CDs used to be relatively high and was risk-free. This encourages the banks to 
increase their holding of liquid assets (chapter 4). Consequently, this lowers the level 
of their riskiness. 
Also, the regression test shows that there is an inverse relationship between the 
credits to assets ratio (as a proxy for credit risk). The coefficient of this variable is 
0.088, and is significant at the five percent level. The interpretation of this is that the 
higher the credit to asset ratio the lower the banks' riskiness. This result contradicts 
what is expected. It seems that the higher the credit ratio the more conservative the 
banks will be in assessing the credit facilities, which lowers the possibility of default 
and variance on return. Also, it is related to the fact that banking services concentrated 
on credit before the Banking Law of 2000, and the effect of slow down in the 
economy, as mentioned, since the bank lowered the growth rate of their credit has 
affected their profits. 
As expected, the loan loss provision ratio and riskiness shows a positive 
relationship, with the response of the coefficient being 0.084, and is significant at one 
percent level, which means that the higher the loan-loss-provision to credit ratio, the 
higher will be the variance of return on assets (risk). However, the higher provisions 
reflect higher non- performing loans in banks portfolios, as this provision is usually 
built as a request from the regulatory authority to cover non-performing loans. 
The ultimate objective of regulation and supervision of banks is to face market 
imperfections (Llewellyn, 1995). To face these problems and the consequences of 
moral hazard problems, the regulatory authority imposes capital adequacy rules. 
Unfortunately, the response of banks to capital adequacy ratio increases risk and 
uncertainty. This is confirmed by the work of Koehn and Santomero (1980), Kim and 
Santomero (1988) Keeley and Furlong (1990) Flannery (1994) and Dhumale (2000) 
(literature review). Moreover, the empirical result of this study using capital 
regulation in Jordan, also confirms that the higher the capital regulation, the more 
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risky the banks will be, particularly, due to deregulation of financial markets, which 
enhance the competitiveness among banks for a limited stake in the financial market. 
The study aims to find a specific way to take account of the special nature of 
Islamic banks and conventional banks in Jordan, this will be examined through both 
fixed effect and random effect. 
6.5.2 Fixed and random effect model 
To investigate the differences in magnitude of regulation for Islamic banks and 
conventional banks, in terns of the effects of capital adequacy (CAPDEP), credit ratio 
(CRAS), liquidity ratio (LIQDEP), and provisions (PRCR) on banks' riskiness, as 
well as the difference in the characteristics among Islamic banks and conventional 
banks, the fixed effects and random effect models are used. Since these tests take 
account of individual and / or time differences in behavior effects in the context of 
panel data regression, the regression coefficients are allowed to vary across 
individuals (Banks) and /or time (period of the study 1990-2000). The differences in 
the regression coefficient can be depicted in the intercept and the slope parameters. 
6.5.2.1 Fixed effects model 
Fixed effect model (FEM) takes into account the individuality of each 
company (bank) or each cross-sectional unit by letting the intercept vary for each 
company, but still assuming that the slope coefficient is constant across companies 
(Gujarati, 2003). 
The differences across unit are captured in the differences in the constant 
terms (Greene, 2003). These differences may be due to special entrepreneurial or 
managerial skills of the firm's executives (Baltaji, 2003). 
The formulation of the model assumes that differences across units can be 
captured in differences in the constant term (Greene, 2003). This model can be 
estimated by letting the intercept vary for each bank, but it still assumes it is constant 
over time, while the slopes of coefficients of independent variables do not vary across 
banks or over time (Gujarati, 2003). 
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y;, = a; + b'x1, + ci, (6.2) 
Where a; s represents individual specific constant intercepts for each bank. 
The model is allowed to vary across banks by using dummy variables. Equation (6.2) 
can be re-written with dummy variables as: 
y;, =a, d, 1, +a2d,;, +..... +b'x;, +Bi, (6.3) 
Where d,;, =1 if the observation belongs to bank number one, 0 otherwise, 
d,,, =1 if observation belong to bank number two and so forth. 
To test for the groups or individual effects (bank) the t ratio can be used. But 
for the test of the hypothesis that the coefficient is equal zero, this is typically not 
useful for testing in this regression context, therefore, the differences across groups 
then can be tested according to the hypothesis that the constant terms are all equal 
with the F test (Greene, 2003). 
6.5.2.2 Random effects model 
Random effect model (REM) considers a; as an individual specific 
disturbance. The intercept for each firm can be expressed as follows: 
a. =a, +Er, where ci is the error term for each bank i. Therefore the random 
model can be written as (green, 2003): 
a, +h'x;, +e;, +u; 
Where: E[u, ]=0, var[ it ;]= Qe 
2 cov[ e;, u, ]=0 
(6.4) 
6.5.2.3 Estimation of Fixed Effect and Random Effect 
Model: 
The basic regression equation for testing banking regulation using fixed effects and 
random effects is as follows: 
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DEVROA 2;, = b,; + b, CAPDEP, + b3LIQDEP;, + b, CRAS;, + bSPRCR -I- e;, (6.5) 
The coefficient response of the variables of both results, fixed effects and 
random effects confirm the previous OLS test, with higher explanation for the 
coefficient of determination, as the R2 increases to 32.6% compared with 21.4% for 
the OLS without any restrictions (Table 6.3). Therefore the explanation of the 
variables is not different in these tests from the previous one. 
To choose between REM and FEM, Gujarati (2003) states that if the error 
teen and the regressors are uncorrelated, REM may be appropriate, where as if the 
error and the regressors are correlated, FEM may be appropriate (Gujarati, 2003). 
There are other factors that affect the error term, but can not be represented in the 
model (unobserved variables), it is expected that the fixed effect model is appropriate 
for this study. 
Also, to investigate the differences between Islamic banks and conventional 
banks Hausman's test9 was conducted. This test favors fixed effects over random 
effects, which assures that the difference between the two groups can be depicted 
through the intercept. It is worth noting that there were no changes for the significance 
of the explanatory variables from the previous regression. 
However, the fixed effect model declares that Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB), 
which is the oldest Islamic bank in Jordan, had a higher fixed effect coefficient than 
most similar banks in terms of assets, deposits, and capital. More specifically, the 
coefficient value was 11.2, which put the JIB with groups of small and risky banks in 
the banking system (Table, 6.4). However, the most risky conventional banks are 
those that have suffered from serious financial problems over the previous years. This 
reflects the specific characteristics of both banks in Jordan. 
Elaboration on the results for Islamic banks declares interesting results. There 
is a positive relationship between Islamic banks' risk and the change in capital to 
deposit ratio like other banks. Taking into consideration the higher risks inherent in 
Islamic financing modes, it is expected that Islamic banks have higher capital to 
deposit ratio. Moreover, banks' management is not only under the pressure of 
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shareholders to increase their return, which may lead to higher risks, but also from the 
bank's management itself to compensate the holders of investment accounts, other 
wise they may withdrawal their deposits, particularly with high competition fi-om 
conventional banks. This is also behind the calls for raising the capital adequacy of 
Islamic banks (Al-Hammar in Wilson, 1997). While others suggest the need for a 
different methodology for capital adequacy for Islamic banks (Obaidullah, 2000, 
Chapra and Khan, 2000, Islmail, etal., 2002) 
Also, the regression result declares that the higher the liquidity ratio, the lower 
the banks' riskiness. Although when the ratio of liquidity is higher it gives more 
confidence for the depositors, this is for a certain level, but Islamic banks suffer from 
over-liquidity. This is related to unavailability of instruments for liquidity 
management on the one hand and unavailability of lender of last resort on the other. 
Also, Wilson (1997) relates this to the absence of a secondary market for Islamic 
financial institutions. This may necessitate the need for finding appropriate 
instruments for Islamic banks. Radwan (1995) calls for financing from the central 
banks for Islamic banks in a form of mudarabah deposits. However, some countries 
such as Sudan, and Bahrain innovated special instruments for management of 
liquidity for their Islamic banks. 
With regard to credit to assets, the regression results show that the higher the 
ratio of credit the lower the ratio of risk, it is expected that Islamic banks are facing 
different credit risk than those of conventional banks, particularly for PLS, therefore a 
positive relationship between them was expected. Al Omar and Abdel Haq (1996), 
and Sundararajan (2000) declare that the risk of the Islamic banks' portfolio if not 
recognized and supervised could lead to systemic risk for the financial system. 
Although, Presley and Sessions (1994) state the ability of Islamic banks to overcome 
asymmetry of information through the sharing of project return between owner of the 
capital and entrepreneur, but the problem of principal-agent-problem can not be ruled 
out. Also see, Nienhaus (1993), Ford, et al. (1998) and Presley and Dar (1999). 
On the other hand, the Loan-loss-provisions to credit ratio show a positive 
relation with banks' risks. The higher the ratio of provision may give a signal about 
the size of non-performing loans in the bank' portfolio, therefore, the higher ratio of 
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provisions the higher the expected rate of default in the bank's portfolio, which has an 
adverse affect on credit risk of Islamic banks. It is worth noting that Islamic banks 
used to be reluctant in building such reserves (chapter 4). This issue was solved with 
issuance of the new Banking Law of 2000, which required these banks to build 
adequate provisions consistent with the level of asset risk. Errico and Farahbaksh 
(1998) declare that because systematic risk can not be eradicated researchers call for 
building adequate reserves for preserving the solvency and the viability of Islamic 
banks. 
In summary, the empirical analysis confirms that bank regulations such as 
capital, liquidity risk (Lower liquidity ratio) and provisions have the same effect on 
Islamic banks' riskiness as those of conventional banks. This means that the higher 
the capital or liquidity risk or provisions the higher the risk. In contrast the credit ratio 
of Islamic banks may contradict the empirical results, as the Islamic banks have a 
higher credit risk than othere banks. These results have some implications such as the 
need for enhancement to risk management, transparency through information 
disclosure, as well as activate internal control system. 
Table 6.3 : The Results of OLS, fixed Effect and Random Effect 
Independent 
Variable 
OLS Fixed -Effect Random Effect 
Constant 8.6085 
(3.849) * 
8.7238 
(2.808) * 
CAPDEP . 1161 
(2.873)* 
. 1490 
(2.358)** 
. 1139 
(3.442)* 
LIQDEP -. 1005 (-3.675)* -. 
9695E-01 
(-2.422)** -. 
1011 
(-3.517)* 
CRAS -. 8822E-01 
(-2.188)** 
-. 1547 
(-2.789)* 
-. 9247E-01 
(-2.194)** 
PRCR 
. 8421E-01 
(6.106) 
. 1287 
(4.859)* 
. 9184E-01 
(5.773)* 
R 21.4% 32.6% 
Adjusted R 20% 23.9% 
F- ratio 14.06* 3.75* 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
Bank 1 10.28563 4.02996 2.55229 
Bank 2 11.75431 3.96487 2.96461 
Bank 3 10.45574 4.00809 2.60866 
Bank 4 10.49457 4.13433 2.53840 
Bank 5 10.73411 3.94934 2.71795 
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Bank 6 10.41370 4.05976 2.56510 
Bank 7 8.10679 4.48004 1.80954 
Bank 8 10.12145 4.17837 2.42235 
Bank 9 8.43368 4.46657 1.88818 
BanklO 8.89598 3.75430 2.36955 
Bank 11 9.30840 3.76820 2.47025 
Bank 12 10.88913 3.63563 2.99512 
Bank 13 12.10578 3.87636 3.12298 
Bank14 14.03597 4.16224 3.37222 
Bank 15 10.29281 4.10427 2.50783 
Bank 16 11.99164 4.17231 2.87410 
Bank 17 12.57729 4.07705 3.08490 
Bank 18 10.60969 4.15223 2.55518 
Bank 19 3.08400 5.14967 . 59887 
Bank 20 11.24480 4.24828 2.64691 
Bank 21 3.25268 3.83689 . 84774 
* Donate significant at 1% level 
k* Donate significant at 5% level 
6.6 Summary 
Econometrics analysis of Islamic banking, in general is rare, this is mainly due 
to the new-experience of Islamic banks and the unavailability of data. The field of 
this study has rarely been addressed through econometric analysis with respect to 
Islamic banks, particularly, in the field effectiveness of banking regulation. Therefore, 
as the study is at the developing stage, it needs to be approached with more caution. 
The estimated banking regulation effectiveness models using panel data on 21 
banks in Jordan for the year 1990-2000 declare that capital regulation did not reduce 
the banks' risk in the banking system in Jordan, which is consistent with the results of 
other studies that declare that capital regulation has different intuition than what the 
regulator intends to accomplish. Therefore, strategies for regulation and supervision 
should concentrate more on prudential regulation and supervision. Although capital 
adequacy is biased toward risk, this does not mean reducing the dependence on it as a 
cushion for risks, but it should not have negative consequences on the efficiency and 
competitiveness of the banking system. The current regulation and supervision 
practices in Jordan, particularly, capital regulation seem to be generally appropriate, 
for reducing banks as far as the conventional banks are concerned. The capital 
adequacy applied now is 12%, which is higher than the minimum capital adequacy 
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requirements of Basel Accord (8%). However, some countries with a similar economy 
such as Singapore and Argentina have adopted capital adequacy requirements of 12 
%and 11.5%, respectively (Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick, 2000). 
With regard to Islamic banks, it is clear that the sensitivity to the change in the 
estimated variable of the study, in general, is applied to Islamic banks as well as 
conventional banks, but the fixed effect model declares the fact that Islamic banks 
have different characteristics relative to their assets and liabilities than those of 
conventional banks, which initiate the need for different regulation and supervision 
standards than those applied on the conventional banks. The implication of this 
chapter will be highlighted in the last chapter. 
Table 6.4 Distribution of Banks in Jordan According to the Size of 
Assets and the Coefficient of Fixed Effect 
Group Assets Coefficient (Fixed 
effect) 
Bank I (Arab bank 3534.6 10.28563 
Bank 2 (National) 890.2 11.75431 
Bank 3(Jordan) 536.9 10.45574 
Bank 4(Cairo Amman) 592.6 10.49457 
Bank 5 (Housing Bank) 1574 10.73411 
Bank 6 (Jordan Kuwait Bank 543 10.41370 
Bank 7(Jordan Gulf Bank) 306 8.10679 
Bank 8 (Arab Banking) 260 10.12145 
Bank 9 (Export Financing) 195 8.43368 
Bank10 (Arab Jordan Investment) 244 8.89598 
Bank 11 (Jordan Investment) 306.3 9.30840 
Bank 12 (Union Bank) 256 10.88913 
Bank 13 (Philadelphia) 145.3 12.10578 
Bank 14 (Middle East) 67.6 14.03597 
Bank 15 (Arab Land Bank) 267 10.29281 
Bank 16 (HSBC) 287.3 11.99164 
Bank 17 (Grindlays) 257.9 12.57729 
Bank 18 (Citi Bank) 137.5 10.60969 
Bank 19 (Rafiain Bank) 182.5 3.08400 
Bank 20 (Jordan Islamic Bank) 683.9 11.24480 
Bank 21( International Islamic Arab 
Bank) 
197 3.25268 
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Notes 
1- William Greene defines longitudinal data as data sets containing observations 
on individuals or families, each observed at several points in time (Greene, 
2003). 
2- Llewellyn determines five roles for capital. First, the rate of return on equity 
and creating shareholder value has become the ultimate business objective. 
Second, the volume of capital determines the business that can be taken on the 
balance sheet. Third, capital is a major input factor in the banking firm, as 
such, has a cost attached to it, it therefore, needs to be ruminated, as do all 
inputs. Fourth, the structure and amount of capital a bank has on the balance 
sheet has important implications for the pricing of asset and liabilities, which 
has a powerful impact on the competitiveness of banks vis a vis the capital 
market and alternative suppliers of the banking services. Fifth, capital is a 
major focus on regulation of banks. 
3- It is related to the unobserved behavior of one party can not be seen for the 
other party. 
4- This model is based on a number of restrictive asumptions include no 
transaction costs, no taxes, borrowing and lending rate are equal no 
bankruptcy costs, and the productive activities of the firm independent of its 
financing decisions. 
5- Researcher's calculation. 
6- DEVROA2 is calculated for each bank by the sequare root of the deviation of 
return on assets from its mean value. 
7- Some researchers use standard diviation as a risk of banks to calculate a data 
point of risk, see Turn Seref (1995). 
8- The regression model and their spesifications are presented in the next 
section. 
9- This test developed by Hausman 1978 to teset for fixed effect and random 
effcet measures (Greene (2003). 
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DESCRIPTIVE AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: 
(SURVEY OF REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF 
ISLAMIC BANKS) 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter seven examined the hypotheses of the study related to the need for special 
regulation and supervision standards for Islamic banks based on econometric analysis of 
longitudinal data for Jordanian banks for the period 1990-2000. This chapter is dedicated 
to testing the hypotheses based on cross-sectional data collected through managed 
questionnaires. The main elements of Islamic banking regulation and supervision are 
covered by the questionnaires including the objectives of regulation and supervision, 
deposit protection, licensing measures, credit and liquidity risk, capital adequacy 
standards and information disclosure. Respondents to the questionnaire account for 59, 
distributed to four groups of concerned institutions with regard to regulation and 
supervision in Jordan; namely the CBJ, conventional banks, Islamic banks and external 
auditors of the Islamic banks. To identify the general characteristics and the differences 
among these groups concerning these issues descriptive and ANOVA analysis have been 
used. 
Descriptive analysis of data directly related to the hypotheses was used to identify 
the general overview of Islamic banking regulation and supervision norms. Although this 
analysis provides a general picture concerning the related hypotheses, it does not declare 
the differences among the respondent groups. For this purpose, previous studies have 
used analysis of variance (ANOVA). This test is used to investigate the behavioral 
differences among the respondent groups concerning each variable of the study as well as 
to identify the groups that were responding differently. It is worth noting that Al Gareeb 
(1996) used chi-square where the variance between responses of the Central Bank of 
Egypt and Islamic banks was concerned. 
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In general, there is a consensus among researchers on the importance of regulation 
and supervision norms for Islamic banks as well as for conventional banks. Qarni (1990) 
states that banks adhering to Islamic standards form part of the overall banking systems 
and are expected to come under the control of central banks. Errico and Farahbash (1998) 
argue that effective prudential supervision of banks is just as necessary and desirable for 
Islamic banking as it is for conventional banking. Also, Chapra and Khan (2000), after 
reviewing the Basel standards for regulation and supervision, concluded that these 
standards would be easier for Islamic banks to adopt if separate capital standards were set 
for demand deposits and investment deposits. Obaidullah (1998) confirms this when he 
argues "uniform application of norms may result in an inequitable scenario and 
discrimination contrary to the "level playing field" objective of the regulator". Wilson 
(1997) comments on the Basel Committee on the requirements of applying the same 
requirements on all banks, states that "given the nature of Islamic bank liabilities, it has 
been suggested that this provision is unnecessarily restrictive". In contrast, Abdul Malik 
-Al-Hamar, a fonner governor of the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates suggests 
that Islamic banks need more regulation than conventional banks (Wilson, 1997). 
Empirical analysis will clarify whether the current norms are appropriate for 
Islamic banks or whether there is a need for a set of different ones. As far as the four 
groups are concerned the differences among these groups will be tested. This chapter is 
organized as follows. Section two describes the regulator profile. Section three highlights 
the hypotheses of the study. Section four presents the results of testing the hypotheses. 
Section five summarises the chapter. 
7.2 Regulator Profile 
This section provides a descriptive background of some characteristics of the 
regulators and supervisors in Jordan, in general and Islamic banks in particular, these 
characteristics include age, educational level, and experience. The main interest of this 
profile stems from the qualifications and responsibilities[ of regulators and supervisors in 
conventional systems. Regulators of Islamic banks are not exceptional; they face greater 
challenges than the counterparts of conventional banks, in addition to proper 
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documentation they are required to examine that the projects financed are sound (Chapra, 
1985). However, the regulatory and supervisory body of Islamic banks is subject to 
criticism from some scholars. Iqbal, et al. (1998) argue that lack of understanding of the 
correct nature of Islamic banks may be partially responsible for inappropriate policies of 
the central banks towards Islamic banks. It is worth noting that the Third Expert Meeting 
on Islamic banking held in Dhaka in 1989 recommended that the central bank's personnel 
should be trained on shari'ah-based banking. Chapra and Khan (2000) raise the need for 
building of experience of Islamic banks regulators and supervisors for developing 
effective internal rating and control systems and risk management culture in these banks. 
Regulator profile covers the age level, educational level, and experience. 
7.2.1 Age Level 
The age level of regulators and supervisors is one of the most important elements 
for regulator profile, particularly for this kind of profession. Table 7.1 shows that the 
regulators and supervisors covered in the questionnaires are mainly middle-aged, the 
frequency distribution of this group with age over 36 years accounts for 70.9 percent, 
while 27.3 percent of regulators and supervisors are in the age group 24-35 years, and 
1.8% in the below 25 years age group. This distribution of regulator age reflects that they 
are relatively mature when conducting the supervision process. 
Table 7.1: Freauencv Distribution of Respondents' Age Level 
Age Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Over 45 25 42.4 45.5 45.5 
36-45 14 23.7 25.5 70.9 
4-35 15 25.4 27.3 98.2 
Under 25 1 1.7 1.8 100.0 
Total 55 93.2 100.0 
No -Response 4 6.8 
59 100.0 
8.2.2 Educational level 
Table 7.2 shows that regulators and supervisors are well educated in Jordan, as 
over 87 percent of them are holders of higher degrees of PhD or MBA or are chartered 
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accountant. While the remaining part are holders of business qualifications or other 
university degrees. 
Table 7.2: Freauencv Distribution of Educational Level 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
PhD or MBA and 
Chartered Accountant 
19 32.2 35.2 35.2 
MBA 4 6.8 7.4 42.6 
hartered Accountant 24 40.7 44.4 87.0 
A 3 5.1 5.6 92.6 
Other 4 6.8 7.4 100.0 
Total 54 91.5 100.0 
o-Response 5 8.5 
59 100.0 
7.2.3 Experience 
Also, the experience of regulators and supervisors is an essential element in 
determining the characteristics of regulators. As regulation and supervision is an evolving 
process, regulators and supervisors need to have a cumulative experience in terns of 
tracking banks' records, regulation and instructions. Table 7.3 shows that regulators have 
relatively long-experience in regulation and supervision of Islamic banks. The frequency 
distribution of those who have over 5-year experience accounts for more than 79 percent 
of the respondents. While 15 percent of them have experience of 2-5 years, and the 
remaining 2 percent have less than two years experience. 
Table 7.3: Frequency Distribution of Respondents' Experience 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
More than 10 28 47.5 52.8 52.8 
5-10 14 23.7 26.4 79.2 
-5 9 15.3 17.0 96.2 
Less than 2 2 3.4 3.8 100.0 
Total 53 89.8 100.0 
No-Response 6 10.2 
59 100.0 
As the respondents have a lot of experience, some of them have a pre-experience 
in regulation and supervision in other institutions. This experience is mainly concentrated 
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in commercial and investment, which accounts for 67.4 percent, and those who have 
worked in accounting and consultancy services account for 21.7 percent, while those who 
have pre-experience in Islamic banks are relatively very low, which accounts for 2.2 
percent. 
Table 7.4: Freauencv Distribution of Respondents' Pre-experience 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Commercial Banks 26 44.1 56.5 56.5 
Investment Banks 5 8.5 10.9 67.4 
Accountant & Consultancy services 10 16.9 21.7 89.1 
Islamic banks 1 1.7 2.2 91.3 
Other 4 6.8 8.7 100.0 
Total 46 78.0 100.0 
No-Response 13 22.0 
59 100.0 
In summary, as the sample of this study represents those working in the field of 
regulation and supervision in the concerned institutions, which is part of the whole 
banking system in Jordan, it is expected that the population of this study is relatively 
homogeneous, it is expected that the sample represents the characteristics of this 
population. Therefore, it is acceptable to say that the regulators and supervisors in Jordan 
are well educated as many of them are holders of PhD, MBA or are charter accountants. 
With regard to age level, most of them are middle- aged (over 36 year). Moreover they 
have a lot of experience in banking regulation and supervision. As the focus of the study 
on banking regulation and supervision, this profile will be of a high interest as a 
background for the empirical analysis. 
7.3 The Null Hypotheses 
The main objective of this dissertation is to investigate and identify appropriate 
regulation and supervision standards for Islamic banking. The hypotheses to be tested are 
divided into seven categories, related to: the objectives, deposits protection, licensing 
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measures, credit risks, liquidity risks, capital adequacy, and information disclosures 
(Appendix A). 
The general form of the null hypothesis states: 
Ho: There are no differences among respondent institutions (groups) concerning the 
objectives of regulation and supervision, or deposit protection, or licensing 
measures, etc. 
Accepting the null hypothesis implies no differences among the groups regarding 
the tested variables and visa versa. This test will be carried out using ANOVA. The null 
hypothesis will be accepted if the calculated f-value of the four tested groups is lower 
than the critical value from f- distribution at 5% significant level. 
7.4 Descriptive and Statistical Analysis 
After determining the hypotheses to be tested and the analysis methods, this part 
will be dedicated to descriptive analysis of data related to all respondents (as one group), 
while the testing of the hypotheses is based on the differences among the four respondent 
groups. 
7.4.1 Objectives of Regulation and Supervision 
Chapter three discussed the main objectives of regulation and supervision of 
conventional banks from a Western perspective. The importance of studying these 
objectives is the fact that they determine the framework of the regulatory and supervisory 
process, thereafter the instruments that should be adopted to attain these objectives. 
However, these objectives stem from the core responsibilities of central banks. As the 
objectives of central banks in an Islamic economy do not differ fundamentally from those 
of a traditional central bank counterpart in other countries, the objectives of regulation 
and supervision of Islamic banks could be the same (Khan, 1995)2. Al-Gareeb (1996) 
suggests that seven objectives of regulation stem from central bank objectives, which can 
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be summarized into four groups: maintaining inflation control, mobilization of savings, 
depositor protection, and direct credit for certain sectors. 
In Jordan, the main objective of monetary policy is maintaining monetary stability 
and encouragement of real economic growth3. Since monetary stability means stability of 
prices, it encompasses a triangle of inflation rates, interest rates and exchange rates`. Ten 
objectives of regulation and supervision of conventional banks were developed from 
literature as objectives of regulation and supervision for conventional banks in Jordan5 
(Table 7.5 and Appendix A). These objectives are expected to be appropriate as 
objectives for regulation and supervision for Islamic banks. The respondents were asked 
to state their views on the appropriateness of these objectives. 
Figure 7.1 and Table 7.1 show that for seven out of ten objectives, eighty percent 
of respondents claimed that they at least agreed with these objectives (also Tables 7. A5- 
7.14, Appendix Q. This means there was a consensus among respondents on the 
appropriateness of current regulatory and supervisory objectives for conventional banks 
as well as for Islamic banks. The consensus was generally due to two reasons. First, the 
comprehensiveness of the CBJ's objectives allows the encompassing of all financial 
institutions, particularly after issuance of the new Banking Law of 2000. This law brings 
together all banking activities including the supervision of Islamic banks under one 
legislative framework (chapter 5). Second, the general objectives are suitable for both 
kinds of institutions as far as the ultimate objective of these regulations is to enhance the 
efficiency and soundness of the banking systems as well as to preserve the rights of 
depositors. 
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Figure 7.1 Objectives of Regulation and Supervision 
Maintaining Confidence of Financial System 
Disagree arrora 
Ag- 
Applying Fair Value for Assessing Assets 
Disagree 
Control of Money and Credit Expansion 
Disagree 
Improving Banking Activities 
Maintaining Shareholder's Interests Depsitors Protection 
Disagree 
onyly Agree 
CHAPTER 7 
Applying International Standards 
Maintaining Inflation under Control 
Direct Credit for Certain Sectors 
Mobilizing Savings 
Table: 7.5: The Objectives of Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banks 
MCFS DP MSI CMCE IC DCCS S IBA AIS FVAA 
59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 
Mean 1.612 1.407 1.678 1.695 2.203 2.509 2.322 1.831 1.932 1.932 
Std. Dev. 
. 670 . 619 . 77 . 
651 . 
943 1.12 1.181 . 6735 1.015 . 
868 
In a scale being 1 for strongly agree and 5 strongly disagree. 
Maintaining confidence of financial system (MCFS) 
Maintaining shareholder's interests (MSI) 
Maintaining inflation under control (MIC) 
Mobilizing savings (MS) 
Applying international standards (AIS) 
Depositors protection (DP) 
Control of money and credit expansion (CMCE) 
Direct credit for certain sectors (DCCS) 
Improving banking activities (IBA) 
Applying fair value for assessing assets (AFVAA) 
In contrast, the remaining three objectives, namely direct credit for certain sector 
(DCCS), mobilizing savings (MS) and maintaining inflation under control (MIC) show a 
relatively lower degree of agreement among respondents than the other objectives. The DCCS, 
frequency analysis shows that 64.4 percent of responses at least agree with this objective, the 
remaining 35.6 percent are distributed between "disagree" and "don't know (Table 7. A6, 
Appendix Q. Table 7.5 confirms the aforementioned analysis. This response is mainly due to the 
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fact that this objective is no longer perceived as a priority since the adoption of indirect tools of 
monetary policy by the CBJ after lifting all direct credit control measures toward the end of 
1993. In contrast, researchers suggest that central banks should have the power to guide and 
regulate the investment operations of financial institutions with a view to bringing about an 
allocation of credit, which conforms to Islamic goals (Chapra, 1985). 
For MIC, 74.6 percent of responses at least agree with this objective. The remaining 
percentage, which corresponds to negative responses, is attributed to one of two reasons. First, 
the unclear relationship between regulation and inflation for some respondents (Table 7. A5, and 
Table 7. A11, Appendix Q. Second, economic scholars agree to the non-expansionary role of 
Islamic financing modes. Radwan (1990) argues that Islamic banking is relatively less 
expansionary as far as monetary expansion is concerned and less inflationary as far as prices are 
concerned. At this stage the source of differences is not clear. This will be elaborated in the 
analysis of variance. 
As for MS, Figure 7.5 and Table 7. A7 (Appendix C) show that 70 percent of responses 
at least agree with this objective. The negative responses from some respondents may be due to a 
misunderstanding of the essence of regulation and supervision, which aims to maintain the 
stability of the financial system, and to improve the public confidence in the financial system, 
thereafter to enhance saving in the economy through the intermediary institutions in the economy 
(Khan, 1995, and Al-Gareeb, 1996). However, the source of difference will be clarified when 
the analysis of variance is performed. 
In Summary, the descriptive analysis of all respondents, as one group, declares there is a 
consensus among the respondents on the appropriateness of the objectives of regulation and 
supervision of conventional banks for the counterpart of Islamic banks. However, the views of 
different institutions concerned with this subject may be different. For this purpose ANOVA is 
conducted. 
The following null hypothesis is tested: 
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Ho: There are no differences among respondent groups concerning the objectives of 
regulation and supervision. 
Table 7.6 shows that the differences among respondent groups are statistically 
insignificant for eight out of the ten objectives, as the f-values of these objectives are lower than 
the threshold figures, this implies the acceptance of the null hypothesis. This means that all 
groups attached similar importance to the eight objectives; therefore, they show a consensus on 
the appropriateness of these objectives for Islamic banks. This consensus on these objectives 
reflects the comprehensiveness of conventional banking regulations and supervision objectives 
on the one hand, and the ability of Islamic banks to work under the ultimate objectives of 
regulations without breaching their characteristics on the other. 
In contrast, "applying international standards of information disclosure, accounting and 
regulation" (AIS), and "maintaining inflation under control" (MIC) show statistically significant 
differences among the four respondent groups as their calculated values (5.54 and 3.17, 
respectively) exceed the f-value distribution for 2,55 degrees of freedom of 2.76. Therefore they 
fall in the region where the null hypothesis is rejected, thereby implying that the groups differ in 
their responses concerning these two objectives. For AIS, the main source of difference is due to 
a high positive response of Islamic bank's respondents compared with other respondent groups 
(Table 7. A11, Appendix C). This reflects the thirst of Islamic banks to have special 
arrangements for information disclosure, accounting and regulation, which are very important to 
their progress worldwide, and the reluctance of the regulatory authority to apply appropriate 
accounting standards to Islamic banks on the other. Chapra and Khan (2000) argue that further 
growth of this industry (Islamic banking), as well as its successful response to the challenge of 
promoting systemic stability and economic development, depend on the adoption of international 
standards of best practices. 
With regard to MIC, most of the negative responses came from both Islamic and 
conventional banks (Table 7. A11, Appendix Q. This is possibly due to the unawareness of some 
of the respondents in the two groups of the essence of objectives of banking regulations and 
supervision and its relation with maintaining inflation control on the one hand, and the non- 
inflationary role of Islamic financing modes on the other. 
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In general, the differences among these groups are mainly due to the different 
backgrounds of each group to the economic and financial issues. For example was expected that 
the respondents of the central banks were more informed about issues like inflation, saving and 
banking regulations than other groups. In contrast, external auditors were more informed about 
accountancy standards and international accounting standards than other groups. 
Table 7.6 ANOVA: Objectives of Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banks 
Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Maintaining confidence of financial system Between Groups . 630 3 . 
210 . 
455 . 715 
Within Groups 25.403 55 . 
462 
Total 26.034 58 
Depositors protection Between Groups . 989 3 . 
330 . 854 . 471 
Within Groups 21.248 55 . 386 
Total 22.237 58 
Maintaining shareholder's interests Between Groups 1.469 3 . 
490 . 
806 . 496 
Within Groups 33.413 55 . 
608 
Total 34.881 58 
Control of money and credit expansion Between Groups . 
969 3 
. 
323 
. 
755 
. 
524 
Within Groups 23.539 55 . 428 Total 24.508 58 
Maintaining inflation under control Between Groups 7.608 3 2.536 3.173 . 031 
Within Groups 43.951 55 . 799 
Total 51.559 58 
Direct credit for certain sectors Between Groups 1.783 3 . 
594 
. 
461 
. 
711 
Within Groups 70.962 55 1.290 
Total 72.746 58 
Mobilizing savings Between Groups 3.882 3 1.294 . 
924 . 
435 
Within Groups 76.999 55 1.400 
Total 80.881 58 
Improving banking activities Between Groups . 
621 3 . 207 . 444 . 
723 
Within Groups 25.684 55 . 467 
Total 26.305 58 
Applying international standards Between Groups 14.825 3 4.942 5.535 . 002 
Within Groups 49.107 55 . 893 
Total 63.932 58 
Applying fair value for assessing assets Between Groups . 
100 3 3.335E 
-02 
. 
038 
. 
990 
Within Groups 47.832 55 . 870 
Total 47.932 58 
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Al-Gareeb (1996) tested the differences between the respondents of the Central Bank of 
Egypt and Islamic banks in Egypt concerning the appropriate current objectives of regulation of 
conventional banks for Islamic banks. He concludes that there were no differences between the 
two groups mainly because these objectives can be achieved without breaching the 
characteristics of Islamic banks. 
Summary 
Regulation and supervision objectives of conventional banks are generally regarded as 
appropriate for Islamic banks. Frequency analysis declares a consensus among respondents on 
these objectives. This may be due to the comprehensiveness of the objectives of current 
regulation and supervision after amendments of banking law on the one hand, and the similarity 
of the objectives of both systems on the other. Testing the differences among respondent groups 
reveals no significant differences among these groups concerning these objectives except for two 
objectives related to the maintaining of inflation control and applying international standards of 
information disclosure, accounting and regulation. However, these differences are mainly related 
to the different backgrounds of each group. 
7.4.2 Objective of Deposit Protection of Islamic Banks 
The main aim of deposit protection is to maintain confidence in the financial institutions 
and eliminate the systematic risk, consequently an avoidance of bank runs. As the depositors 
could not monitor the bank's performance in terns of qualification and cost, this became the 
responsibility of the supervisory authority. Wilson (1997) states that the prime responsibility of a 
central bank in its supervisory capacity is the protection of depositors. Islamic banks are no 
exception; even more supervision is required in this case. Information asymmetry between bank 
and depositors, particularly in unrestricted mudarabah contracts may lead to moral hazard 
incentives from the part of bank's management due to the fact that capital value and investment 
return are not guaranteed (Sarker, 2002). 
The relationship between these banks and depositors differs from their counterparts in 
conventional banks, particularly in investment deposits, as they share in the profit and loss of the 
bank's financing modes, therefore, they require special treatment from the regulatory authority. 
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Islamic economic scholars suggest special provisions for the regulation of deposits with Islamic 
banks in terms of required reserves and capital adequacy. Chapra and Khan (2000) argue that 
demand depositors need a lot more protection compared to investment deposits. Also, Wilson 
(1997) states that depositors in Islamic banks may require less protection in the case of Islamic 
banks where most liabilities are investments deposits. Radwan (1995) mentions that there is no 
dispute about applying cash reserves on current accounts, as these deposits do not participate in 
profit and loss, and they should be payable on demand. In contrast, investment deposits, 
particularly unrestricted mudarabah, are sharing in profit and loss; accordingly, their values will 
be affected by the composition of the bank's portfolio. Moreover, holders of investment accounts 
(IAs) know that their deposits are fixed in time and that all of them share in the consequences 
except in case of negligence and fraud. 
Consequently, deposit protection objectives should have special provision for investment 
accounts against operational risks and reducing the incentives for moral hazard by management, 
particularly in unrestricted mudarabah contracts. Chapra (2000) suggests a separate capital 
adequacy for demand deposits and investments deposits. Archer (1998) mentioned that Profit- 
and-loss Sharing Investment Accounts (PSIA) might become liabilities of the Islamic banks, 
when it, as mudarib, is guilty of misconduct or negligence in the performance of its contractual 
duties to the investor. 
To investigate the respondents' view on the objectives of deposit protection for Islamic 
banks, three objectives were specified: 
- Protection of current accounts 
- Protection of investment accounts against operational risks 
- Protection of investment account against high risk taken (moral hazard problem). 
As expected, Figure 7.2 and Table 7.7 show that there was a consensus among 
respondents on the objectives of deposit protection to be applied to Islamic banks. 
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Figure 7.2 Objective of Deposit Protection of Islamic Banks 
Protection of Current Accounts Protection of As from Operational Risks 
Missing 
J 
Strongly Agree 
Protection of As from high Risks 
Missing 
1 11, ,, 
These results are consistent with the nature of Islamic banks for the following reasons. 
First, deposits in current accounts do not participate in profit and loss, and should be paid on 
demand; therefore the regulation should ensure full payment of these deposits. Second, 
protection of investment accounts against operational risk, which arise as a result of misconduct 
of a bank's management or the failure of internal control system, should be the responsibility of 
the supervisory authority to protect depositors against these risks. Third, Islamic banks use 
investment deposits as mudarib, this may expose depositors' funds to a high risk if it coincides 
with a conflict of interest, particularly as the bank's management may change their attitude after 
contract; this may lead to moral hazard, which may create incentives for excessive risk taking by 
management to attain a high return at the expense of depositors. 
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Table: 7.7: The Objectives of Deposit Protection of Islamic Banks 
rotection of Current 
ccounts (PCAD) 
rotection of Investment 
ccounts Against 
Operational Risks 
PIAOR) 
rotection of Investment 
ccounts Against Taking 
High Risks by Management 
PIAMH) 
Valid 58 58 58 
Issing 1 1 1 
Mean 1.638 1.690 1.741 
Std. Dev. . 693 . 730 . 715 In a scale being 1 for strongly agree and 5 for strongly disagree. 
Descriptive analysis shows a relatively high consistency among all respondents 
concerning the objectives of deposit protection of Islamic banks. To investigate the differences 
among respondent groups ANOVA analysis was used to test the following null hypothesis: 
Ho: There are no differences among respondent groups concerning the objectives of 
deposit protection in Islamic banks 
Table 7.8 shows that the differences are statistically insignificant, failing to reject the null 
hypotheses, thereby, implying that the respondent groups are indifferent concerning these 
objectives. These results illustrate that the respondents are aware of the special nature of modes 
of Islamic financing on the one hand, and the responsibilities of banks toward current accounts 
and investment accounts on the other. Shihadeh (1995) states that Islamic banks treat current 
accounts as trust deposits, which should be paid on demand, they are like current accounts in 
conventional banks except for the fact that Islamic banks do not pay these accounts any interest 
or profit and these accounts are guaranteed by shareholder's equity. On the other hand, 
investment accounts are subject to investment risk, the bank's capital and reserves guarantee 
compensation for these accounts in case of trust abuse only. 
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Table 7.8: ANOVA: Objectives of Deposit Protection of Islamic Banks 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Protecting of current accounts Between Groups 2.530 3 . 
843 1.83 
2 . 
152 
Within Groups 24.866 54 . 460 
Total 27.397 57 
Protecting of investment accounts against 
operational risks 
Between Groups 1.153 3 . 384 . 709 . 
551 
Within Groups 29.261 54 . 542 
Total 30.414 57 
Protecting of investment accounts against taking 
high risk by management 
Between Groups 
. 
644 3 
. 
215 . 
407 
. 
749 
Within Groups 28.477 54 . 527 
Total 29.121 57 
Summary 
The respondents agree on the need for appropriate objectives for deposit protection in 
Islamic banks. For current accounts, the objectives of deposit protection should be directed 
toward full coverage of these deposits, while in the case of investment accounts; the objective 
should be to protect these deposits against operational risks and moral hazard of Islamic banks' 
managements. 
7.4.3 Licensing Measures 
The licensing process is concerned with setting the requirements for establishing proper 
banks. This process consists of an assessment of organization, ownership, structure, directors and 
senior management, business plan, initial capital, and financial services (Basel, 1997). As far as 
these measures are concerned they insure the entrance of viable and sound banks to the banking 
industry, therefore, licensing of Islamic banks should not differ generally from those of 
conventional banks. To investigate the respondents' views concerning these issues, they were 
asked about the appropriateness of conventional banks' licensing measures for the counterparts 
of Islamic banks (Appendix A). 
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Table 7.9 shows that all respondents agree on suggested measures. This means that the 
respondents are consistent on the appropriateness of these licensing measures for establishing 
Islamic banks. Saker (2000) argues that the licensing process is just as necessary in an Islamic 
banking framework to enable supervisory authorities to ensure that new banks are sound and 
stable. Radwan (1995) suggests extending the licensing for the foundation of new banks and the 
opening of new branches of conventional banks to Islamic banks. 
Table: 7.9: Licensing Measures of Islamic Banks 
C SODSM RBFP LF PIEA PFS PIS B RAAC TAR 
59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 58 
1 
Mean 1.712 1.695 1.661 2.186 1.593 2.237 2.458 2.034 2.068 1.72 
Std. 
Deviation . 
948 . 725 . 659 1.008 . 591 
1.088 1.088 1.033 1.081 . 
874 
In a scale being I for strongly agree and 5 for strongly disagree. 
Capital requirements (CR) 
Standards of ownership and directors and senior management's qualifications (SODSMQ) 
Requirements of business plan and feasibility studies (RBFS) 
Licensing fees (LF) 
Provisions of internal control and external audit functions (PIEAF) 
Permissible financial services (PFS) 
permissible investment sectors (PIS) 
Branch network (BN) 
Relationship with associate / affiliate companies (RAAC) 
Transparency in application of regulation (TAR) 
The descriptive analysis treats all respondents as one group. As far as four respondent 
groups are concerned, it is interesting to investigate the differences among these groups. For this 
purpose ANOVA was conducted. The following null hypothesis is tested: 
Ho: There are no differences among respondent groups concerning the 
appropriateness of the licensing measures of conventional banks for Islamic 
banks. 
Table 7.10 shows the differences among these groups concerning each measure are 
statistically insignificant except for two measures: licensing fees (LF) and provisions of internal 
control and external audit functions (PIEAF)6. The agreement of four groups on the eight 
measures is expected as far as those measures directed toward enhancing the safety, stability, and 
transparency of financial institutions. However, the differences among respondent groups 
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concerning the LF and PIEAF are possibly related to cost of regulation and supervision of 
Islamic banks. But it is still not clear which groups are behaving differently. 
To investigate the sources of differences among respondent groups concerning the two 
measures, we should have a look at the mean response of each group. Table 7. C11, Appendix C 
shows that the mean responses concerning LF vary substantially between Islamic banks and the 
CBJ on the one hand, and conventional banks and external auditors on the other. The response by 
Islamic banks implies that they do not have an interest in being subjected to higher licensing 
fees. Similarly, the CBJ response stems from current practices. In contrast, the latter institutions 
are aware of the efforts required from the regulatory authority for the supervision of Islamic 
banks, consequently the need for higher licensing fees. This view may find advocates from some 
scholars. Chapra (1995) for example claims that the examination of Islamic banks is unlike the 
conventional banks, it may necessary to ensure that in addition of documentations, the project 
financed are sound. 
With regard to the negative responses for PIEAF, this result was unexpected as this 
measure is a basis for licensing a bank according to the Core Principals of the Basel Accord of 
1997. Also, Sarker (2000) considers this requirement is an appropriate licensing measure for 
Islamic banks as well as for conventional banks. However, the significance of the test is not only 
due to negative responses of external auditors? but to a strong agreement of other groups with 
this measure (Table 7. C11, Appendix Q. 
ANOVA shows a consensus among respondent groups on the eight out of ten licensing 
measures in Jordan. In contrast, Al Gareeb (1996) tests the differences between the respondents 
of the Central Bank of Eygpt and the counterparts of Islamic banks concerning the 
appropriateness of ten current management and organizational measures for Islamic banks in 
Eygpt using Chi square. The results of the tests show that the respondent groups are consistent 
on four measures related to management, rating, control on liquidation and emerging process, 
while they are different on six measures such as deposit insurance, increase and decrease of 
capital, licensing, branching, and permissible activities. Although these results are acceptable in 
teens of deposit insurance and permissible activities, as Islamic banks need special treatment for 
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deposit insurance, and permissible activities such as in the case of Jordan, it is unexpected to see 
a divergence of the views on the other measures such as branching. 
Table 7.10: ANOVA Test of the Appropriateness of Licensing Measures of Conventional 
Banks for Islamic Banks 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
ICR Between Groups 2.797 3 . 932 1.040 . 382 
Within Groups 49.304 55 . 896 
Total 52.102 58 
SODSM 
Q 
Between Groups 1.432 3 . 477 . 
903 . 446 
Within Groups 29.077 55 . 529 
Total 30.508 58 
RBFP Between Groups 1.823 3 . 608 
1.428 . 244 
Within Groups 23.397 55 . 425 
Total 25.220 58 
LF Between 
Groups 
17.115 3 5.705 7.500 . 000 
Within Groups 41.834 55 . 761 
Total 58.949 58 
PIEAF Between 
Groups 
3.645 3 1.215 4.028 . 012 
Within Groups 16.592 55 . 302 
Total 20.237 58 
PFS Between Groups 9.322E- 
02 
3 3.107E- 
02 
. 025 . 995 
Within Groups 68.585 55 1.247 
Total 68.678 58 
PIS Between Groups 3.527 3 1.176 . 993 . 403 
Within Groups 65.117 55 1.184 
Total 68.644 58 
BN Between Groups 5.528 3 1.843 1.797 . 
159 
Within Groups 56.404 55 1.026 
Total 61.932 58 
RAAC Between Groups 1.952 3 . 651 . 544 . 
654 
Within Groups 65.777 55 1.196 
Total 67.729 58 
TAR Between Groups 1.610 3 . 537 . 690 . 562 Within Groups 41.976 54 . 777 
Total 43.586 57 
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Summary 
Descriptive analysis of respondents' views in one group shows that the Central Bank, 
Islamic banks, conventional banks and external auditors generally agree on the appropriateness 
of current licensing measures for Islamic banks. Also, the analysis of variance among the four 
groups show there is an agreement among respondents on these measures except for two 
measures. The two measures showing divergence of views concern the licensing fees (LF) and 
provisions of internal control and external audit functions (PIEAF). With regard to the sources of 
differences, Islamic banks and the Central Bank are more convinced of current LF; in contrast, 
the conventional banks and external auditors are less convinced of the suitability of current 
practices. However, the difference among these institutions may be due to the special nature of 
operations conducted by Islamic banks that require more supervisory oversight, which requires 
higher costs, therefore, higher licensing fees. With regard to PIEAF, the differences are not only 
due to the relatively high negative response of external auditors, but also to strong positive 
agreement of other groups with this variable. 
7.4.4 Credit Risk of Islamic Banks 
Credit risk is defined as the probability that the debtors or borrowers will not be able to 
pay the interest and / or the principals in due time. Elgari (2003) states that it is related to the 
ability of a debtor to repay at the time appointed for repayment and in accordance with the 
conditions stipulated in the contracts. This risk may lead to an unexpected decline in a bank's 
total cash flow; also it can give rise not only to a liquidity crunch but also severely affect the 
quality of assets (Chapra and Khan, 2000), therefore, weakening the ability of banks to pay back 
client's deposits. This risk constitutes one of the sources that could affect the bank's soundness, 
which may lead to bank runs. Therefore, assessment and monitoring of banks' assets has 
acquired a high priority from the regulatory and supervisory authority in order to control this 
kind of risk. 
Core Principles of Basel Accord, 1997 provide a set of sources of credit risks of 
conventional banks. This part examines whether these sources also apply to Islamic banks. 
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Special sources of credit risks facing Islamic banks will be examined. Moreover, measures of 
controlling credit risk facing Islamic banks will be discussed. In addition, a general question 
regarding the level of credit risk of Islamic banks compared to conventional banks counterpart 
will be tested. 
7.4.4.1 Ordinary Credit Risk of Islamic Banks 
This section will examine whether the ordinary sources of credit risk facing conventional 
banks also face Islamic banks. These sources relate to the borrowers' creditworthiness and 
economic, and legal conditions. Therefore, nine sources of credit risk facing conventional banks 
were selected according to the Core Principles of Basel Accord, 1997. The respondents were 
asked whether those sources applied to Islamic banks(Appendix A). 
Table 7.11 shows there was an agreement among all respondents concerning each one of 
the selected sources of credit risks. This is clear from the lower value of means and standard 
deviations of all sources of credit risks. Thus asserting that the respondents agreed that Islamic 
banks face the same set of credit risks confronted by conventional banks. 
Table: 7.11: The Sources of Credit Risk of Conventional Banks 
FME DBC DCF DVA LC CC IELS ML INS 
N 59 59 5 5 59 59 59 5 59 
Mean 1.593 1.64 1.525 1.559 1.86 1.593 1.746 1.593 1.678 
Std. 
Deviation 
. 
561 
. 
783 . 
568 . 
565 1.432 . 673 . 
94 
. 853 . 840 
In a scale being 1 for strongly agree and 5 for strongly disagree. 
Fluctuation of macro economy (FME) 
Deterioration of borrowers' creditworthiness (DBC) 
Decline in the net cash flow (DCF) 
Deteriorating of the value of assets (DVA) 
Lack/insufficient collaterals (LC) 
Concentration of credit ratio according to individuals, related groups, sectors, financial instruments... etc (CCI) 
Inefficient of legal system in solving commercial conflicts (IELS) 
Maturity of investments, the longer the maturity the higher will be the credit risk (MLO) 
Inefficient of Internal control systems (INS) 
Descriptive analysis shows that the respondents, as one group, are consistent on these 
sources. To investigate the differences among the respondent groups concerning regulation with 
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respect to these sources of credit risks ANOVA was conducted. The following null hypothesis 
was tested: 
Ho: Islamic banks are facing the same sources of credit risk as conventional banks. 
Table 7.12 shows that the differences are statistically insignificant except for fluctuations 
of the macro economy (FME). As expected, all suggested sources of credit risks apply to Islamic 
banks. Algari (2003) states that Islamic banks face the same credit risks as conventional banks, 
particularly in murabahah, istisna, and installment sale. These results are generally acceptable as 
far as they are related to general economic conditions, legal issues, and a relationship between 
creditor and debtor. However, the difference among respondent groups concerning FME was 
unexpected. Any fluctuation in the macro economy may lead to deterioration in business 
activities, which may severely affect the borrowers' creditworthiness. This increases the 
possibility of delay or default. To investigate the sources of differences among these groups it is 
worth looking at the mean value of each group. Table 7. D23, Appendix C shows that the 
differences among respondent groups are not a result of negative responses of external auditors, 
but due to the strong positive responses of the other three groups including the CBJ and Islamic 
banks, and conventional banks. 
Table 7.12: ANOVA: The Sources of Credit Risks of Islamic Banks 
Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
FME Between Groups 3.016 3 1.005 3.632 . 018 
Within Groups 15.222 55 . 277 
Total 18.237 58 
DBC Between Groups . 717 3 . 239 . 378 . 770 Within Groups 34.809 55 . 633 
Total 35.525 58 
DCF Between Groups . 111 3 3.699E-02 . 109 . 954 Within Groups 18.601 55 . 338 
Total 18.712 58 
DVA Between Groups . 203 3 6.779E-02 . 203 . 894 Within Groups 18.339 55 . 333 
Total 18.542 58 
LC Between Groups 6.791 3 2.264 1.110 
. 353 Within Groups 112.125 55 2.039 
Total 118.915 58 
CCI Between Groups . 280 3 9.325E-02 . 198 . 898 
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Within Groups 25.958 55 . 472 
Total 26.237 58 
IELS Between Groups 6.075 3 2.025 . 867 . 464 
Within Groups 128.501 55 2.336 
Total 134.576 58 
MLO Between Groups 1.437 3 . 
479 . 646 . 589 
Within Groups 40.801 55 . 
742 
Total 42.237 58 
INS Between Groups . 580 
3 
. 193 . 264 . 
851 
Within Groups 40.301 55 . 733 
Total 40.881 58 
7.4.4.2 Special Sources of Credit Risk for Islamic Banks 
In addition to ordinary sources of credit risk, Islamic banks face additional sources 
related to the environment in which they operate and the nature of their financing modes. Al- 
Omar and Abdel-haq (1996) and Sundararajan (2000) raise the issue of Islamic banks' portfolio 
risks, they claim that if these risks are not recognized and supervised they could be a source of 
systematic risk for the entire financial system. Taking into consideration the environment, and 
legal systems in which they work, and the nature of their modes, eight sources of credit risk for 
Islamic banks have been identified. The respondents were asked to state their views concerning 
these sources. 
Table 7.13 shows that the respondents generally were consistent on the importance of 
these sources of liquidity risks for Islamic banks. This is epitomized by relatively low mean 
values and standard deviations of those sources (Appendix A). 
Table: 7.13: The Special Sources of Credit Risk of Islamic Banks 
UEFS ILS UHI DPLS WA LCP ULP UEN 
N Valid 59 59 5 59 59 58 5 58 
Missin 1 1 
Mean 2.000 1.7458 1.9831 1.9492 2.016 2.2414 1.9322 2.1897 
Std. Dev. . 89056 . 80072 . 90003 . 91771 . 95577 1.03127 . 8683 1.1914 In a scale being 1 for strongly agree and 5 for strongly disagree. 
Underdeveloped economic and financial system (UEFS) 
Inefficient legal system in addressing commercial conflicts (ILS) 
Unavailability of hedging instruments according to Islamic perception (UHI) 
High default probability of profits loss sharing PLS (DPLS) 
Week commitment for adopting Islamic accounting standard (WAI) 
Lack of collateral for most PLS (LCP) 
Un-availability of legitimate penalty rate (ULP) 
Un-favorable environment, Interest based system (UEN) 
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However, some sources show relatively more diversion than the other sources, such as 
lack of collateral (LCP) and unfavorable environment (UEN). Figure 7.3 shows that the positive 
response of those who at least agree with LCP and UEN accounts for 74.1 percent and 70.7 
percent, respectively. Tables 7. D6 and 7. D8( Appendix C) confirm the abovementioned results. 
Fortunately, the deviation of the two sources is not high, but such kinds of differences were 
expected among respondents concerning credit risks of Islamic banks, because they are newly 
established institutions compared to conventional banks, and the cultural credit and risks is still 
in the early stage. 
Figure 7.3 Special Sources of Credit Risk of Islamic Banks 
Lack of Collatral for PLS 
Missing 
Un-favorable Envirnoment 
Missing 
However, analysis of variance among the respondent groups should clarify whether there 
is a significant difference or there is agreement on the concerned sources of credit risks. The 
following null hypothesis is tested using ANOVA: 
Ho: There are no differences among respondent groups concerning the sources of 
credit risk of Islamic banks. 
Table 7.14 shows there is no variable statistically significant, which means failure to 
reject the null hypothesis. This reflects a consensus among respondents concerning the special 
sources of credit risk facing Islamic banks. The consensus reflects that the respondents are well 
aware of the nature and characteristic of the Islamic banks' financing modes, and the economic, 
financial, and legal environment in which they operate as well as the challenge they face. 
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Table: 7.14: ANOVA: Special Sources of Islamic Banks' Credit Risks 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
UEFS Between Groups 5.441 3 1.814 2.460 . 072 
Within Groups 40.559 55 . 737 
Total 46.000 58 
ILS Between Groups 3.267 3 1.089 1.766 . 164 
Within Groups 33.920 55 . 617 
Total 37.186 58 
UHI Between Groups 6.095 3 2.032 2.733 . 052 
Within Groups 40.888 55 . 743 
Total 46.983 58 
DPLS Between Groups 4.686 3 1.562 1.945 . 133 
Within Groups 44.161 55 . 803 
Total 48.847 58 
WAI Between Groups 3.063 3 1.021 1.125 . 347 
Within Groups 49.920 55 . 908 
Total 52.983 58 
LCP Between Groups 5.520 3 1.840 1.803 . 158 
Within Groups 55.101 54 1.020 
Total 60.621 57 
ULP Between Groups 3.566 3 1.189 1.628 . 193 
Within Groups 40.163 55 , . 
730 
Total 43.729 58 
UEN Between Groups 8.255 3 2.752 2.045 . 118 
Within Groups 72.659 54 1.346 
Total 80.914 57 
7.4.4.3 Controlling Credit Risks of Islamic Banks 
Algari (2003) argues that credit risk is deemed to be the most important type of risk faced 
by a bank. This risk if not recognized and supervised could lead to a serious financial problem. 
Therefore, a bank's management usually uses a variety of measures to control credit risks of 
Islamic banks (Al Gareeb, 1996 and Chapra and khan, 2000). 
Thirteen measures have been suggested. Respondents were asked to determine their 
views concerning the appropriateness of these measures (Appendix A). Table 7.15 shows that the 
respondents agree on the suggested measures for controlling credit risks. The mean responses 
and standard deviations confirm these results; also these results are consistent with the literature 
and practice for controlling credit risks. The consensus among respondents reflects that these 
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measures are part of regulatory measures, which Islamic banks and conventional banks are 
accustomed to on the one hand and are convenient measures for Islamic banks without breaching 
their characteristics on the other. 
Table: 7.15: Measures for Controlling Credit Risks of Islamic Banks 
CFM PIS PCIRG PIC CCB PCSS 
Valid 5 58 5 5 5 59 
Missirr 1 
Mean 2.102 2.345 1.94 1.94 1.678 2.271 
Std. Dev. 
. 885 . 965 . 86Q . . 
839 
. 753 1.157 
MF RHFC CT ICSEMAC C LPD LLP 
N Valid 59 5 59 5 59 5 58 
Missin 1 
Mean 1.949 2.627 1.94 1.442 1.78 1.661 1.931 
Std. Dev. . 918 1.128 . 89 . 
5341 . 7208 . 7568 . 8135 In a scale being I for strongly agree and 5 for strongly disagree. 
Determining a ceiling for each kind of financing modes (CFM) 
Determining the percentage of investment in each sector (PIS) 
Determining the percentage of credit for each individual and related groups PCIRG 
Determining the percentage of Investment in each company and or all companies PIC 
A ceiling on the credit ratio to the board of directors (CCBD) 
Prohibition of credit for some sectors (PCSS) 
Determining the maturity of financing (MF) 
Restrictions on holdings of assets in foreign currencies (RHFC) 
Requirements of collateral according to type of investment (CTI) 
Enhancing internal control system in evaluating, monitoring and assessment of credits (ICSEMAC) 
Requirement of cash margins (CM) 
Creating of a legitimate penalty rate in case of delay of due payment (LPDP) 
Increasing loan loss provisions (LLP) 
It is worth noting that three measures show relatively little bet diversion among 
respondents, namely restrictions on holdings of assets in foreign currencies (RHFC), determining 
the percentage of investment in each sector (PIS), and prohibition of credit for some sectors 
(PCSS). Inconsistency among respondents on RHFC is justifiable, as this measure is no longer 
used for controlling credit in Jordan, particularly after adopting full convertibility of the 
Jordanian Diner. Moreover, holding a proportion of foreign assets relative to their liabilities is 
necessary for asset management and to avoid the consequences of negative movement in foreign 
exchange. PIS and PCSS are no longer used after easing credit control measures since 1993, 
even the new Banking law expands the range of financial services for Islamic banks over other 
banks, for example there is a limit to the involvement of conventional banks in trade, while 
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Islamic banks are allowed to do so. However, the main restriction on Islamic banks' operations 
should be consistent with Islamic percepts (Banking Law, 2000). 
Figure 7.4: Measures for Controlling Credit Risks of Islamic Banks 
Prohibition of Holding of Foreign Assets 
Percentage of Investment in each Sector 
Prohibtion of Credit for Certain Sectors 
Strongly Disagree 
The descriptive analysis gives a general picture of the respondents' views concerning the 
credit control measures. To investigate the difference among these groups, the following null 
hypothesis is tested through ANOVA: 
Ho: There are no differences among the respondent groups concerning the credit risk 
control measures 
Table 7.16 shows that the differences among these groups are statistically insignificant 
except for PCSS; which reflects a consensus among respondent groups on these variables. 
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Table: 7.16: ANOVA: Measures for Controlling of Credit Risks 
Sum of Squares df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
CMF Between Groups 1.924 3 . 641 . 812 . 
493 
Within Groups 43.465 55 . 790 
Total 45.390 58 
PIS Between Groups 4.060 3 1.353 1.490 . 228 
Within Groups 49.044 54 . 908 
Total 53.103 57 
SPCIRG Between Groups 2.314 3 . 771 1.047 . 379 
Within Groups 40.533 55 . 737 
Total 42.847 58 
PIC Between Groups 1.142 3 . 381 . 527 . 665 
Within Groups 39.706 55 . 722 
Total 40.847 58 
CCBD Between Groups 
. 
361 3 . 120 . 204 . 
894 
Within Groups 32.520 55 . 591 
Total 32.881 58 
PCSS Between Groups 12.926 3 4.309 3.661 . 018 
Within Groups 64.735 55 1.177 
Total 77.661 58 
MF Between Groups 3.039 3 1.013 1.216 . 312 
Within Groups 45.808 55 . 833 
Total 48.847 58 
RHFC Between Groups 4.596 3 1.532 1.218 . 312 
Within Groups 69.200 55 1.258 
Total 73.797 58 
CTI Between Groups 2.547 3 . 849 1.054 . 376 
Within Groups 44.301 55 . 805 
Total 46.847 58 
ICSEMAC Between Groups . 546 3 . 182 . 
625 . 602 
Within Groups 15.997 55 . 291 
Total 16.542 58 
CM Between Groups 2.287 3 . 762 1.506 . 
223 
Within Groups 27.848 55 . 506 Total 30.136 58 
LPDP Between Groups 1.453 3 . 484 . 839 . 478 Within Groups 31.767 55 . 578 
Total 33.220 58 
LLP Between Groups 2.592 3 . 864 1.328 . 275 Within Groups 35.132 54 . 651 
Total 37.724 57 
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However, the differences among the respondents concerning PCSS are due to the 
negative response of the CBJ and to a lesser degree with conventional banks compared with 
those of Islamic banks and external auditors (Table 7. D25, Appendix Q. The main reason 
behind this is due to the fact that the Banking Law of 2000 expanded the range of financial 
services of licensed banks, particularly Islamic banks. Moreover, the CBJ removed all direct 
credit control measures. Therefore, prohibition of credit for certain sectors is no longer used. 
This is primarily why the mean response for the CBJ reached 2.8 compared to 1.5 for external 
auditors and 2.0 for Islamic banks; it seems that the former groups were more informed on these 
measures than the latter (Table 7. D25, Appendix C). It was expected that a statistically 
significant difference among the groups concerning, for example, RHFA and PIS would be 
found. These results contradict those of Al Gareeb in the case of Islamic banks in Egypt (Al 
Gareeb, 1996). 
It is worth noting that, even though Islamic banks have an ability to reduce the capital 
value of investment deposits in case of losses, they can not eradicate systemic risk, which could 
lead to a bank run. Therefore, researchers call for a building of adequate reserves for preserving 
the solvency and the viability of Islamic banks as an ongoing operation (Errico and Farahbakhsh, 
1998). This is why respondents show an agreement on the importance of loan loss provisions 
(LLP) measures for controlling credit risk (Table 7.15 and 7.16). 
In general, the respondent groups demonstrate the importance of credit risk control 
measures for Islamic banks. This may be a signal for adoption of appropriate measures for 
controlling credit risks related to Islamic banks'activities. 
7.4.4.4 Level of Credit Risk of Islamic Banks 
Analysis of the sources of credit risks shows that there is a consensus among the 
respondents on each source of credit risk for Islamic banks. A general question of the level of 
Islamic banks' credit risks is asked to confirm the respondents' views concerning the level of this 
risk. The respondents agree that credit risks of Islamic banks are higher than for conventional 
banks. 
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Figure 7.5 and Table 7.17 show that the responses are relatively positive, since the mean 
is 2.63, and the standard deviation is 1.36. Table 7. D22, Appendix C shows that 54 percent of the 
responses at least "agree" with the higher level of credit risk of Islamic banks. 
Figure 7.5 
High Level of Credit Risk of Islamic Banks 
Strongly Disagree 
Table: 7.17: The Higher Level of Credit Risk of Islamic Banks 
Valid 5 
Missing 
Mean 2.6271 
Std. Dev. 1.36329 
As far as the four groups are concerned, the differences among them will be tested to 
clarify whether there is a consensus or difference concerning the higher level of Islamic banks' 
credit risks. The following null hypothesis is tested: 
Ho: There are no differences among respondent groups concerning the higher level 
of credit risk of Islamic banks compared to the counterpart of conventional 
banks. 
Table 7.18 shows that the level of credit risk is statistically significant as the f- value 
distribution exceeds 8.1. This means the null hypothesis must be rejected, and the hypothesis of 
the differences among the respondents on the higher level of credit risks must be accepted. Table 
7. D26, Appendix C shows that the mean responses vary substantially between both external 
auditors and Islamic banks on the one hand and the CBJ and conventional banks on the other, as 
the mean values of former groups are 1.6 and 1.8, respectively compared to 3.3 and 3.1, 
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respectively for the latter. Although the CBJ and conventional banks are consistent on the 
special sources of credit risks of Islamic banks, which entails a higher level of risk for Islamic 
banks' financing modes, it was unexpected that they were inconsistent on the higher level of 
credit risk as 62% of their responses at least disagree with the higher level of credit risks. This 
inconsistency may be due to their current practice of regulation and supervision, which stem 
from a conventional point of view; this also is consistent with the conventional banks' point of 
view. 
Table 7.18: ANOVA: Higher Level of Credit Risks of Islamic Banks 
Sum of Square d Mean 
Squar 
Sig. 
Between Groups 33.178 3 11.059 8.152 . 00 
Within Groups 74.61 55 1.357 
Total 107.79 58 
Summary 
Islamic banks as well as conventional banks face the same credit risks, particularly in the 
operations based on mark-up. These sources of risks are generally related to the performance of 
macro economy, borrowers' creditworthiness, decline in banks' cash flow and asset value, 
maturity, collateral, concentration ratios, efficiency of legal and internal control systems. In 
addition to these sources of credit risks, Islamic banks face special sources of credit risks related 
to the nature of their operations. Taking into consideration these sources, eight sources have been 
recognized, which include the underdevelopedness of the economic and financial system, 
inefficient legal system in addressing commercial conflicts, unavailability of hedging 
instruments, high default probability of PLS, lack of collateral, weak commitments for adopting 
Islamic standards, lack of collateral for most PLS, unavailability of legitimate penalty rate, and 
unfavorable environment. It is worth noting that the respondents are consistent with the sources 
of special kinds of credit risk faced by Islamic banks. 
With regard to the suggested measures for controlling credit of Islamic banks, all 
respondents are in harmony about these measures except for one out of thirteen measures, which 
is related to PCCS. The differences among respondent groups is possibly due to abolishing this 
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measure, after adopting an indirect monetary policy in 1993 where the CBJ and conventional 
banks' respondents were more informed of this measure than the other groups. 
In general, the descriptive analysis of the level of credit risks of Islamic banks shows that 
the respondents agree on the higher level of credit risks of Islamic banks than those of 
conventional banks, but there is difference among the groups concerning the magnitude of credit 
risk. 
7.4.5 Liquidity Risk of Islamic Banks 
Liquidity risk is related to the ability of the bank to raise money in a short period of time 
at a reasonable cost (Al-Sadah, 2000). The sources of this risk include volatility of deposits, 
maturity transformation, availability of interbank market and lender of last resort. 
7.4.5.1 Sources of Liquidity Risk of Islamic Banks 
Six sources of liquidity risk facing conventional banks were selected. The respondents 
were asked whether these sources applied to Islamic banks. Frequency analysis indicated that all 
respondents agreed on the appropriateness of these sources of liquidity risk for Islamic banks. 
Table 7.19 shows that the respondents are positively agreed on the sources as sources of 
liquidity risk for Islamic banks. These results were expected as far as these sources of liquidity 
risk are general sources (Appendix A) related to any intermediary financial institution, and 
Islamic banks are not exception, particularly as they are involved like other financial institutions 
in assets transfonnation (maturity transformation) which may be susceptible to liquidity risk. 
Table: 7.19: The Sources of Liquidity Risk of Islamic Banks 
VD MA DD LSAREC AIBM LL 
N Valid 5 5 5 58 58 58 
Missin 1 1 1 
Mean 2.25 1.932 2.458 2.448 2.310 2.19 
Std. Dev. 1.06 . 888 . 897 . 902 . 79 . 8263 Volatility of deposits (VD) 
Dependence on demand deposits (DDD) 
Availability of inter-bank market (AIBM) 
Mismatch between assets and liabilities (MAL) 
Lower size of assets readily exchange for cash (LSAREC) 
Lender of last resort (LLR) 
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To investigate the differences among the four groups of respondents concerning the 
appropriateness of these sources as sources of liquidity risk, the following null hypothesis is 
tested: 
Ho: Islamic banks face the same sources of liquidity risk as those of conventional 
banks. 
Table 7.20 shows that differences among these groups are statistically insignificant 
concerning the suggested sources of liquidity risks except for volatility of deposits (VD) and 
dependence on demand deposit (DDD). This means there is a consensus among respondent 
groups concerning four out of six variables as sources of liquidity risks for Islamic banks. These 
results were expected as they were related to general factors of sources of liquidity risk, which 
Islamic banks are expected to face as well as conventional banks such as availability of interbank 
market, mismatch between assets and liabilities, size of liquid assets, and lender of last resort. 
With regard to VD and DDD, it statistically significant differences for any of the two variables 
were unexpected. Researchers believe that volatility of deposits of conventional banks is one of 
the main sources of liquidity risks (Emco, and Farahbaksh, 1998). It is believed that Islamic 
banks are no exception. Although the share of demand deposits or current accounts constitute a 
relatively lower portion of total Islamic banks' funds in Jordan (17%), but it will be a serious 
problem if it accompanied with withdrawal of investment deposits before maturity. Therefore, it 
is difficult for banks' management to build their long term financing plan without taking into 
consideration the nature of these deposits. 
With regard to the sources of differences, Table 7. E18 (Appendix C) shows that the mean 
responses vary substantially between, the CBJ, and Islamic banks and external auditors for VD, 
and between the CBJ and conventional banks, and external auditors and Islamic banks for DDD, 
as the mean values of the former are higher than the latter for both variables. This leads us to 
conclude that the CBJ and conventional banks are not totally convinced of the two variables as 
sources of liquidity risk for Islamic banks. However, the response of the CBJ was unexpected 
and it contradicts the literature (Errico, and Farahbaksh, 1998). They may think that deposits of 
Islamic banks have lower volatility than conventional banks, because they depend more on 
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investment deposits as the main source of funds compared with other sources. Wilson (1997) 
argues that Islamic banks have a high proportion of customer deposits in investment accounts 
and a relatively low proportion of demand deposits. He also concludes that the immediate 
liabilities are often lower than those of conventional banks. This is confirmed by the composition 
of liabilities of Islamic banks in Jordan. Although, investment deposits constitute a relatively 
high proportion of funds compared to current accounts, they can be withdrawn before maturity, 
which represents a major source of liquidity risk for Islamic banks. In addition to that, Islamic 
banks are engaged in asset transformation, which increases the probability of liquidity risks. 
Table: 7.20: ANOVA: Sources of Liquidity Risks for Islamic Banks 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
VD Between Groups 15.267 3 5.089 5.607 . 002 
Within Groups 49.920 55 . 908 
Total 65.186 58 
MAL Between Groups 5.055 3 1.685 2.278 . 
090 
Within Groups 40.674 55 . 740 
Total 45.729 58 
DDD Between Groups 8.145 3 2.715 3.879 . 014 
Within Groups 38.499 55 . 700 
Total 46.644 58 
LLA Between Groups 2.493 3 . 831 1.023 . 390 
Within Groups 43.852 54 . 812 
Total 46.345 57 
AIBM Between Groups . 100 3 3.337E-02 . 050 . 985 
Within Groups 36.314 54 . 672 
Total 36.414 57 
LLR Between Groups 4.611 3 1.537 2.419 . 076 
Within Groups 34.303 54 . 635 
Total 38.914 57 
7.4.5.2 Special Sources of Liquidity Risk of Islamic Banks 
Taking into consideration the nature of the sources of funds, investments, and the 
environment, Islamic banks face special sources of liquidity risks. Wilson (1997) summaries 
some sources of liquidity risks, he states: 
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" The composition of Islamic bank assets pose problem for central bankers who 
are accustomed to dealing with conventional banks. Islamic banks cannot hold treasury 
bills or bonds or other interest yielding securities. Hence conventional measures of 
liquidity cannot be applied to Islamic banks yet this is one measure, which is important 
for central banks in their role as protectors of depositors. Islamic banks tend to hold 
greater cash reserves than conventional banks, and short-term trade-financing assets can 
be regarded as fairly liquid, but these are not tradable instruments, and therefore cannot 
be transformed into cash until the importer being financed repays. The basic problem is 
the absence of a secondary market for Islamic financing instruments which impeded not 
only liquidity management, but also liquidity evaluation". 
In addition to ordinary sources of liquidity risk of conventional banks, Islamic 
banks face special sources related to the nature of the financing modes of these banks. 
Eleven sources are suggested (Mudawi, 1995, Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998, and Chapra 
and Khan, 2000). 
Respondents were asked to determine their views concerning the appropriateness of these 
special sources of liquidity risk for the Islamic banks (Appendix A). Table 7.21 shows the 
respondents generally agreed on the suggested sources of liquidity risk. It is worth noting that 
two variables, namely large size of demand deposits relative to investment deposits (LSDD) and 
large demand on Islamic bank financing modes (LDIBM) show lower consistency among 
respondents compared to the other variables. Table 7. E7 and Table 8. E16 (Appendix C) confirm 
the aforementioned analysis. The lower agreement on LSDD is due to the larger size of 
investment deposits relative to demand deposit of Islamic banks (Annual reports of JIB and 
ISAB, 2002). With regard to LDIBM, the consensus among respondents is due to the fact that 
Islamic banks have an excess liquidity compared to other banks, which is behind the relatively 
negative response toward this source. However, the sources of differences will be clarified when 
variance among respondent groups is tested. 
Table: 7.21: The Special Sources of Liquidity Risks of Islamic Banks 
LSD MMA DLPLS UIBMI ULLRI UISI 
N Valid 58 58 57 58 57 58 
Missin 1 1 2 1 2 1 
Mean 2.828 2.293 2.035 2.22 2.281 2.259 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.12 . 918 . 963 . 85 . 881 1.05 
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DRF WDBM LILM LDIBM FRCSD 
Valid 58 58 58 58 58 
Missin 1 1 1 1 1 
Mean 2.00 2.345 2.39 3.121 2.50 
Std. 
Deviatio . 
898 1.052 . 97 
1.04 
. 
922 
In a scale being 1 for strongly agree and 5 for strongly disagree. 
Large size of demand deposits relative to investment deposits (LSDD) 
Mismatch between assets and liabilities (MMAL) 
Difficulty in liquidation of most PLS' investments (DLPLS) 
Un-availability of inter- bank market (UIBM) 
Un- availability of lender of last resort according to Islamic percepts (ULLR) 
Un- availability of Islamic sharing instruments (UISI) 
Difficulty in raising funds from the market (DRF) 
Withdraw of investment deposits before maturity (WDBM) 
Lack of instruments for liquidity management (LILM) 
Large demand on Islamic bank financing modes (LDIBM) 
Fiqhi restriction on cash sale of debt (FRCSD) 
To investigate the sources of differences among respondent groups the following null 
hypothesis is tested using ANOVA: 
Ho: There are no differences among respondent groups concerning the special 
sources of liquidity risk for Islamic banks. 
Table 7.22 shows there are no statistically significant variables except for difficulty in 
raising funds from the market (DRF) and Fiqhi restriction on cash sale of debt (FRCSD). This 
entails failing to reject the null hypotheses in eight out of these variables. Thus there is a 
consensus among the respondent groups on the sources of liquidity risk of Islamic banks, 
particularly those related to the management of liquidity according to Islamic precepts, lender of 
last resort, and those related to the nature of Islamic financing modes. With regard to DRF and 
FRCSD, the differences among respondent groups were not expected, even though they are 
considered sources of liquidity risk for Islamic banks (Chapra and Khan, 2000). Fortunately the 
difference among the groups is due to the high positive response of Islamic banks and external 
auditors compared to other groups for the former and external auditor compared to the other 
groups for the latter (Table 7. E19, Appendix Q. The high response of external auditors and 
Islamic banks is due to the desire of the two groups to raise of the surface the problem of 
management of liquidity of Islamic banks, and may be they were more informed about these 
issues than other groups. 
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Table: 7.22: ANOVA: Spe ial Sources of Li uidi Risks o f Islamic B 
Sum of 
Squares 
df can 
Square 
Sig. 
LSDD Between Groups 8.068 3 2.689 2.262 . 092 
Within Groups 64.208 54 1.189 
Total 72.276 57 
MMAL Between Groups 5.387 3 1.796 2.274 . 090 
Within Groups 42.631 54 . 789 
Total 48.017 57 
DLPLS Between Groups 6.324 3 2.108 2.450 . 074 
Within Groups 45.606 53 . 860 
Total 51.930 56 
UIBMI Between Groups 4.421 3 1.474 2.113 . 109 
Within Groups 37.666 54 . 698 
Total 42.086 57 
ULLRI Between Groups 2.609 3 . 870 
1.127 . 346 
Within Groups 40.899 53 . 772 
Total 43.509 56 
UISI Between Groups 3.169 3 1.056 . 952 . 422 
Within Groups 59.951 54 1.110 
Total 63.121 57 
DRF Between 
Groups 
7.463 3 2.488 3.486 . 022 
Within Groups 38.537 54 . 714 
Total 46.000 57 
WDBM Between Groups 8.143 3 2.714 2.667 . 057 
Within Groups 54.960 54 1.018 
Total 63.103 57 
LIMII Between Groups 5.229 3 1.743 1.935 . 135 
Within Groups 48.651 54 . 901 
Total 53.879 57 
LDIBC Between Groups 8.549 3 2.850 2.871 . 045 
Within Groups 53.606 54 . 993 
Total 62.155 57 
FRCSD Between 
Groups 
8.970 3 2.990 4.085 . 011 
Within Groups 39.530 54 . 732 
Total 48.500 157 1 1 
7.4.5.3 Level of Liquidity Risk of Islamic Banks 
anks 
To assess the level of liquidity risk of Islamic banks the respondents were asked two 
questions. The first one was related to the level of liquidity risk of Islamic banks and the second 
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was related to the appropriateness of a liquidity ratio. Figure 7.6 and Table 7.23 show that 
respondents agreed with the high liquidity risk of Islamic banks. But, neutral and negative 
responses can not be ignored. Respondents show similar responses concerning the high ratio of 
liquidity of Islamic banks, but a different degree of magnitude toward "disagree". These results 
show that the respondents were well-informed of the liquidity problems of Islamic banks; 
therefore solving liquidity risk can not be achieved through a higher liquidity ratio. Wilson 
(1997) states that Islamic banks tend to hold greater cash reserves than conventional banks 
because of an absence of a secondary market for Islamic financing instruments. 
Figure 7.6 The Level of Islamic Banks' Liquidity Risks 
High Level of Liquidity Risk of Islamic Banks Liquidity Ratio of Islamic Banks should be high 
Descriptive analysis shows there was a consensus among the respondents on the high 
level of liquidity risk of Islamic banks compared to conventional banks. This result confirms the 
results of the abovementioned sources of liquidity risks of Islamic banks. Sundararajan (1999) 
argues that institutions offering Islamic financial products suffer from the same risk of liquidity 
as conventional intermediaries. It is expected that Islamic banks suffer from liquidity risk more 
than conventional banks for the issues discussed in the previous part. Wilson (1997) states that 
Islamic banks tend to hold greater cash reserves than conventional banks because of the absence 
of a secondary market for Islamic financing instruments. Researchers suggest a greater role for 
central banks to help Islamic banks face their liquidity problems. Radwan (1995) suggests that 
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the central bank may provide finance for "Islamic Banks" in the form of Mudarabah deposits on 
which the Islamic bank may pay profit at the rate declared for such deposits. 
Table: 7.23: The Level of Islamic Banks' Liquidity Risks 
LRISHCB* LRAISSHCB** 
Valid 58 56 
Missing 1 3 
Mean 2.3966 2.500 
Std. Deviation . 9722 1.22103 
In scale being 1 for strongly agree and 5 for strongly disagree. 
*Level of liquidity risks of Islamic banks is higher than the counterpart of conventional banks 
**The ratio of liquidity of Islamic banks should be higher the conventional bank counterparts 
To investigate the differences among these groups the following null hypothesis is tested 
using ANOVA: 
Ho: There are no differences among respondent groups concerning the higher level 
of liquidity risk (or high liquidity ratio) of Islamic banks compared with the 
counterpart of conventional banks. 
Table 7.24 shows there are statistically significant results for the high level of liquidity 
risk and higher ratio of liquidity of Islamic banks compared to conventional banks8. With regard 
to the sources of differences, Table 7. E21, Appendix C shows that the CBJ and conventional 
banks are relatively less convinced of the higher level of risk and ratio of liquidity compared to 
Islamic banks and external auditors. This may be due to the fact that Islamic banks do not face 
liquidity risk because they have, at present, excess liquidity. 
Table: 7.24: ANOVA: level of Liquidity risks of Islamic bank 
Sum of Squares di Mean Square Sig. 
LRISHCB Between Groups 12.403 3 4.134 5.383 . 003 Within Group s 41.47 54 . 768 
Total 53.87 57 
LRAISHCB Between Groups 16.80 3 5.602 4.468 . 007 Within Groups 65.19 52 1.254 
Total 82.00 55 
In scale being I for strongly agree and 5 for strongly disagree. 
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Summary 
The descriptive analysis of all respondents indicates that Islamic banks face the same 
sources of liquidity risks as conventional banks. The test of differences among respondent groups 
declares that these groups are consistent on the sources of liquidity risks except for two variables, 
namely volatility of deposits and dependence on demand deposits. In addition to these sources 
of risk Islamic banks face other sources of risk related to the nature of financing anodes and their 
work environment. 
With regard to the general level of liquidity risk, the respondents agreed on the higher 
level of Islamic bank risks. But the degree of response was different among the respondent 
groups; the CBJ and conventional banks were less convinced of the higher level of risk 
compared to the Islamic banks and external auditors. 
7.4.6 Capital Adequacy Standards for Islamic banks 
The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) became an international standard for banking 
regulation and supervision since 1988. This ratio works as a cushion for risks that could face the 
banks. These risks include credit risk and market risks. CAR was suggested by Basel for the 
banks in the G-ten countries. The risk initially covered credit risk, and then the coverage was 
expanded to include market risk. It is worth noting that most countries are committed to applying 
CAR, including most Islamic countries. 
7.4.6.1 Applying Basel Standards of CAR for Islamic banks 
This section aims to investigate whether the factors that determine the CAR of 
conventional banks could be applied to Islamic banks' therefore nine factors determining the 
CAR according to Basel accord were suggested. The respondents were asked whether these 
factors could be applied to Islamic banks. 
Table 7.25 shows that the respondents agreed on these suggested factors, which mean the 
appropriateness of these factors as determinants for CAR for Islamic banks. These results are 
186 
CHAPTER 7 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
acceptable as far as they are related to primary factors determining capital adequacy, which 
could be applied to conventional and Islamic banks. 
Table: 7.25: The Appropriateness of Factors Determine the CAR of Conventional Banks 
for Islamic Banks 
LA APD ASC MC QBR SD SFLS IARM CAG 
Valid 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Missing 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Mean 1.8621 1.72 1.983 2.086 1.759 1.965 2.138 2.086 1.948 
Std. Dev. 
. 661 . 615 . 607 . 
683 . 683 . 591 . 888 . 779 . 
711 
In scale being 1 for strongly agree and 5 for strongly disagree. 
Level of asset risks (LAR) Ability to repay deposits (APD) 
Availability of sufficient collaterals (ASC) Maturity of credit/investments (MCI) 
Quality of borrowers (QBR) Subordinate debt (SD) 
Sophisticated financial and legal system (SFLS) Instruments for assets risk management (IARM) 
Classifying assets within groups according to their risks (CAGR) 
To investigate the differences among respondent groups, the following null hypothesis is 
tested: 
Ho: There are no differences among respondent groups concerning the 
appropriateness of factors determining the CAR of conventional banks for 
those of Islamic banks. 
Table 7.26 shows there are no statistically significance results except for one factor, 
namely sophistication of financial and legal systems (SFLS). This means failure to reject the 
null hypotheses of no differences among the groups concerning these variables. The consensus 
among the respondent groups confirms the appropriateness of these factors for Islamic banks. 
With regard to the SFLS, the differences among the groups were not expected. The higher the 
sophistication of the financial system the more liquid the financial assets will be in the economy, 
which will have an impact also on their quality. The more developed the legal system the less 
time is required for solving the financial and commercial conflicts between the banks and their 
clients, which also has a significant impact on the banks' asset quality. Table 7. F9(Appendix 
Q. shows that the difference is due to the negative response of external auditors compared to 
other groups. This response from external auditors is not understood. However, as far as the 
institutions directly involved with regulation and supervision are concerned (namely the CBJ and 
187 
CHAPTER 7 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Islamic banks) agree on this factor, it is therefore acceptable to say that all suggested factors are 
important for determining the CAR for Islamic banks. 
Table 7.26: ANOVA: Factors Determin ing the CAR for Conventional I 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
LAR Between Groups . 532 3 . 177 . 
393 . 759 
Within Groups 24.365 54 . 451 
Total 24.897 57 
APD Between Groups 2.126 3 . 709 1.967 . 130 
Within Groups 19.460 54 . 360 
Total 21.586 57 
ASC Between Groups 1.033 3 . 344 . 
932 . 431 
Within Groups 19.949 54 . 369 
Total 20.983 57, 
MCI Between Groups 2.686 3 . 895 2.024 . 121 
Within Groups 23.883 54 . 
442 
Total 26.569 57 
QBR Between Groups 2.355 3 . 785 1.747 . 168 
Within Groups 24.266 54 . 449 
Total 26.621 57 
SD Between Groups 1.989 3 . 663 1.995 . 126 
Within Groups 17.942 54 . 332 
Total 19.931 57 
SFLS Between Groups 16.374 3 5.458 10.333 . 000 
Within Groups 28.523 54 . 528 
Total 44.897 57 
IARM Between Groups 1.200 3 . 400 . 647 . 588 
Within Groups 33.369 54 . 618 
Total 34.569 57 
CAGR Between Groups 1.665 3 . 555 
1.102 .3 56 
Within Groups 27.180 54 . 503 
Total 28.845 57 
anks 
In scale being 1 for strongly agree and 5 for strongly disagree. 
7.4.6.2 Factors Determining the CAR for Islamic Banks 
Taking into consideration the nature and characteristics of Islamic banks financing 
modes, as well as the environment in which they work, fourteen factors were suggested 
(Appendix A). The respondents were asked if these factors were appropriate for determining the 
CAR for Islamic banks. Table 7.27 shows there are a consensus among respondents on each of 
the suggested factors. This is confirmed by the work of some researchers (Ismail, et al., 2002, 
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Chapra and Khan, 2000, and Obaidullah, 2000). It is also consistent with the work of the 
Accounting and Auditing Organization of Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), which has 
issued a statement in 1997 for calculation of CAR for Islamic financial institutions. 
Table: 7.27: The Sources Determine the Level of CAR for Islamic Banks 
ASBA RMPDF P PRDIP OPR MH UNHI 
N Valid 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Missing 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Mean 2.017 1.81 2.155 2.103 1.897 2.017 2.035 
Std. Deviatio 
. 
80549 . 71222 . 
89446 . 66727 . 
66727 
. 68803 . 85769 
LC IRSINEH WRID OFFBA SFS PC CBBB 
N Valid 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Missing 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Mean 2.035 1.966 2.121 2.069 2.069 1.948 2.397 
Std. Deviation 
. 917 . 772 . 
818 . 792 . 722 . 
633 1.059 
In scale being 1 for strongly agree and 5 for strongly disagree. 
Adopting similar standards of Basel accord (ASBA) 
Adopting risk-weighting methodology of assets according to the probability of default and risk of each financing 
mode (RMPDFM) 
Portfolio's risks (PR) 
Payment of demand deposits and withdraws of investment deposits before maturity (PRDIP) 
Covering of operational risks (OPR) 
Eliminating of moral hazard (MH) 
Unavailability of hedging instruments (UNHI) 
Level of collaterals (LC) 
Investment risks should be shared between investment deposits and shareholders' equity (IRSTNEH) 
Weighted-risks of investment deposits should be lower than 100% (WRID) 
CAR should be sufficient to cover off balance sheet items (OFFBAL) 
Sophistication level of financial systems (SFS) 
Provision to cover credit risks (PCR) 
CAR should be determined bank by bank (CBBB) 
To investigate the differences among the four groups, the following null hypothesis is 
tested using ANOVA. 
Ho: There are no differences among respondent groups concerning the factors 
determining the CAR for Islamic banks. 
Table 7.28 shows no variable is statistically significant. This means there is no reason for 
rejecting the null hypothesis of no differences among the groups on the importance of these 
factors for determining the CAR for Islamic banks. This consensus among the four groups 
reflects the awareness of these groups to basic factors determining the CAR for Islamic banks 
and the need for an special CAR for these Banks. 
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7.28: ANOVA: Factors Determine the Level of CAR for Islamic Banks 
Sum of 
S uares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
ASBA Between Groups 2.411 3 . 804 1.255 . 299 
Within Groups 34.571 54 . 640 
Total 36.983 57 
RMPDFM Between Groups 2.992 3 . 997 2.078 . 114 
Within Groups 25.921 54 . 480 
Total 28.914 57 
PR Between Groups 1.288 3 . 429 . 523 . 668 
Within Groups 44.315 54 . 821 
Total 45.603 57 
PRDIP Between Groups . 735 
3 . 245 . 537 . 659 
Within Groups 24.645 54 . 456 
Total 25.379 57 
OPR Between Groups . 309 3 . 
103 . 222 . 
881 
Within Groups 25.070 54 . 464 
Total 25.379 57 
MH Between Groups 1.390 3 . 463 . 978 . 
410 
Within Groups 25.592 54 . 474 
Total 26.983 57 
UNHI Between Groups 5.087 3 1.696 2.485 . 070 
Within Groups 36.844 54 . 682 
Total 41.931 57 
LC Between Groups 5.482 3 1.827 2.325 . 085 
Within Groups 42.449 54 . 786 
Total 47.931 57 
IRSINEH Between Groups 1.342 3 . 447 . 741 . 532 
Within Groups 32.589 54 . 603 
Total 33.931 57 
WRID Between Groups 3.413 3 1.138 1.768 . 164 
Within Groups 34.743 54 . 
643 
Total 38.155 57 
OFFBAL Between Groups 1.863 3 . 
621 
. 990 . 404 
Within Groups 33.861 54 . 627 
Total 35.724 57 
SFS Between Groups 1.333 3 . 444 . 845 . 475 Within Groups 28.392 54 . 526 Total 29.724 57 
PCR Between Groups 1.641 3 . 
547 1.393 . 255 
Within Groups 21.204 54 . 393 
Total 22.845 57 
CBBB Between Groups . 866 3 . 289 . 247 . 863 
Within Groups 63.013 54 1.167 
Total 63.879 57 
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7.4.6.3 Methodology and Level of CAR for Islamic Banks 
To acquire a general opinion relating to the CAR, the respondents where asked to specify 
their opinion concerning the following issues: 
Calculation of CAR for Islamic banks requires different methodologies 
(CARISMDC). 
Level of CAR for Islamic banks should be different from that of conventional banks 
(CARISDCB). 
Levels of CAR for Islamic banks should be higher than the counterpart of 
conventional banks (CARISHCB). 
Table 7.29 shows there is a consistency with what is expected. This means that the 
respondents agreed on the need for a different methodology and level of CAR for Islamic banks, 
but they were not sure about the need for higher CAR. These results are consistent with the 
nature and characteristics of Islamic banks' financing modes. With regard to the differences 
concerning the need for a higher level of CAR for Islamic banks, this idea finds some advocates 
among the more conservative on the Islamic banks' operations (Al-Hammar in Wilson (1997). 
Also, some central banks, who applies higher CAR than that of the Basel committee for all 
banking including the Islamic banks like the case of Jordan (Chapter 4). 
Table: 7.29: Methodoloev and Level of CAR of Islamic Banks 
Std. 
In scale beii 
CARISMDC CARISDCB CARISHCB 
Valid 57 57 55 
Missirr 2 2 
Mean 2.3509 2.4211 2.9818 
iation 1.20255 1.13306 1.07997 
To see the differences among the groups, the following null hypothesis is tested using 
ANOVA: 
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Ho: There are no differences among respondent groups concerning the 
Methodologies and the level of CAR for Islamic banks. 
Table 7.30 shows there is no statistically significant of the CARISMDC, therefore failing 
to reject the null hypothesis of no difference among these groups concerning the importance of 
adopting a different methodology for calculation of CAR for Islamic banks. This is related to the 
fact that Islamic banks financing modes are different from those of conventional banks, which 
entails differences in the terms credit risk. In addition to credit risk, Islamic banks are exposed to 
liquidity risk and operational risks. For these considerations the AAOIFI takes the initiative and 
suggests a different methodology for calculation of CAR for Islamic banks (AAOIFI, 1999). 
With regard to the level of CAR, Table 7.30 shows there are statistically significant 
differences concerning both CARISDCB and CARISHCB. This means that the groups are 
different concerning the need for different and higher level of CAR for Islamic banks. The 
differences among the groups are due to the fact that the calculation of CAR for Islamic banks is 
still debatable (Ismail, et al., 2002), and that the current practices of some central banks is to 
require higher CAR according to Basel' methodology. However, as far as the groups show a 
consensus in the need for different methodology for calculation the CAR for Islamic banks, the 
comparison between the soundness of Islamic banks should be done according to the new 
methodology. 
Table 7.30: ANOVA: the Methodology and Level of CAR 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
CARISMDC Between Groups 8.360 3 2.787 2.034 . 120 
Within Groups 72.622 53 1.370 
Total 80.982 56 
CARISDCB Between Groups 12.609 3 4.203 3.757 . 016 
Within Groups 59.286 53 1.119 
Total 71.895 56 
CARISHCB Between Groups 16.192 3 5.397 5.883 . 002 Within Groups 46.790 51 . 917 
Total 62.982 54 
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Summary 
International capital adequacy requirements have acquired a greater interest from 
academics and regulators since 1988. Almost all Moslem countries apply these requirements; 
therefore, some analysts and institutions call for different methodologies to be used for Islamic 
banks, because their operations are different from those of conventional banks. This section tries 
to test the views of the respondents concerning the factors affecting the CAR for Islamic banks 
and the methodology for their calculation. The first part examined whether the current factors 
determining the CAR for conventional banks are similar to those of Islamic banks; it was clear 
that these factors also apply to Islamic banks. Moreover, special factors related to the nature and 
characteristics of Islamic banks as well as the environment in which they work are also 
examined. It was clear that the respondents unanimously agreed on the factors suggested that 
determined the level of CAR for Islamic banks. The last part was dedicated to testing whether 
Islamic banks needed a different methodology than that applied for conventional banks. It is 
worth noting that the groups show a consensus on the need for a different methodology for 
calculation of CAR for Islamic banks. This is explained by the differences between Islamic 
banks and conventional banks in terms of the nature of Islamic financing modes, credit risk, 
liquidity risk and operational risk. 
7.4.7 Information disclosed to the Public 
Information disclosure became an essential element in banking regulation and 
supervision. The main purpose of information disclosure is to enhance transparency and 
eliminate information asymmetry. Some countries have enacted extensive disclosure 
requirements supported by greater liabilities, mandatory ratings by at least two private ratings 
agencies, and on line credit reporting systems as New Zeland, Chili and Argentina respectively 
(Dhmalc, 2000). Errico, and Farahbaksh (1998) argue that financial disclosure is more important 
in an Islamic banking environment than in conventional banking, because it reduces information 
asymmetries between banks and its depositors, particularly in unrestricted mudarabah contracts. 
Wilson (1997) states that depositors who are sharing in the bank's profits can reasonably expect 
a high degree of transparency from the bank and full information disclosure. Chapra and Khan 
(2000) and Wilson (1997) confirm that information disclosure is more important in the risk- 
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sharing nature of Islamic finance, because of the need to enable the shareholders and depositors 
to monitor the affairs of the bank and thereby help inject greater discipline. For this purpose 
three sets of information were suggested to be disclosed to the public by the Islamic banks to 
enhance the transparency and provide more information: external Information, internal 
information, and mutual funds. 
7.4.7.1 External Information Disclosure 
The external information in this analysis includes the information disclosed to the public 
by banks such as cash flow statements (CFS), balance sheet statements (BSS) and income 
statements (IS). The respondents were asked to determine the importance of these statements 
usually disclosed to the public by Islamic banks. As expected, Table 7.31 shows that the 
respondents had a consensus on the importance of these statements. 
Table: 7.31: The Information Disclosed to the Public 
CFS BSS IS 
N Valid 58 58 58 
Missin 1 1 1 
Mean 1.7069 1.5345 1.569 
Std. 
Deviatio . 
81668 . 70625 . 70368 
In scale being I for strongly agree and 5 for strongly disagree. 
Cash flow statements (CFS) 
Balance sheet statements (BSS) 
Income statements (IS) 
To investigate the differences among the groups concerning the importance of these 
statements, the following null hypothesis is tested using ANOVA: 
Ho: There are no differences among respondent groups concerning the information 
disclosed to the public by Islamic banks 
Table 7.32 shows no statistical significance of any of the three variables, which means 
there is a consensus among the respondent groups on the importance of the three statements. 
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Table: 7.32: ANOVA: Information Disclosed to the Public 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
CFS Between Groups 2.234 3 . 745 1.124 . 348 
Within Groups 35.784 54 . 663 
Total 38.017 57 
BSS Between Groups 3.109 3 1.036 2.210 . 097 
Within Groups 25.322 54 . 469 
Total 28.431 57 
IS Between Groups 2.133 3 . 711 1.471 . 233 
Within Groups 26.091 54 . 483 
Total 28.224 57 
7.4.7.2 Internal Information Disclosure 
Internal information means, for this analysis, the internal information (reports) disclosed 
for internal use for the purposes of board of directors and supervisors (Appendix, A). The 
respondents were asked to determine the importance of these reports issued for internal use to the 
public. Table 7.33 shows respondents agreed on the importance of all these reports. This can be 
seen through the lower values of both means and standard deviations of these variables. 
Table: 7.33: The importance of Information Disclosed for Supervisors and Board of 
Directors 
C P IRS M CR L OPR AMD 
N Valid 58 57 58 58 58 58 57 58 
Missin 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Mean 1.50 1.60 1.552 1.672 1.621 1.655 1.702 1.707 
Std. 
Deviatio . 
60 . 
678 . 73 . 735 . 70 . 690 . 731 . 749 
In scale being 1 for strongly agree and 5 for strongly disagree. 
Credit concentration ratio according to assets and borrowers (CRA) Performance data (PD) 
Internal rating systems (IRS) Market risk and (VaR) reports (MRR) 
Credit risk reports (CRR) Liquidity risk reports (LRR) 
Operational risks reports (OPR) 
Assessment of management and director reports (AMD) 
To investigate the differences among the groups, the following null hypothesis is tested 
using ANOVA: 
Ho: There are no differences among respondent groups concerning the importance 
of information disclosed for internal use to the public. 
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Table 7.34 shows there was no statistical significance of any of these types of 
information disclosed, which means that all respondent groups agreed on the importance of these 
reports. These results reflect the greater need for such information. Although, this information is 
important for the public particularly the depositors; publishing of information should be 
consistent with the regulations and direction of the central banks to prevent any adverse effect on 
the stability and soundness of financial institutions. 
Table: 7.34: ANOVA: Information Disclosed to the Supervisors and Board of Directors 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
CRA Between Groups . 541 3 . 
180 . 488 . 
692 
Within Groups 19.959 54 . 370 
Total 20.500 57 
PD Between Groups 1.119 3 . 373 . 804 . 
497 
Within Groups 24.600 53 . 464 
Total 25.719 56 
IRS Between Groups 1.528 3 . 509 . 
955 . 
421 
Within Groups 28.817 54 . 534 
Total 30.345 57 
SMR Between Groups . 785 
3 . 262 . 471 . 
704 
Within Groups 29.991 54 . 555 
Total 30.776 57 
CRR Between Groups 1.356 3 . 452 . 928 . 433 
Within Groups 26.299 54 . 487 
Total 27.655 57 
LRR Between Groups . 651 
3 . 217 . 443 . 723 
Within Groups 26.453 54 . 490 
Total 27.103 57 
OPR Between Groups . 
516 3 . 172 . 310 . 
818 
Within Groups 29.414 53 . 555 
Total 29.930 56 
AMD Between Groups 1.103 3 . 368 . 642 . 591 
Within Groups 30.914 54 . 572 
Total 32.017 57 
7.4.7.3 Information Disclosed by Mutual Funds 
As Islamic banks are similar to mutual funds (MFs) in terms of sources of funds and 
sharing in profit and loss by the money holders, information disclosed by MFs to their 
shareholders will be used to examine the need of Islamic banks for such information. It is worth 
noting that MFs are the most regulated financial activities (Al-Osimi, 1993). Errico and 
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Farahbaksh (1998) argue that information disclosed by Islamic banks should include the 
information disclosed by investment companies such as investment objectives, policies, 
concentration ratios and performance data. However, seven types of information disclosed by 
mutual fiends have been suggested (Appendix A). The respondents were asked to determine 
whether it was important that the Islamic banks disclosed this information. Table 7.35 shows 
there was a consensus on the importance of such information to be disclosed by Islamic banks to 
the public. 
Table: 7.35: The Importance of Information Disclosed by Mutual Funds 
IOP CR RFB I PD QE I 
N Valid 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Missin 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Mean 1.72 1.69 1.741 1.69 1.638 1.70 1.862 
Std. 
Deviation . 
586 . 537 . 
66 . 598 . 718 . 701 . 
805 
In scale being I for strongly agree and 5 for strongly disagree. 
Investment objectives and policies (IOP) 
Risk factor of bank's portfolios (RFBP) 
Performance data (PD) 
Inside Trading (IT) 
Concentration ratios (CR) 
Internal controls IC 
Qualification and experience of management (QEM) 
As far as the four groups are concerned, differences among these groups are tested using 
ANOVA: 
Ho: There are no differences among respondent groups concerning the importance 
of information disclosed by mutual funds for Islamic Banks. 
However, it was expected that various groups would be consistent on the importance of 
the information to be disclosed by Islamic banks. The result of variance test (ANOVA) shows 
there was no statistical significance in the differences in terms in these variables, which means 
that the CBJ, conventional banks, Islamic banks and external auditors agree with the importance 
of this information being disclosed by Islamic banks. Also, disclosing of information should be 
coordinated with a regulatory authority. 
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Table: 7.36: ANOVA: Information Disclosed by Mutual Funds 
ý 
F 
t 
f 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
FIO Between Groups . 
210 3 . 070 . 195 . 
899 
Within Groups 19.376 54 . 359 
Total 19.586 57 
FCR Between Groups . 
100 3 . 033 . 110 . 954 
Within Groups 16.314 54 . 302 
Total 16.414 57 
RFBP Between Groups . 360 3 . 120 . 262 . 853 
Within Groups 24.761 54 . 459 
Total 25.121 57 
IC Between Groups . 510 3 . 170 . 
462 . 710 
Within Groups 19.903 54 . 369 
Total 20.414 57 
PD Between Groups 1.181 3 . 394 . 
753 . 525 
Within Groups 28.216 54 . 523 
Total 29.397 57 
QM Between Groups 2.234 3 . 
745 1.559 . 210 
Within Groups 25.784 54 . 477 
Total 28.017 57 
IT Between Groups 2.561 3 . 854 
1.343 
. 270 
Within Groups 34.336 54 . 636 
Total 36.897 57 
Summary 
Information disclosure acquires great attention in the supervision standards in 
conventional banks. The importance of information disclosure is more needed for Islamic banks 
than conventional banks as it reduces information asymmetries and moral hazard. To investigate 
the need of such information, three sets of information were tested. The information disclosed to 
the public, was namely, cash flow statements, balance sheets and income statements. With regard 
to the information disclosed for supervisors and board of directors including concentration ratio 
according to assets and borrowers, performance data, internal rating systems, market risk and 
(VaR) reports, credit risk reports, liquidity risk reports, operational risks reports, and assessment 
of management and directors. Also, seven types of information disclosed by mutual funds were 
tested; these included investment objectives and policies, concentration ratios (type of assets), 
risk factor of bank's portfolios, internal controls, performance data, qualification and experience 
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of management and inside trading. The respondents showed a consensus on all these types of 
information, which reflects the thirst of the public for such information. 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter was divided into four parts. The first part covers the introduction. The 
second part presents the regulator profile, which includes the characteristics of the respondents to 
the questionnaires in terms of the age level, educational level, and experience. The number of 
respondents to the questionnaires was 59 distributed throughout four groups concerned with 
regulation and supervision in Jordan, namely the Central Bank of Jordan, conventional banks, 
Islamic banks and external auditors of Islamic bank. The aim of this part was to provide a 
background of regulators and supervisors in Jordan. The third part, briefly introduced the 
general hypothesis for the seven sets of variables. The fourth part provided the descriptive 
analysis and testing of the hypotheses: the objectives of regulation and supervision of Islamic 
banks, depositor protection, licensing measures, credit risk, liquidity risk, capital adequacy and 
information disclosure. The purpose of the descriptive and analytical part was to find the 
foundation for adopting different regulations and supervision standards for Islamic banks in 
Jordan, and to generalize these results in other Islamic countries that adopt the similar financial 
systems. In general, the analysis affirmed the views on the different nature of Islamic banks, 
which initiates the need for the special arrangements in terms of objectives, credit risk, liquidity 
risk, capital adequacy ratio and nature of information that is needed to alleviate the asymmetry of 
information problem, particularly for investment deposits. The following chapter provides a 
summary of the findings and implications for future research. 
199 
CHAPTER 7 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Notes 
1- Sees Basel Core Principles (1997). 
2- The 6 Th Expert Level Meeting on Islamic Banking held in Bahrain during May 26-28, 
1999 reached to the same conclusion. 
3- The Central Bank Law of 1971(2001). 
4- Annual Report of the Central banks, 2002. 
5- Al-Tamimi, Unis(1998 ) determines the objectives of regulation of the Central Banks of 
Jordan of depositor protection, control of expansion of credit and money, direct credit to 
certain sectors, maintaining the stability of financial sector, protect sharholders' interest, 
mobilization of saving, limit the concentration of ownership, and examine the application 
of licensing measures. 
6- The calculated f-values accout for LF and PIEAF ( 7.5 and 4.03, respectively). 
7- The mean value of external auditors accouts for 3.188 compared to 1.57 for Islamic banks 
counterpart. 
8- The f- value for LRISHCB and LRAISSHCB (5.38,4.4, respectively) is higher than the 
distribution value for a degree of freedom 3,54. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
The last two chapters discuss the data analysis and the tests conducted for 
answering the research questions. This chapter presents a summary of the results that 
have been reached and their implications for the regulatory and supervisory authority, 
Islamic banks and academics. 
The need for such a study stems from the fact that prudential regulation and 
supervision is an integral part of an efficient financial system; they play an important role 
in control of bank risk under acceptable positions that the banks can bear from their 
internal resources without jeopardizing their solvency. For this purpose, all countries 
apply regulation and supervision standards consistent with the nature of their financial 
systems. On an international level, since 1988 Basel accord on banking regulation and 
supervision became the norm for all banks in developed and developing countries 
including Islamic countries. As these standards are basically designed for conventional 
banks, some of these standards are not appropriate for Islamic banks because their 
operations are based on sharing of profit and loss arrangements. 
The primary objective of this study was to undertake an in-depth analysis of the 
foundations for the regulation and supervision standards of Islamic banks in Jordan based 
on the analysis of risks and its relationship with banking regulation and supervision 
standards. 
Before detennining the foundations for regulation and supervision of Islamic 
banks, the research aimed at identifying the basic characteristics of the Islamic financial 
system in terms of permissible activities, structure, institutions and instruments. In 
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addition, the study covers the economy, financial system and regulation in Jordan as a 
background for the country case study. The analysis also shows that Islamic banking 
practice diverges from the paradigm version, as the mark up based contracts dominant 
their operations. This is mainly due to the higher risk of PLS arrangements and the moral 
hazard problem. Although, Islamic banks' operations are dominated by mark up 
contracts, they are susceptible to financial risk such as credit risk, liquidity risk and 
operational risk. 
To investigate empirically the objective of the research, two methodologies have 
been adopted. The first methodology is based on longitudinal data analysis, which 
depends on secondary data gathered for 21 licensed banks in Jordan during the period 
1990-2000. For analytical purposes three methods are used, pooled data ordinary least 
square, fixed effect and random effect models. The purpose of these tests was to 
determine whether there was a relationship between banks capital regulation, credit risk, 
liquidity risk, and loan-loss-provisions on the one hand, and banks' risks on the other. 
The second methodology is based on cross-sectional -data gathered through 
questionnaires. These questionnaires were designed to answer the questions related to the 
foundations for adopting special regulations and supervisions of Islamic banks. Seven 
sets of regulations and supervisions were tested: objectives of regulation and supervision, 
objectives of deposit protection, licensing measures, credit risk, liquidity risk, and capital 
adequacy and information disclosures. 
The next section summarizes the results and findings of the research as well as the 
implications for the regulatory and supervisory authority, Islamic banks and academics. 
Also, this chapter identifies the limitations and avenues for future researches. 
8.2 Results and findings 
8.2.1 General Findings 
Although there is research on Islamic banks in Jordan, present research on Islamic 
banks' regulation and supervision is the first empirical research of the foundations of 
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regulation and supervision for Islamic banks and effectiveness of capital regulation in 
Jordan. The literature and empirical research intend to increase our knowledge on Islamic 
banks and their regulation and supervision. The investigation shows that the 
characteristics of the PLS arrangements and their risks are different from those of the 
conventional banks; it also shows that some current regulations and supervision standards 
should be different. In general, the objectives of regulation and supervision of Islamic 
banks are similar to those of conventional banks, but the objectives of depositor 
protection should be specified to take account of the characteristics of deposits in Islamic 
banks, particularly investment deposits. Also the licensing measures of conventional 
banks are generally appropriate for licensing of Islamic banks. In addition, Islamic banks' 
riskiness is higher than the counterpart of conventional banks; these include credit risks, 
liquidity risks, and operational risks. As the risks of Islamic banks are different from the 
conventional banks, the capital adequacy ratio and methodology for its calculation should 
be different. Moreover, Islamic banks need to disclose more information on their 
performance and financial statements to eliminate the moral hazard problems. 
8.2.2. Details of Findings 
8.2.2.1 Regulator Profile 
The study increases our knowledge on the regulator profile. It is declared from the 
current study that the regulators and supervisors in Jordan are well educated, mature and 
have a long experience in banking regulation and supervision. This profile provides a 
background for regulators and supervisors in Jordan which is of a greater interest to the 
empirical analysis. 
8.2.2.2 Objectives of Regulation and Supervision 
The objectives of regulation and supervision of conventional banks are generally 
appropriate for Islamic banks. Ten objectives of regulation and supervision are developed 
which include maintaining the confidence of the financial system, depositor protection, 
maintaining the shareholder's interests, controlling money and credit expansion, keeping 
inflation under control, directing credit for certain sectors, mobilizing savings, improving 
banking activities, applying international standards, and applying fair value for assessing 
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assets. The respondents show a consensus on these objectives. The importance of these 
objectives is due to the comprehensiveness of the objectives of current regulation and 
supervision after amendments of banking law on the one hand, and the similarity of the 
objectives for both systems on the other. 
8.2.2.3 The Objectives of Deposit Protection in Islamic Banks 
The objective of deposit protection in Islamic batiks should reflect the different 
nature of these deposits on the one hand, and the type of these deposits on the other. 
However, three objectives were developed: full protection of current accounts, protection 
of investment accounts against operational risks and protection of investment accounts 
against high risk taking (the moral hazard problem). The objectives of deposit protection 
should be directed toward full coverage of current accounts, while in the case of 
investment accounts; the objectives should be directed toward operational risks and the 
moral hazard problems. 
8.2.2.4 The Licensing Measures 
Licensing measures of conventional banks are generally appropriate for licensing 
of new Islamic banks. The respondents show a consensus on eight out of ten measures. 
The two measures that show divergence of views are related to the licensing fees (LF) 
and provisions of internal control and external audit functions (PIEAF). With regard to 
the sources of differences, Islamic banks and the Central Bank are more convinced of 
current LF; in contrast, the conventional banks and external auditors are less convinced of 
the suitability of current practices. However, the difference among these institutions is 
due to the special nature of operations conducted by Islamic banks that require more 
supervisory oversight, which requires a higher cost, therefore, higher licensing fees. With 
regard to PIEAF, the differences are not only due to the relatively high negative response 
of external auditors, but also to strong positive agreement of other groups with this 
variable. 
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8.2.2.5 Credit risks 
Islamic banks face a high level of credit risk compared with those of conventional 
banks, but there is a difference among the groups concerning the magnitude of the 
sources of credit risk. These sources of risks are generally related to the performance of 
the macro economy, borrowers' creditworthiness, decline in banks' cash flow and asset 
value, maturity, collateral, concentration ratios, efficiency of legal and internal control 
systems. In addition to these sources of credit risks, Islamic banks face special sources of 
credit risks related to the nature of their operations. Taking into consideration the nature 
of these operations, eight sources have been recognized, which include the 
underdevelopedness of the economic and financial system, inefficient legal system in 
addressing commercial conflicts, unavailability of hedging instruments, high default 
probability of PLS, weak commitments for adopting Islamic standards, lack of collateral 
for most PLS, unavailability of legitimate penalty rate, and unfavorable environment. 
8.2.2.6 Liquidity risks 
In addition to credit risk, Islamic banks face a higher level of liquidity risk than 
those of conventional banks. However, the degree of response was different among the 
respondent groups; the CBJ and conventional banks were less convinced of the higher 
level of risk compared to Islamic banks and external auditors. The main sources of 
liquidity risk include volatility of deposits, mismatch between assets and liabilities, 
dependence on demand deposits, lower size of assets readily exchange for cash, 
availability of inter-bank market, and lender of last resort. 
In addition to these sources of liquidity risks, Islamic banks face other sources of 
liquidity risk related to the nature of financing modes and their work environment 
including mismatch between assets and liabilities, difficulty in liquidation of most PLS 
investments, unavailability of inter-bank market, unavailability of lender of last resort 
according to Islamic precepts, unavailability of Islamic sharing instruments, difficulty in 
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raising funds from the market, possibility of withdraw of investment deposits before 
maturity, lack of instruments for liquidity management, large demand on Islamic bank 
financing modes and fiqhi restrictions on cash sale of debt. 
8.2.2.7 Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 
Capital adequacy ratio is necessary for Islamic banks as well as for conventional 
banks but the methodology for calculation of the CAR should be different. This is due to 
the fact that the former face different sources affecting the calculation of CAR. This is 
explained by the differences between Islamic banks and conventional banks in terms of 
the nature of Islamic financing modes, which entail the difference of credit, liquidity and 
operational risks on the one hand, and the nature of investment deposits which share in 
the risk as the shareholders' equity on the other. 
8.2.2.7 Information disclosure 
The literature shows that Islamic banks need to disclose more information to the 
public than that disclosed by conventional banks, as Islamic banks are expected to be 
exposed to moral hazard and adverse selection as a result of information asymmetry. This 
information is important to enable depositors, particularly the holders of Investment 
accounts to supervise the banks' performance and risks. 
Three sets of information are suggested to be disclosed by Islamic banks to the 
public. First, cash flow statements, balance sheets and income statements. Second, 
information disclosed to supervisors and board of directors should include concentration 
ratio according to assets and borrowers, performance data, internal rating systems, market 
risk and (VaR), credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, and assessment of management 
and director reports. Third, information disclose by mutual funds should include 
investment objectives and policies, concentration ratios (type of assets), risk factor of 
bank's portfolios, internal controls, performance data, qualification and experience of 
management and inside trading. The respondents show a consensus on all these types of 
information, which reflects the thirst of the public for such information. 
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8.3 Implications of the research 
This research aims to increase our knowledge of the foundations for adopting 
different regulation and supervision standards for Islamic banks than those of 
conventional banks in Jordan. This section reviews the implications of this study. 
8.3.1 Implication for the regulatory and supervisory authority 
A regulatory authority should recognize that the nature and characteristics of 
Islamic banks' financing modes are different from those of conventional banks, in that 
they entail a higher risk than those of conventional banks, if these risks are not 
recognized they will be a source of risk not only for these banks but also for the whole 
financial system. In this regard, the regulatory and supervisory authority should insure the 
existence of adequate risk management policies, liquidity management instruments 
according to Islamic precepts, effectiveness of capital regulation, information disclosure 
on the performance of these banks to the public, internal control systems and market 
discipline. 
Effectiveness of the supervisory framework for Islamic banks requires that the 
supervisory authority should be an independent entity. This will enable it to adequately 
perform supervisory processes; strong enforcement of regulation, fair disclosure of 
problem banks, legal protection of supervisors against the adverse affect on their 
reputation and career prospects. Also, the supervisory authority should have the authority 
to train skilled staff in the operations of Islamic banks, risk management practices and 
remunerate the supervisors through efficient incentive schemes to attract skilled staff in 
the face of competition from the private sector. 
The regulatory authority should give the regulation and supervision of Islamic 
banks more attention. This would be through appointment of shari'ah supervisory board, 
and establishment of special regulatory framework for regulation and supervision of 
Islamic banks. 
208 
CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATION 
8.3.2 Implication for Islamic banks 
Islamic banks have attained a great progress over a relatively short period of time. 
To maintain this progress they need to take the following measures: increase their share 
in PLS arrangements, design appropriate risk management policies, disclose more 
information to depositors or large depositors, and train their skilled staff on their modes 
of financing. Also Islamic banks should cooperate to create an inter-bank market to 
facilitate their management of the liquidity. 
8.3.3 Implications for Academics 
This research shed some light on one of the important areas of Islamic banks, 
which is regulation and supervision. This area does not receive adequate investigation, 
particularly the foundations of regulation and supervision of Islamic banks. Furthermore, 
this area should be of interest not only to academics in Jordan but also in Islamic and 
non-Islamic countries. 
8.3.4 Suggestions for Future Research 
This study developed a good deal of knowledge on the regulation and supervision 
of Islamic banks, many areas of this research could be extended. For example, this study 
is based on data available on capital to deposit ratio for the period 1990-2000, new 
research must use capital adequacy ratio based on risk-weighted assets to confirm the 
result of this research or whether using this ratio will enhance the effectiveness of 
banking regulation. Also, research on Islamic bank risks in other Islamic countries should 
focus on credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, operational risk to help the regulatory 
authority identify and design appropriate measures for controlling the risk as well as 
developing regulatory standards to control bank risk on the one hand and maintain the 
progress of Islamic banks world wide on the other. 
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Appendix A 
List of the Questionnaire Variables 
1. Objectives of Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banks 
Objective Symbol 
Maintaining confidence of financial system MCFS 
Depositors protection DP 
Maintaining shareholder's interests MSI 
Control of money and credit expansion CMCE 
Maintaining inflation under control MIC 
Direct credit for certain sectors DCCS 
Mobilizing savings ms 
Improving banking activities IBA 
Applying international standards AIS 
Applying fair value for assessing assets and liabilities AFVAA 
2. Objectives of Deposit Protection of Islamic Banks 
Objective of Deposit protection Symbol 
Full protection of current accounts PCAD 
Protection of investment accounts (IAs) against operational risks PIAOR 
Protection of investment accounts against taking high risks than expected 
by bank's management or moral hazard 
PIAMH 
3. Licensing Measures of Islamic Bank 
Licensing Measure Symbol 
Capital requirements CR 
Standards of ownership and directors and senior management's 
qualifications 
SODSMQ 
Requirements of business plan and feasibility studies RBPFS 
Licensing fees LF 
Provisions of internal control and external audit functions PIEAF 
Permissible financial services PFS 
Permissible investment sectors PIS 
Branch network BN 
Relationship with associate / affiliate companies RAAC 
_Transparency 
in application of regulation TAR 
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4. Credit Risks of Islamic Banks 
4.1 Sources of Credit Risks of Conventional Banks 
Source of Credit Risk Symbol 
Fluctuation of macroeconomy FME 
Deterioration of borrowers' creditworthiness DBC 
Decline in the net cash flow DCF 
Deteriorating of the value of assets DVA 
Lack/insufficient collaterals LC 
Concentration of credit ratios according to individuals and related groups, 
sectors, financial instruments and countries 
CCI 
Inefficient of the legal system in solving commercial conflicts IELS 
Maturity of investments, the longer the maturity the higher will be the 
credit risk 
MLO 
Inefficient of Internal control systems INS 
4.2 Special Sources of Credit Risks of Islamic Banks 
Sources Symbol 
Underdeveloped economic and financial system UEFS 
Inefficient legal system in addressing commercial conflicts ILS 
Un-availability of hedging instruments according to Islamic percepts UHI 
High default probability of profits loss sharing PLS DPLS 
Weak commitment for adopting Islamic accounting standard WAI 
Lack of collateral for most PLS arrangement LCP 
Un-availability of legitimate penalty rate ULP 
Un-favorable environment, Interest based system UEN 
4.3 Appropriateness of Regulatory Measures for Controlling Credit Risks of 
Islamic Bank 
Measure Symbol 
Determining a ceiling for each kind of financing modes CFM 
Determining the percentage of investment in each sector PIS 
Determining the percentage of credit for each individual and related groups PCIRG 
Determining the percentage of Investment in each company and or all companies PIC 
A ceiling on the credit ratio to the board of directors CCBD 
Prohibition of credit for some sectors PCSS 
Determining the maturity of financing MF 
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Restrictions on holdings of assets in foreign currencies RHFC 
Requirements of collateral according to te of investment CTI 
Enhancing internal control system in evaluating, monitoring and assessment of 
credits 
ICSEMAC 
Requirement of cash margins CM 
Creating of a legitimate penalty rate in case of delay of due payment LPDP 
Increasing loan loss provisions LLP 
4.4 Level of Credit Risks of Islamic banks 
Level of credit risk Symbol 
Level of credit risk of Islamic banks is higher than the counterpart of 
conventional banks 
CRISHCB 
5. Sources of liquidity Risks of Islamic banks 
5.1 Sources of Liquidity Risks of Conventional Banks 
Source of Liquidity Risk Symbol 
Volatility of deposits VD 
Mismatch between assets and liabilities MAL 
Dependence on demand deposits DDD 
Lower size of assets readily exchange for cash LSAREC 
Availability of inter-bank market AIBM 
Lander of last resort LLR 
5.2 Special Sources of Liquidity Risks of Islamic Banks 
Source of Liquidity Risk Symbol 
Large size of demand deposits relative to investment deposits LSDD 
Mismatch between assets and liabilities MMAL 
Difficulty in liquidation of most PLS' investments DLPLS 
Un-availability of inter- bank market UIBM 
Un- availability of lender of last resort according to Islamic percepts ULLR 
Un- availability of Islamic sharing instniments UISI 
Difficulty in raising fiends from the market DRF 
Withdraw of investment deposits before maturity WDBM 
Lack of instruments for liquidity management LILM 
Large demand on Islamic bank financing anodes LDIBM 
Fi hi restrictions on cash sale of debt FRCSD 
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5.3 Level of Liquidity Risk of Islamic Banks 
Level of Liquidity Risk Symbol 
Level of liquidity risk of Islamic bank is higher than the counter-parts of LRISHCB 
conventional banks 
Ratio of liquidity of Islamic banks should be higher than the counterpart of LRISSHCB 
conventional banks 
6 Capital Adequacy Ratio 
6.1 Appropriateness of the Factors Determine the Capital Adequacy Ratio of 
Conventional Banks for those Islamic Banks 
Factor Symbol 
Level of asset risks LAR 
Ability to repay deposits APD 
Availability of sufficient collaterals ASC 
Maturity of credit/investments MCI 
Quality of borrowers QBR 
Subordinate debt SD 
Sophisticated financial and legal system SFLS 
Instruments for asset risk management IARM 
Classifying assets within groups according to their risks CAGR 
6.2 Factors Determine the Capital Adequacy for Islamic Banks 
Factor Symbol 
Adopting similar standards of Basel accord ASBA 
Adopting risk-weighting methodology of assets according to the probability 
of default and risk of each financin mode 
RMPDFM 
Portfolio's risks PR 
Payment of demand deposits and withdraws of investment deposits before 
maturity 
PRDIP 
Covering of operational risks OPR 
Eliminating of moral hazard MH 
Unavailability of hedging instruments UNHI 
Level of collaterals LC 
Investment risks should be shared between investment deposits and 
shareholders' equity 
IRSINEH 
Wei hted-risks of investment deposits should be lower than 100% WRID 
CAR should be sufficient to cover off balance sheet items OFFBAL 
Level of sophisticated financial systems SFS 
Provision to cover credit risks PCR 
CAR should be determined bank by bank CBBB 
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6.3 Methodology and CAR Level of Islamic banks 
Methodology and Level Symbol 
The methodology of calculating CAR of Islamic banks should be different CARISMDC 
than the counterpart of conventional banks 
The level of CAR of Islamic banks should be different than the counterpart of CARISDCB 
conventional banks 
The level of CAR of Islamic banks should be higher than conventional bank CARISHCB 
counterpart 
7 Information Disclosure 
7.1 Information Disclosed to the Public 
Type of Information Symbol 
Cash flow statements CFS 
Balance sheet statements BSS 
Income statements IS 
7.2 Information Disclosed for supervisors and Board of Directors 
Type of Information S mbol 
Credit concentration ratios according to assets and borrowers CRA 
Performance data PD 
Internal rating systems IRS 
Market risk and (VaR) reports MRR 
Credit risk reports CRR 
Liquidity risk reports LRR 
Operational risks reports ORR 
Assessment of management and director reports AMD 
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7.3 Information disclosed by Mutual Funds 
_Type 
of Information Symbol 
Investment objectives and policies lop 
Concentration ratios CR 
Risk factor of bank's portfolios RFBP 
Internal controls IC 
Performance data PD 
Qualification and experience of management QEM 
Inside trading IT 
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Questionnaire on Islamic Banking Regulation 
and Supervision 
Researcher: Qasem Abdel AL, 
Loughbourgh University/UK 
Subject: Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banks 
A statement of confidentiality should be included here 
Your assessment of regulation and supervision of Islamic Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) will constitute an essential part in formulating 
regulation standards that are consistent with the nature of these 
institutions. Your practical view adds invaluable insight to the regulation 
of IFIs. 
Should you require more information on the questionnaire, please do 
not hesitate to contact me on 4630301, ext. 2465, Amman or e-mail: 
abdelalq @cbj. gov. jo 
I. Respondent Information 
a. Name ......................................................... 
(optional) 
b. Age: Q under 25 years Q 25-35 years 
Q 36 - 45 years Q over 45 years 
c. Position ...................................................... 
d. Your qualifications 
QBA QMBA Q Chartered accountant 
MBA and chartered accountant. LI other, please specify ................ 
e. How long have you been working in banking regulation? 
Q less than 2 years 02-5 years 
0 5-10 years Q more than 10 years 
f. Do you have a prior experience of working for any of the following 
institutions? 
Q Commercial bank 0 Merchant bank 0 Accountant and consultancy 
services 
Q External auditor Eli Islamic bank 0 Other, please 
specify .............. 
g. Address ...................................................... 
h. Postal Code/City ........................................... 
i. Phone/ Telefax /e-mail .................................... 
General 
II. Do you think that the following objectives of conventional bank regulation 
and supervision are appropriate for Islamic banks (please choose one 
answer for each question)? 
Strongly Agree Do not Disagree Strongly 
Agree know Disagree 
Maintaining confidence of 
financial system 
Depositor protection (in general) 
Maintaining shareholder's interest 
Control of monetary and credit 
expansion 
Maintaining the inflation 
/deflation rate under control 
Directing credit for certain sectors 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
I aý 
0 
I 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
C a 
4 
.ý a 
q 
3 
1--1 
4 Ii 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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Mobilizing savings 
Improving banking activities 
Applying International Standards 
(information disclosure, 
accounting and regulations) 
Applying fair value for assessing 
assets and liabilities 
III. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
ý 
2 
z 
I 
Strongly Agree Do not Disagree Strongly 
Agree Know Disagree 
3 
4 
4 
a 
ý 
Given the nature of Islamic financing modes, would you specify the 
objectives of regulatory authority concerning the depositor protection of 
Islamic banks (please choose one answer for each question)? 
Full Protection of current accounts 
'rotection of investment accounts against 
operational (fiduciary) risks (error, 
fraud and misconduct) from the part of 
management) 
Protection of investment accounts 
against taking more risk by 
management to attain high profits 
(particularly through Mudaraba 
contracts) 
Licensing Process 
I 
I 
I 
z 
2 
2 
3 
3 
,I 
s 
3 
IV. Do you think that the following licensing measures and requirements of 
conventional banks are appropriate for Islamic banks (please choose one 
answer for each question)? 
Strongly Agree Do not Disagree Strongly 
Agree Know Disagree 
Initial capital requirements 
Standards of ownership, 
directors and senior 
management qualifications 
Requirements of business plan 
and feasibility study 
Licensing fee 
ý 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
ý 
ý 
ý 
ý 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
F-] 
0 
4 
4 
4 
3I 14 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Provisions of internal and 
external audit functions 
Permissible financial services 
Permissible investment sectors 
Branch network 
The relation with 
associate/affiliate companies 
Transparency in applications 
of regulations 
Credit Risks 
ý 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
I 3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
C7 4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
V. Do you think that the following sources and factors of credit risks of 
conventional banks are the same for Islamic banks (please choose one 
answer for each question)? 
Strongly Agree Do not Disagree Strongly 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Agree 
Fluctuation in the performance of 
macro economy 
Deterioration of borrowers' 
creditworthiness which lead to 
default cases 
Decline in the net cash flow of 
banks 
0 
F-I 
I 
I C 
I 
Deterioration in the value of the 
bank's assets 
Lack/insufficient collaterals 
Concentration of credit ratios 
according to individuals and 
related groups, sectors, financial 
instruments, countries... etc 
Inefficiency of the legal system in 
solving commercial conflicts 
between banks and their clients 
Maturity of investments e. g. the 
longer the maturity the higher 
the credit risk 
I 
r71 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Inefficient internal control a 
systems 
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2 
2 
ý 
2 
2 
ý 
2 
z 
ý 
know Disagree 
3 
0 
0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
ý 
I 
4 
I 
4 
4 
,I 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
VI. Do you agree that the following factors are special sources of credit/ 
investment risks for Islamic banks (please choose one answer for each 
question)? 
Underdeveloped economic and 
financial systems 
An inefficient legal system in 
addressing commercial conflicts 
The unavailability of hedging (risk 
mitigation) instruments according 
to Islamic percepts 
A high default probability (risks) 
of Profit Loss Sharing PLS (such 
as Mudarba, Musharka, Salam, 
Ijarah... etc) compared to loans of 
conventional banks 
Weak commitment for adopting 
Islamic accounting standards 
A lack of collaterals for most PLS 
The unavailability of a legitimate 
penalty which alternative to 
interest does not allow for re- 
scheduling of profit rate at the 
same time it gives incentive for 
Islamic bank's clients to default. 
Unfavorable environment, interest 
rate system 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
I 
I 
C 
a 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
ý 
2 
2 
ý 
ý 
2 
ý 
ý 
Do not Disagree Strongly 
know 
C-I 
a s 
Disagree 
4 
4 
4 C 
4 
4 
,I 
4 
VII. Do you think that the following regulatory measures are appropriate for 
controlling credit risks of Islamic banks (please choose one answer for 
each question)? 
Strongly Agree Do not Disagree Strongly 
Agree 
Determining a ceiling for each 
kind of financing modes 
Determining the percentage of 
investment in each sector 
Determining the percentage of 
credit for each individual and 
related group 
Determining the percentage of 
investment in each company and 
/ or all companies 
A ceiling on the ratio of credit to 
the board of directors 
2 
E-1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Prohibition of credit for some 
C 
2 
2 
ý 
ý 
Know 
ý 
0 3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
0 
E-1 
ra 
a 
Disagree 
4 5 
.ý 
4 
4 
4 
S 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
S 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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sectors 
Determining the maturity of 
financing 
Restriction on holdings of assets in 
foreign currencies 
Requirements of collaterals 
according to the type of 
investment 
Enhancing the internal control 
system in evaluating, monitoring 
and assessment of credits 
Requirement of cash margins 
Creating a legitimate penalty rate 
in case of delay of due payments 
Increase loan loss provisions 
r--1 
2 
2 
2 
F-I 3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
VIII. Do you think that the overall credit/investment risk of Islamic banks is 
higher than conventional banks counterpart (please choose one 
answer)? 
Strongly 
Agree 
E-1 
Liquidity Risks 
Agree 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
F7' 
D 
2 
2 
F-7 
I 
I 
2 
Do not Disagree Strongly 
Know 
a 3 ,I 5 
IX. Do you think that the following sources of liquidity risks of conventional 
banks are the same as those of counterparties of Islamic banks (please 
choose one answer for each question)? 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Volatility of deposits 
Mismatch between assets and liabilities 
Dependence on demand deposits 
Lower size of assets readily exchangeable 
for cash 
Availability of inter-bank market 
Lender of last resort 
I 
F-I 
222 
I 
I F--_] 
I 
I 
I 
F] 
2 
2 
ý 
2 
2 
2 
Do not Disagree Strongly 
Know Disagree 
3 
0 
0 
4 
ý 
4 
4 a 
ý 
4 
4 
Disagree 
1--1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
F-7 
F7 
4 
4 
3 
4 
4 
5 
a 
5 
5 
5 
5 
X. Do you agree that the following factors represent special sources of liquidity 
risks for Islamic banks (please choose one answer for each question)? 
Large size of demand deposits relative to 
investment deposits 
Mismatch between assets and liabilities 
I 
I 
Difficulty in liquidation of most PLS 
investments 
Unavailability of inter-bank market 
Un availability of lender of last resort 
according to Islamic percepts 
Un availability of Islamic sharing 
instruments 
Difficulty in raising funds from the 
market 
Withdrawal of investment deposits 
before maturity 
Lack of instruments for liquidity 
management 
Larger demand on Islamic bank credits 
Fiqhi restrictions on cash sale of debt 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
F-I 
0 
F--] 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
ý 
ý 
2 
2 
ý 
ý 
ý 
2 
2 
2 
Do not Disagree Strongly 
Know Disagree 
r71 
F7 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
ý 
a 
4 
4 
4 
,I 
4 
,{ 
XI. Do you think the liquidity risks of Islamic banks is higher than the 
conventional banks counterparts (please choose one answer)? 
Strongly Agree 
High 
Do not Disagree Strongly 
Know disagree 
F-- I F--]2 
71 
223 
3 ý 5 
S 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
XII. Do you think that liquidity ratio of Islamic banks should be higher than 
conventional banks counterpart (please choose one answer)? 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Do not Disagree Strongly 
Know Disagree 
I ý 4 
Capital Adequacy 
XIII. Do you agree that the following factors determine the level of capital 
adequacy ratio for conventional banks apply to Islamic banks (please 
choose one answer for each question)? 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Level of asset risks 
Ability to repay the deposits 
Availability of sufficient collaterals 
Maturity of credits/ investments 
Quality of borrowers 
Subordinate debt 
Sophisticated financial and legal 
systems 
Instruments for asset risk 
management 
Classifying assets within groups 
according to their risks 
F7 
I 
I 
I 
3 
I 
I 
F7 
I 
I I I 
I 
224 
I 
Do not 
Know 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 0 
2 
2 
5 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
4 
ý 
4 
5 
5 
S 
5 
3 
3 4 
5 
5 
3 
3 
21 
_-1 
3 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
XIV. Do you agree that the following considerations and factors determine the 
level of CAR of Islamic banks (please choose one answer for each 
question)? 
Strongly Agree Do not Disagree Strongly 
Agree Know 
Adopting international standards 
similar to Basel accord 
Adopting risk-weighting 
methodology of assets according to 
the probability of default and risk of 
each mode of financing mode 
CAR should reflect the portfolio's 
risk, eg. the higher the ratio of 
mudaraba and musharaka 
compared to the sale contracts the 
larger will be the CAR and vis 
versa. 
I 2 
I 2 
ý 
3 
The level of CAR should guarantee 
the repayment of demand deposits 
and withdrawal of investment 
deposits before maturity 
CAR should be sufficient to cover 
operational (fiduciary) risks (errors, 
fraud, misconduct, and negligent 
from the part of bank's 
management) and displaced risks 
(the bank can not catch-up with 
other banks in competition, 
therefore it gives higher profit to 
holders of deposit accounts at the 
expense of shareholders) 
CAR should be sufficient to eliminate 
the moral hazard of the bank's 
management 
The unavailability of risk mitigating 
(hedging) instruments 
CAR should depend on the 
availability and sufficiency of 
collaterals 
The investment risk should be shared 
between investment deposits and 
shareholders 
As investment deposits bear 
investment risks their weighted- risk 
should be lower than 100% 
CAR should be sufficient to cover off 
balance sheet items 
CAR should depend on the level of 
sophisticated financial and legal 
systems 
Provisions to cover investment 
(credits) and market risks 
CAR should be determined bank by 
bank 
2 I 
I 2 
I ý 71 
I 
2 I 
I a 
1 
Iý 
Iý 
I 
I 
I U 
z 
ý 
ý 
122 
z 
3 
3 
3 
3 
I 
I 
I 
3 
} 
4 
a 
,I 
ý 
a 
,I 
4 
4 
Disagree 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
S 
5 
4 
0 4 
5 
5 0 
F7 
,, F7 
4 
,, 
a 
a 
S 
5 
5 
5 
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XV. Given the nature of Islamic modes of financing, do you think that the 
methodology of calculating the CAR for Islamic banks should be different 
from conventional banks counterpart (please choose one answer)? 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
I 3 4 5 
XVI. Do you think that the CAR should be different in Islamic banks than in 
conventional banks (please choose one answer)? 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
3 0 4 
Disagree 
Disagree 
5 
XVII. The level of the CAR of Islamic banks should be higher than the 
conventional bank counterparts (please choose one answer)? 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
I 3 4 5 
Information Disclosure 
XVIII. How relevant are the following information requirements of conventional 
banks for Islamic banks, (please choose one answer)? 
I 
0 
Do not Disagree Strongly 
Know 
2 
Do not Disagree Strongly 
Know 
2 
Do not Disagree Strongly 
Know Disagree 
z 
a. Information release for public 
Strongly Agree 
agree 
Cash flow statements 
Balance sheets 
Income statements 
F-] 
I 
I 
I 
226 
F-I 
2 
2 
ý 
Do not 
Know 
I 
3 
3 
3 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
4 
F7 
I 
,I 
5 
5 
5 
b. Information release for supervisors and board of directors (please choose one 
answer for each question)? 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Concentration ratios 
according to assets and 
borrowers 
0 
I 
1 
Performance data 
Internal rating systems 
Market risk and (VaR) 
reports 
Credit risk reports 
Liquidity risk reports 
Operational risk reports 
Assessment of management 
and directors a 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 0 
2 
2 
ý 
2 
2 
ý 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
0 
a 
a 
4 
4 
4 
4 
L 
5 
5 
5 
a I 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
c. Do you think that the Information disclosed by mutual funds is appropriate 
for Islamic banks (please choose one answer for each question)? 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Investment objectives and 
policies 
Concentration ratios (type of 
assets) 
Risk factor of bank's 
portfolios 
Internal controls 
Performance data 
Qualification and experience 
of management and senior 
staff 
F-7 F-] 
a 
F7 
F-I 
F-1 
I 
I 
I 
I F-I 
I 
I 
0 
Inside trading 
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2 
ý 
2 
z 
ý 
ý 
2 
Do not 
Know 
Do not Disagree Strongly 
Know Disagree 
ý 
C7 
F7 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
a 
F-7 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
a 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
XIX. Use the space provided below if you wish to make additional comments or 
suggestions for improving the regulation of Islamic banks? 
Thank you for taking the time to respond to this survey 
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Appendix C: Statistical Analysis for Chapter Seven 
Table: 7. A1: Frequency Distribution of Maintaining Confidence of Financial System 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 7 5.8 5.8 5.8 
Agree 0 50.8 50.8 6.6 
Disagree 2 3.4 3.4 100.0 
Total 59 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. A2: Freauencv Distribution of De)ositors Protection 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 8 4.4 4.4 4.4 
Agree 19 32.2 2.2 6.6 
Don't Know 1 1.7 1.7 8.3 
Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. A3: Freauencv Distribution of Maintaining Shareholder's Interest 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree G 4.1 4.1 4.1 
Agree 29 9.2 9.2 3.2 
Don't Know .4 .4 
6.6 
Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 8.3 
Strongly Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. A4: Frequency Distribution of Control of Money and Credit Expansion 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 22 37.3 37.3 7.3 
Agree 35 59.3 59.3 6.6 
Disagree 3.4 3.4 100.0 
Total 59 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. A5: Frequency Distribution of Maintaining Inflation under Control 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 12 0.3 20.3 0.3 
Agree 2 54.2 54.2 74.6 
Don't Know 6 10.2 10.2 84.7 
Disagree 9 15.3 15.3 100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. A6: Freauencv Distribution of Direct Credit for Certain Sectors 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 10 16.9 16.9 16.9 
Agree 28 7.5 7.5 4.4 
Don't Know 2 
.4 
3.4 67.8 
_Disagree 
19 32.2 32.2 100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
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Table: 7. A7: Frequency Distribution of Mobilizing Savings 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 16 27.1 7.1 7.1 
Agree 5 2.4 2.4 9.5 
Don't Know .4 .4 2.9 
isagree 15 5.4 5.4 8.3 
Strongly Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
Total 9 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. A8: Freauencv Distribution of Improving Banking Activities 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 17 8.8 8.8 8.8 
Agree 7 2.7 2.7 1.5 
Don't Know 3 5.1 5.1 6.6 
Disagree .4 
3.4 100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
'I'able: 7. A9: Frepuencv Distribution of Applying International Standards 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 23 9.0 9.0 9.0 
Agree 26 4.1 4.1 83.1 
Don't Know 1 1.7 1.7 84.7 
isa ree 15.3 15.3 100.0 
otal 9 100.0 100.0 
'fable: 7. A10 : Freauencv Distribution of Applying Fair Value for Assessing Assets 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 0 33.9 33.9 33.9 
Agree 7 5.8 5.8 79.7 
Don't Know 8 13.6 13.6 3.2 
Disagree .8 .8 100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
Table7. A11: ANOVA: (Descriptive) Objectives of Regulation of Islamic Banks 
N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Std. Error 95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Maintaining Confidence of 
Financial System 
Central bank 21 1.4762 . 5118 . 1117 1.2432 1.7091 1.00 2.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.6429 . 8419 . 2250 1.1568 2.1290 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.7273 . 4671 . 
1408 1.4135 2.0411 1.00 2.00 
Conventional 
banks 
13 1.6923 . 8549 . 
2371 1.1757 2.2089 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 1.6102 . 6700 8.722E-02 
1.4356 1.7848 1.00 4.00 
Depositors Protection Central bank 21 1.3810 . 4976 . 
1086 1.1544 1.6075 1.00 2.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.5714 . 9376 . 2506 
1.0301 2.1128 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.1818 . 
4045 
. 
1220 . 9101 1.4536 1.00 2.00 
Conventional 
banks 
13 1.4615 . 
5189 
. 
1439 1.1480 1.7751 1.00 2.00 
Total 59 1.4068 . 6192 8.061E-02 1.2454 1.5681 1.00 4.00 
Maintaining Shareholders' 
Interest 
Central bank 21 1.8571 . 9103 . 1986 1.4428 2.2715 1.00 5.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.5714 
. 
9376 
. 
2506 1.0301 2.1128 1.00 4.00 
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Auditors I1 1.7273 . 4671 . 1408 1.4135 2.0411 1.00 2.00 Conventional 
banks 
13 1.4615 
. 
5189 
. 
1439 1.1480 1.7751 1.00 2.00 
Total 59 1.6780 . 7755 . 1010 1.4759 1.8801 1.00 5.00 
Control of Money and 
Credit Expansion 
Central bank 21 1.5238 . 
5118 
. 
1117 1.2909 1.7568 1.00 2.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.7857 1.0509 . 2809 1.1789 2.3925 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.8182 . 4045 . 1220 1.5464 
2.0899 1.00 2.00 
Conventional 
banks 
13 1.7692 . 
4385 
. 1216 1.5042 2.0342 1.00 2.00 
Total 59 1.6949 . 
6500 8.46313-02 1.5255 1.8643 1.00 4.00 
Maintaining Inflation under 
Control 
Central bank 21 1.9048 . 
6249 
. 1364 1.6203 2.1892 1.00 3.00 
Islamic banks 14 2.5714 1.0894 
. 
2912 1.9424 3.2004 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.8182 . 
4045 
. 
1220 1.5464 2.0899 1.00 2.00 
Conventional 
banks 
13 2.6154 1.2609 . 
3497 1.8535 3.3773 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 2.2034 . 9428 . 1227 1.9577 2.4491 1.00 4.00 
Direct Credit for Certain 
Sectors 
Central bank 21 2.5238 1.0305 . 
2249 2.0547 2.9929 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 2.2857 T. 9945 . 
2658 1.7115 2.8599 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.8182 1.4013 . 4225 1.8768 
3.7596 1.00 4.00 
Conventional 
banks 
13 2.4615 1.1983 . 3323 1.7374 3.1857 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 2.5085 1.1199 . 
1458 2.2166 2.8003 1.00 4.00 
Mobilizing Savings Central bank 21 2.1429 1.1526 . 
2515 1.6182 2.6675 1.00 5.00 
Islamic banks 14 2.1429 . 9493 . 2537 1.5948 2.6909 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.8182 1.4013 . 4225 1.8768 3.7596 1.00 4.00 
Conventional 
banks 
13 2.3846 1.2609 
. 3497 1.6227 3.1465 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 2.3220 1.1809 . 
1537 2.0143 2.6298 1.00 5.00 
Improving Banking 
Activities 
Central bank 21 1.9524 . 7400 . 1615 1.6155 2.2892 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.7143 . 
6112 
. 1634 1.3614 2.0672 1.00 3.00 
Auditors 11 1.7273 . 4671 . 
1408 1.4135 2.0411 1.00 2.00 
Conventional 
banks 
13 1.8462 . 8006 . 2221 1.3623 2.3300 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 1.8305 . 6735 8.768E-02 1.6550 2.0060 1.00 4.00 
Applying International 
Standards 
Central bank 21 2.0000 . 9487 . 2070 1.5682 
2.4318 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.2857 . 
4688 
. 
1253 1.0150 1.5564 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 2.9091 1.3003 . 3921 
2.0355 3.7827 1.00 4.00 
Conventional 
banks 
13 1.6923 . 
6304 
. 
1748 1.3113 2.0733 1.00 3.00 
Total 59 1.9322 1.0148 . 1321 
1.6677 2.1967 1.00 4.00 
Applying Fair Value for 
Assessing Assets 
Central bank 21 2.0000 . 9487 . 2070 1.5682 2.4318 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.8571 . 9493 . 2537 1.3091 2.4052 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.8182 . 6030 . 1818 1.4131 2.2233 1.00 3.00 
Conventional 
banks 
13 1.9231 . 8623 . 2392 1.4020 2.4442 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 1.9153 . 8568 . 
1115 1.6920 2.1385 1.00 4.00 
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Table: 7. B1: Frequency Distribution of the Objective of Protection of Current Accounts of Islamic 
Banks 
re uenc Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent- 
Strongly Agree 6 4.1 4.8 4.8 
Agree 9 9.2 50.0 4.8 
Don't Know 1 1.7 1.7 6.6 
Disagree .4 
3.4 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
Total 59 100.0 
Table: 7. B2: Frequency Distribution of the Objective of Protection of Investment Accounts against 
Operational Risks 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 25 2.4 3.1 3.1 
Agree 8 7.5 8.3 1.4 
Don't Know 5.1 5.2 6.6 
Disagree .4 
3.4 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
Total 59 100.0 
Tabfe: 7. B3: Frequency Distribution of the objective of protection of investment 
Accounts aeainst takine more Risks by Management (Whole Groups) 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 2 7.3 37.9 37.9 
Agree 31 52.5 53.4 1.4 
Don't Know 5.1 5.2 6.6 
Disagree i .4 
3.4 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
System 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table7. B4: ANOVA: (Descriptive) Objectives of Deposit protection of Islamic Banks 
N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Std. Error 95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Protecting of current 
accounts 
Central bank 20 1.8000 . 
8944 
. 
2000 1.3814 2.2186 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.4286 . 
5136 
. 
1373 1.1321 1.7251 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.3636 
. 
5045 . 
1521 1.0247 1.7026 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.8462 
. 
5547 
. 
1538 1.5110 2.1814 1.00 3.00 
Total 58 1.6379 . 6933 9.103E-02 
1.4556 1.8202 1.00 4.00 
Protecting of 
Investment Accounts 
against Operational 
Risks 
Central Bank 20 1.8500 . 7452 . 1666 1.5013 2.1987 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.6429 . 8419 . 2250 1.1568 2.1290 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.4545 . 6876 . 2073 . 9926 1.9164 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.6923 . 
6304 
. 
1748 1.3113 2.0733 1.00 3.00 
Total 58 1.6897 . 7305 
9.591E-02 1 1.4976 1.8817 1.00 4.00 
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Protecting of 
Investment Accounts 
against taking high risk 
by management 
Central bank 20 1.8000 . 7678 . 1717 1.4407 2.1593 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.7143 . 
6112 
. 
1634 1.3614 2.0672 1.00 3.00 
Auditors 11 1.5455 . 
9342 
. 
2817 
. 
9179 2.1731 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.8462 . 
5547 
. 1538 1.5110 2.1814 1.00 3.00 
Total 58 1.7414 . 7148 9.385E-02 1.5534 1.9293 1.00 4.00 
Table: 7. C1: Frequency Distribution of the Capital Requirements as a Licensing Measure of Islamic 
Banks Regulation 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 32 54.2 54.2 54.2 
Agree 17 8.8 8.8 83.1 
Don't Know 5 8.5 8.5 1.5 
Disagree 5 8.5 8.5 100.0 
[Total 59 100.0 100.0 
Table7. C2: Frequency Distribution of the Standard of Ownership, Directors and Senior 
Management 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 5 2.4 2.4 2.4 
Agree 29 9.2 9.2 1.5 
Don't Know 5.1 5.1 6.6 
isa ree 3.4 3.4 100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
Tab! e7. C3 : Frequency Distribution of the Requirement of Business Plan and Feasibility Stud 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 25 2.4 2.4 2.4 
Agree 30 50.8 50.8 3.2 
Don't Know 3 5.1 5.1 8.3 
Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
Table7. C4: Frequency Distribution of Licensing Fees 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 17 28.8 8.8 8.8 
Agree 22 37.3 37.3 66.1 
Don't Know 12 0.3 0.3 86.4 
Disagree 8 13.6 13.6 100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
Table7. C5: Frequency Distribution of Provisions of Internal Control and External Audit 
re uenc Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 7 5.8 5.8 5.8 
Agree 9 9.2 9.2 4.9 
Don't Know 3 
.1 5.1 100.0 Total 59 100.0 100.0 
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Table7. C6: Frequency Distribution of Permissible Financial Services 
Frequency Percent alid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 14 23.7 3.7 23.7 
Agree 30 50.8 50.8 74.6 
Don't Know .8 .8 
81.4 
Disagree 15.3 15.3 6.6 
Strongly Disagree .4 .4 
100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. C7: Frequency Distribution of Permissible Investment Sectors 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 15.3 15.3 15.3 
Agree 31 52.5 52.5 67.8 
Don't Know 3 5.1 5.1 72.9 
Disagree 15 5.4 5.4 8.3 
Strongly Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
Table7. C8: Freauencv Distribution of Branch Network 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 1 35.6 35.6 35.6 
Agree 4 0.7 0.7 76.3 
Don't Know 5 8.5 8.5 84.7 
isa ree 15.3 15.3 100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
Table7. C9: Frequency Distribution of the Relation with Associate/ Affiliate Companies 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 0 33.9 33.9 33.9 
Agree 5 2.4 2.4 6.3 
Don't Know 6 10.2 10.2 6.4 
Disagree 10.2 10.2 6.6 
Strongly Disagree 2 .4 
3.4 100.0 
Total 59 100.0 100.0 
Table7. CIO: Freauencv Distribution of Transparency in Application of Regulations 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 27 5.8 6.6 6.6 
Agree 24 0.7 1.4 87.9 
Don't Know 6.8 
.9 
4.8 
Disagree 2 3.4 3.4 8.3 
Strongly Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. C11: ANOVA (Descriptive) Licensing Measures of Islamic Banks 
N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error 95% Confidence Min. Max. 
Interval for Mean 
Lower Upper 
Bound Bound 
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CR Central bank 21 2.0000 1.1832 . 2582 1.4614 2.5386 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.5000 . 9405 . 
2514 
. 
9569 2.0431 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.5455 . 8202 . 
2473 
. 
9944 2.0965 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.6154 . 
5064 
. 1404 1.3094 1.9214 1.00 2.00 
Total 59 1.7119 . 9478 . 
1234 1.4649 1.9589 1.00 4.00 
SODSMQ Central bank 21 1.5714 . 5976 . 1304 1.2994 1.8435 1.00 3.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.7143 . 
8254 
. 
2206 1.2377 2.1909 1.00 4.00 
'Auditors 11 2.0000 . 6325 . 1907 1.5751 2.4249 LOU 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.6154 . 8697 . 2412 1.0898 2.1410 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 1.6949 . 7253 9.442E-02 1.5059 1.8839 1.00 4.00 
RBPFP Central bank 21 1.6190 . 5896 . 1287 1.3507 1.8874 1.00 3.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.6429 . 
8419 
. 2250 1.1568 2.1290 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.0000 . 
6325 
. 
1907 1.5751 2.4249 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.4615 . 
5189 
. 1439 1.1480 1.7751 1.00 2.00 
Total 59 1.6610 . 
6594 8.585E-02 1.4892 1.8329 1.00 4.00 
LF Central bank 21 2.0000 . 
8944 
. 
1952 1.5929 2.4071 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.5714 . 
5136 
. 
1373 1.2749 1.8679 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 3.1818 1.0787 . 3252 2.4571 3.9065 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.3077 . 
9473 
. 2627 1.7352 2.8802 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 2.1864 1.0081 . 1312 1.9237 2.4492 1.00 4.00 
PIEAF Central bank 21 1.5238 . 
6016 
. 
1313 1.2500 1.7976 1.00 3.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.3571 . 4972 . 1329 1.0700 1.6442 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 2.0909 . 5394 . 1626 1.7286 2.4533 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.5385 . 
5189 
. 
1439 1.2249 1.8520 1.00 2.00 
Total 59 1.5932 . 5907 7.690E-02 1.4393 1.7472 1.00 3.00 
PFS Central bank 21 2.1905 1.0305 . 
2249 1.7214 2.6595 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 2.2857 1.4373 . 
3841 1.4558 3.1156 1.00 5.00 
Auditors 11 2.2727 . 
7862 
. 2371 1.7445 2.8009 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.2308 1.0919 . 3028 1.5709 2.8906 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 2.2373 1.0882 . 1417 1.9537 2.5209 1.00 5.00 
PIS Central bank 21 2.5714 1.0757 . 
2347 2.0818 3.0611 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 2.5714 1.2225 . 3267 1.8656 3.2773 1.00 5.00 
Auditors 11 2.6364 1.0269 . 
3096 1.9465 3.3263 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.0000 1.0000 . 2774 1.3957 2.6043 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 2.4576 1.0879 . 1416 2.1741 2.7411 1.00 5.00 
BN Central bank 21 1.8095 . 
8136 
. 1775 1.4392 2.1799 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 2.0714 1.1411 . 3050 1.4126 2.7303 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.6364 1.2863 . 3878 1.7722 3.5005 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.8462 . 
8987 
. 
2493 1.3031 2.3892 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 
, 
2.0339 1.0333 
. 
1345 1.7646 2.3032 1.00 4.00 
RAAC Central bank 21 2.1905 
. 
9808 
. 
2140 1.7440 2.6369 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 2.2143 1.5777 
. 
4216 1.3034 3.1252 1.00 5.00 
Auditors 11 1.7273 
. 
7862 . 
2371 1.1991 2.2555 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.0000 
. 8165 . 
2265 1.5066 2.4934 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 2.0678 1.0806 . 1407 1.7862 2.3494 1.00 5.00 TAR Central bank 21 1.7619 
. 9437 . 
2059 1.3324 2.1914 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.5000 1.0919 . 
2918 
. 8695 2.1305 1.00 5.00 
Auditors 11 2.0000 . 6325 . 1907 1.5751 2.4249 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 12 1.6667 . 6513 . 1880 1.2528 2.0805 1.00 3.00 
Total 58 1.7241 
. 
8745 
. 
1148 1.4942 1.9541 1.00 5.00 
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Table: 7. D1: Frequency Distribution of Underdeveloped Economic and Financial Systems as a 
Special Source of Credit Risks of Islamic Banks (UEFS) 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 15 5.4 25.4 5.4 
Agree 5 59.3 59.3 84.7 
on't Know 8.5 8.5 3.2 
Disagree .4 .4 
6.6 
Strongly Disagree .4 
3.4 100.0 
Total 59 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. D2: Frequency Distribution of Inefficient Legal System (ILS 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
_ 
Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 5 2.4 2.4 2.4 
Agree 7 5.8 5.8 88.1 
Don't Know 
.8 .8 
4.9 
Disagree 5.1 5.1 
- 
100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 1 1 
Table: 7. D3: Freauencv Distribution of Unavailability of Hedging Instruments (UHI 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 18 0.5 30.5 30.5 
Agree 9 9.2 9.2 79.7 
Don't Know 8 13.6 13.6 3.2 
isa ree 5.1 5.1 8.3 
. 
Strongly Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
otal 9 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. D4: Frequency Distribution of High Default Probability of PLS (DPLS 
Frequency Percent alid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 0 3.9 3.9 33.9 
Agree 28 7.5 7.5 81.4 
Don't Know 8.5 8.5 89.8 
Disagree 6 10.2 10.2 100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. D5: Frequency Distribution of Week Commitment for Adopting Islamic Accounting 
Standards (WAI) 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 19 2.2 32.2 2.2 
Agree 7 5.8 5.8 8.0 
Don't Know 10.2 10.2 88.1 
isa ree 11.9 11.9 100.0 
otal 9 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. D6: Frequency Distribution of Lack Collaterals of PLS (LCP 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 14 3.7 24.1 4.1 
Agree 7 5.8 6.6 0.7 
Don't Know 10.2 10.3 81.0 
Disagree 11 18.6 19.0 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
9 100.0 
247 
Table: 7. D7: Frequency Distribution of Un-availability of Legitimate Penalty Rate (ULP 
_ 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
_ 
Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 18 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Agree 3 55.9 5.9 86.4 
Don't Know .4 .4 89.8 
Disagree 6 10.2 10.2 100.0 
tal 59 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. D8: Frequency Distribution of Un-favorable Environment (UEN 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 19 32.2 32.8 32.8 
ree 4 0.7 1.4 74.1 
Don't Know .4 
3.4 77.6 
Disagree 11 18.6 19.0 6.6 
Strongly Disagree 2 .4 
3.4 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. D9: Freauencv Distribution of Determining a Ceiling for each Financing Mode (CFM 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 13 2.0 22.0 2.0 
Agree 34 57.6 57.6 79.7 
Don't Know 8.5 8.5 88.1 
isa ree 11.9 11.9 100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. D10: Frequency Distribution of Determining a Percentage of Investment in each Sector 
(PIS) 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 8 13.6 13.8 13.8 
Agree 34 57.6 58.6 2.4 
, 
Don't Know .8 .9 79.3 
Disa ree 12 20.3 0.7 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. D11: Frequency Distribution of Determining a Percentage of Investment for each Individual 
and Related Group (PCRG) 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 19 32.2 32.2 2.2 
Agree 28 7.5 7.5 79.7 
Don't Know 8 13.6 13.6 3.2 
Disagree 6.8 
.8 
100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
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Table: 7. D12: Frequency Distribution of Determining the Percentage of Investment in each Company 
and or all Companies (PIC) 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 17 28.8 28.8 28.8 
Agree 3 55.9 55.9 84.7 
Don't Know .8 .8 
1.5 
Disagree 8.5 8.5 100.0 
otal 9 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. D13: Frequency Distribution of Determining a Ceiling on Credit to the Board of Directors 
'CCBD) 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 7 5.8 5.8 5.8 
Agree 26 4.1 4.1 89.8 
Don't Know .8 .8 
6.6 
Disagree 3.4 3.4 100.0 
otal 9 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. D14: Frequency Distribution of Prohibition of Credit for Some Sectors (PCSS 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 17 8.8 8.8 8.8 
Agree 4 0.7 0.7 69.5 
Don't Know .8 .8 
76.3 
Disagree 13 2.0 2.0 8.3 
Strongly Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
Total 59 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. D15: Frequency Distribution of Determining the Maturity of Financing (M 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 18 30.5 30.5 30.5 
Agree 33 55.9 55.9 86.4 
Don't Know 3.4 3.4 89.8 
Disagree 5 8.5 .5 8.3 
Strongly Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
Total 59 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. D16: Freauencv Distribution of Holding of Assets in Foreign Currencies (RHFC 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 8 13.6 13.6 13.6 
Agree 7 5.8 5.8 59.3 
Don't Know .8 .8 
6.1 
Disagree 19 32.2 32.2 8.3 
Strongly Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
Total 59 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. D17: Frequency Distribution of Requirements of Collaterals (CTI 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 19 2.2 32.2 32.2 
Tree 30 50.8 50.8 3.1 
Don't Know 6.8 .8 89.8 
Disagree 6 10.2 10.2 100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
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Table: 7. D18: Frequency Distribution of Internal Control System (ICSEMAC 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 4 57.6 57.6 57.6 
Agree 4 0.7 0.7 8.3 
Don't Know 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
Total 59 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. D19: Freauencv Distribution of Cash Margins (CM 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 2 7.3 37.3 37.3 
Agree 9 9.2 9.2 86.4 
Don't Know 7 11.9 11.9 8.3 
Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. D20: Frequency Distribution of Creating a Legitimate Penalty Rate (LPDP 
Frequency 
- 
Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 8 7.5 7.5 7.5 
Agree 25 2.4 2.4 89.8 
Don't Know .8 .8 
6.6 
Disagree 2 3.4 .4 
100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. D21: Frequency Distribution of Increasing Loan Loss Provision (LL 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 17 8.8 29.3 9.3 
Agree 2 54.2 55.2 4.5 
Don't Know 5 8.5 8.6 3.1 
Disagree .8 .9 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. D22: Frequency Distribution of the Level of Credit Risk of Islamic Banks (CRISHCB 
re uenc Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 17 28.8 8.8 28.8 
Agree l5 25.4 5.4 54.2 
Don't Know 5.1 .1 59.3 
Disagree 1 35.6 5.6 4.9 
Strongly Disagree 5.1 5.1 100.0 
Total 9 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. D23: ANOVA: (Descriptive) Sources of Credit Risks of Islamic Banks 
N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Std. Error 95%Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
FME Central bank 21 1.4762 
. 5118 . 1117 
1.2432 1.7091 1.00 2.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.3571 . 4972 . 1329 
1.0700 1.6442 1.00 2.00 
Auditors I1 2.0000 . 6325 . 1907 1.5751 2.4249 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.6923 . 4804 . 1332 1.4020 1.9826 1.00 2.00 
Total 59 1.5932 . 5607 7.300E-02 1.4471 1.7394 1.00 3.00 
DBC Central bank 21 1.5238 . 
5118 
. 
1117 1.2909 1.7568 1.00 2.00 
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Islamic banks 14 1.7143 1.0690 . 
2857 1.0970 2.3315 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.8182 . 7508 . 
2264 1.3138 2.3225 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.6154 . 8697 . 
2412 1.0898 2.1410 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 1.6441 . 7826 . 1019 1.4401 1.8480 1.00 4.00 
DCF Central bank 21 1.5714 . 5071 . 1107 1.3406 1.8023 1.00 2.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.5000 . 
5189 
. 
1387 1.2004 1.7996 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.4545 . 8202 . 2473 . 9035 2.0056 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.5385 . 5189 . 1439 1.2249 1.8520 1.00 2.00 
Total 59 1.5254 . 
5680 7.395E-02 1.3774 1.6734 1.00 3.00 
DVA Central bank 21 1.6190 . 
4976 . 1086 1.3925 1.8456 1.00 2.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.5714 . 5136 . 
1373 1.2749 1.8679 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.4545 . 
8202 
. 
2473 
. 9035 2.0056 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.5385 . 5189 . 
1439 1.2249 1.8520 1.00 2.00 
Total 59 1.5593 . 5654 
7.361E-02 1.4120 1.7067 1.00 3.00 
LCO Central bank 21 1.9524 . 8646 . 1887 
1.5588 2.3460 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 2.3571 2.5901 . 
6922 
. 
8616 3.8526 1.00 11.00 
Auditors 11 1.4545 . 
8202 
. 
2473 . 9035 2.0056 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.5385 . 
5189 
. 
1439 1.2249 1.8520 1.00 2.00 
Total 59 1.8644 1.4319 . 1864 
1.4913 2.2376 1.00 11.00 
CCI Central bank 21 1.5714 . 5976 . 1304 
1.2994 1.8435 1.00 3.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.5000 . 8549 . 2285 
1.0064 1.9936 1.00 3.00 
Auditors 11 1.6364 . 8090 . 2439 1.0928 2.1799 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.6923 . 4804 . 1332 1.4020 1.9826 1.00 2.00 
Total 59 1.5932 . 
6726 8.756E-02 1.4179 1.7685 1.00 3.00 
IELS Central bank 21 2.3333 2.2211 . 4847 1.3223 3.3444 1.00 11.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.5714 1.0163 . 
2716 
. 
9846 2.1583 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.8182 . 
7508 . 
2264 1.3138 2.3225 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.6923 . 9473 . 2627 1.1198 2.2648 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 1.9153 1.5232 . 1983 1.5183 2.3122 1.00 11.00 
MLO Central bank 21 1.6190 . 9207 . 2009 1.2000 2.0381 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.4286 . 
8516 . 
2276 
. 
9369 1.9203 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.4545 . 
8202 
. 
2473 
. 
9035 2.0056 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.8462 . 8006 . 2221 1.3623 2.3300 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 1.5932 . 8534 . 1111 1.3708 1.8156 1.00 4.00 
INS Central bank 21 1.5714 . 
7464 . 1629 1.2317 1.9112 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.6429 . 8419 . 
2250 1.1568 2.1290 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.8182 . 7508 . 2264 1.3138 2.3225 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.7692 1.0919 . 
3028 1.1094 2.4291 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 1.6780 . 
8396 
. 
1093 1.4592 1.8968 1.00 4.00 
Table: 7. D24: ANOVA: (Descriptive)Special Sources of Credit Risks of Islamic Banks 
N Mean Std. Dev. Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
UEFS Central bank 21 2.2381 1.13599 . 
24789 1.7210 2.7552 1.00 5.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.8571 
. 36314 . 09705 1.6475 2.0668 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.4545 . 82020 . 24730 . 9035 2.0056 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.2308 . 72501 . 20108 1.7926 2.6689 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 2.0000 . 89056 . 11594 1.7679 2.2321 1.00 5.00 
IELS Central batik 21 2.0000 . 63246 . 13801 1.7121 2.2879 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.5000 . 85485 . 22847 1.0064 1.9936 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.4545 . 
82020 
. 
24730 
. 
9035 2.0056 1.00 3.00 
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Conventional banks 13 1.8462 . 
89872 
. 24926 1.3031 2.3892 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 1.7458 . 
80072 
. 
10424 1.5371 1.9544 1.00 4.00 
UHI Central bank 21 1.9048 . 53896 . 11761 1.6594 2.1501 1.00 3.00 
Islamic banks 14 2.4286 1.15787 . 30945 1.7600 3.0971 1.00 5.00 
Auditors 11 1.4545 . 
82020 
. 
24730 
. 
9035 2.0056 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.0769 . 
95407 
. 
26461 1.5004 2.6535 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 1.9831 . 90003 . 11717 1.7485 2.2176 1.00 5.00 DPLS Central bank 21 2.0000 . 83666 . 18257 1.6192 2.3808 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.7857 . 80178 . 
21429 1.3228 2.2487 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.5455 . 
82020 
. 
24730 
. 
9944 2.0965 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.3846 1.12090 . 
31088 1.7073 3.0620 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 1.9492 . 
91771 
. 
11948 1.7100 2.1883 1.00 4.00 
WAI Central bank 21 2.1429 . 
85356 . 
18626 1.7543 2.5314 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 2.0714 1.14114 . 
30498 1.4126 2.7303 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.5455 . 
93420 . 
28167 
. 
9179 2.1731 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.1538 . 89872 . 
24926 1.6108 2.6969 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 2.0169 . 
95577 . 
12443 1.7679 2.2660 1.00 4.00 
LCP Central bank 21 2.2857 . 90238 . 
19691 1.8750 2.6965 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 2.0714 1.14114 . 
30498 1.4126 2.7303 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.8182 . 
75076 
. 
22636 1.3138 2.3225 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 12 2.7500 1.21543 . 
35086 1.9778 3.5222 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.2414 1.03127 . 13541 1.9702 2.5125 1.00 4.00 
ULP Central bank 21 1.9524 . 
66904 
. 
14600 1.6478 2.2569 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.8571 . 77033 . 
20588 1.4124 2.3019 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.5455 . 
52223 
. 
15746 1.1946 1.8963 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.3077 1.31559 . 
36488 1.5127 3.1027 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 1.9322 . 
86830 
. 
11304 1.7059 2.1585 1.00 4.00 
UEN Central bank 21 2.2857 1.34695 . 
29393 1.6726 2.8988 1.00 5.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.6429 . 84190 . 
22501 1.1568 2.1290 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.0909 . 70065 . 
21125 1.6202 2.5616 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 12 2.7500 1.42223 . 
41056 1.8464 3.6536 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.1897 1.19144 . 
15644 1.8764 2.5029 1.00 5.00 
Table: 7. D25: ANOVA: (Descriptive) Measures for Controlling Credit Risks of Islamic Banks 
N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Std. 
Error 
95%Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
CFM Central bank 21 2.0952 1.0443 . 2279 1.6199 2.5706 1.00 4.00 Islamic banks 14 1.9286 . 7300 . 1951 1.5071 2.3501 1.00 4.00 Auditors 11 2.4545 . 9342 . 2817 1.8269 3.0821 1.00 4.00 Conventional banks 13 2.0000 . 7071 . 1961 1.5727 2.4273 1.00 4.00 Total 59 2.1017 
. 8846 . 1152 1.8712 
2.3322 1.00 4.00 
PIS Central bank 20 2.3500 
. 
9333 
. 
2087 1.9132 2.7868 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 2.2857 . 8254 . 2206 1.8091 2.7623 1.00 4.00 Auditors 11 2.8182 1.3280 . 4004 1.9260 3.7104 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.0000 
. 7071 . 
1961 1.5727 2.4273 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.3448 
. 
9652 
. 1267 2.0910 2.5986 1.00 4.00 
PCIRG Central bank 21 2.1429 . 9636 . 2103 1.7042 2.5815 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.7143 . 
6112 
. 1634 1.3614 2.0672 1.00 3.00 
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Auditors 11 1.7273 1.1037 . 3328 . 
9858 2.4688 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.0769 . 
6405 
. 1776 1.6899 2.4640 1.00 3.00 
Total 59 1.9492 . 
8595 
. 1119 1.7252 2.1731 1.00 4.00 
PIC Central bank 21 2.0952 . 8309 . 1813 1.7170 2.4735 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.8571 . 
7703 
. 
2059 1.4124 2.3019 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.7273 1.1037 . 
3328 
. 
9858 2.4688 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.0000 . 
7071 
. 
1961 1.5727 2.4273 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 1.9492 . 
8392 
. 1093 1.7305 2.1679 1.00 4.00 
CCBD Central bank 21 1.6667 . 7958 . 1737 1.3044 2.0289 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.7857 . 4258 . 1138 1.5399 2.0316 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.5455 . 
8202 
. 
2473 
. 
9944 2.0965 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.6923 . 
9473 
. 
2627 1.1198 2.2648 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 1.6780 . 7529 9.802 
E-02 
1.4817 1.8742 1.00 4.00 
PCSS Central bank 21 2.8095 1.3274 . 2897 2.2053 3.4137 1.00 5.00 
Islamic banks 14 2.0000 . 
7845 
. 
2097 1.5471 2.4529 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.5455 . 8202 . 
2473 
. 9944 2.0965 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.3077 1.1094 . 3077 1.6373 2.9781 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 2.2712 1.1571 . 
1506 1.9696 2.5727 1.00 5.00 
MF Central bank 21 2.0000 1.0954 . 
2390 1.5014 2.4986 1.00 5.00 
Islamic banks 14 2.2857 . 7263 . 1941 1.8664 2.7051 2.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.7273 1.1037 . 
3328 
. 9858 2.4688 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.6923 . 4804 . 
1332 1.4020 1.9826 1.00 2.00 
Total 59 1.9492 . 
9177 
. 
1195 1.7100 2.1883 1.00 5.00 
RHFC Central bank 21 2.4762 1.2091 . 
2638 1.9258 3.0266 1.00 5.00 
Islamic banks 14 2.7143 1.0690 . 
2857 2.0970 3.3315 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.2727 . 7862 . 2371 1.7445 2.8009 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 3.0769 1.2558 . 3483 2.3181 3.8358 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 2.6271 1.1280 . 1469 2.3332 2.9211 1.00 5.00 
CTI Central bank 21 1.9524 . 
9207 
. 
2009 1.5333 2.3715 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 2.0714 . 
9169 
. 
2450 1.5420 2.6008 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.5455 . 8202 . 2473 . 9944 2.0965 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.1538 . 8987 . 2493 1.6108 2.6969 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 1.9492 . 
8987 
. 
1170 1.7149 2.1834 1.00 4.00 
ICSEMAC Central bank 21 1.5238 . 
6016 
. 1313 1.2500 1.7976 1.00 3.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.5000 . 
5189 
. 
1387 1.2004 1.7996 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.2727 . 
4671 
. 1408 . 
9589 1.5865 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.3846 . 5064 . 1404 1.0786 1.6906 1.00 2.00 
Total 59 1.4407 . 5341 6.953 E-02 
1.3015 1.5799 1.00 3.00 
CM Central bank 21 2.0000 . 
6325 
. 1380 1.7121 
2.2879 1.00 3.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.5714 . 5136 . 1373 1.2749 
1.8679 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.5455 
. 
8202 
. 
2473 
. 
9944 2.0965 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.8462 
. 
8987 
. 2493 1.3031 
2.3892 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 1.7797 . 7208 9.384 
E-02 
1.5918 1.9675 1.00 4.00 
LPDP Central bank 21 1.8095 . 6796 . 1483 1.5002 2.1189 1.00 3.00 Islamic banks 14 1.6429 . 8419 . 2250 1.1568 2.1290 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.3636 . 
5045 . 1521 1.0247 1.7026 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.6923 . 9473 . 2627 1.1198 2.2648 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 1.6610 . 7568 9.853 
E-02 
1.4638 1.8582 1.00 4.00 
LLP Central bank 21 1.9048 . 7684 . 1677 1.5550 2.2545 1.00 4.00 Islamic banks 14 2.0714 . 9169 . 2450 1.5420 2.6008 1.00 4.00 
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Auditors 11 1.5455 . 
8202 
. 
2473 
. 
9944 2.0965 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 12 2.1667 . 
7177 
. 
2072 1.7106 2.6227 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 1.9310 . 8135 . 1068 1.7171 2.1449 1.00 4.00 
TABLE: 7: D26 ANOVA: (Descriptive) Level of Credit Risk of Islamic Banks 
N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error 95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Central bank 21 3.3333 1.27802 . 
27889 2.7516 3.9151 1.00 5.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.8571 1.02711 . 27451 1.2641 2.4502 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.6364 1.12006 . 
33771 
. 
8839 2.3888 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 3.1538 1.14354 . 
31716 2.4628 3.8449 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 2.6271 1.36329 . 
17749 2.2718 2.9824 1.00 5.00 
Table: 7. E1: Frequency Distribution of Volatility of Deposits as a Source of Liquidity Risk (VD 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 14 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Agree 29 9.2 9.2 72.9 
Don't Know 5.1 5.1 78.0 
isa ree 13 2.0 2.0 100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. E2: Frequency Distribution of Mismatch between Assets and Liabilities (MAL 
re ncy Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 19 2.2 32.2 2.2 
Agree 1 52.5 52.5 84.7 
Don't Know 3 5.1 .1 89.8 
Disagree 6 10.2 10.2 100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. E3: Frequency Distribution of Dependence Demand Deposits (DDD 
re ncy Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree .8 .8 .8 
Agree 36 1.0 1.0 7.8 
Don't Know 11.9 11.9 79.7 
Disagree 12 20.3 0.3 100.0 
otal 59 100.0 100.0 
Table: 7. E4: Frequency Distribution of Size of Assets readily Exchangeable for Cash (LSAREC 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 3 5.1 5.2 5.2 
Agree 38 4.4 65.5 70.7 
Don't Know 10.2 10.3 81.0 
Disagree 10 16.9 17.2 8.3 
Strongly Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
System 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
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Table: 7. E5: Frequency Distribution of Availability of Inter-bank Market (AIBM 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 5 8.5 .6 8.6 
Agree 7 2.7 3.8 72.4 
Don't Know 15.3 15.5 87.9 
Disagree 11.9 12.1 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. E6: Frequency Distribution of Availability of Lender of Last Resort (LLR 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 15.3 15.5 15.5 
Agree 35 59.3 60.3 75.9 
Don't Know 8 13.6 13.8 89.7 
Disagree 10.2 10.3 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. E7: Frequency Distribution of large Size of Demand Deposits as a Source of Liquidity Risk 
-- -- -- Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 10.2 10.3 10.3 
Agree 4 0.7 1.4 1.7 
Don't Know .4 .4 
55.2 
Disagree 6 4.1 4.8 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. E8: Frequency Distribution of Mismatch Between Assets and Liabilities (MMAL) 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 8 13.6 13.8 13.8 
Agree 35 59.3 0.3 74.1 
Don't Know 5 8.5 8.6 82.8 
Disagree 10 16.9 17.2 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. E9: Frequency Distribution of Difficulty in Liquidation of most PLS(DLPLS 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 17 8.8 29.8 29.8 
Agree 9 9.2 50.9 80.7 
Don't Know 3 5.1 5.3 86.0 
Disagree 8 13.6 14.0 100.0 
Total 7 6.6 100.0 
No-Response 12 PA 
59 100.0 
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Table: 7. E10: Frequency Distribution of Un-availability of Inter-bank Market(UIBM 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 8 13.6 13.8 13.8 
Agree 37 2.7 3.8 7.6 
Don't Know 5 8.5 8.6 86.2 
Disagree 8 13.6 13.8 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. E11: Frequency Distribution of Un-availability of Lender of Last Resort ((ULLR 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 8 13.6 14.0 14.0 
Agree 33 5.9 7.9 1.9 
Don't Know 8 13.6 14.0 86.0 
Disagree 8 13.6 14.0 100.0 
Total 57 6.6 100.0 
No-Response 2 3.4 
59 100.0 
: Freauencv Distribution of Un-availability of Islamic Sharing Instruments (UISI 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 13 22.0 22.4 22.4 
Agree 28 7.5 8.3 70.7 
Don't Know 8 13.6 13.8 4.5 
Disagree 11.9 12.1 6.6 
Strongly Disagree 2 3.4 3.4 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
otal 59 100.0 
Table: 7. E13: Frequency Distribution of Difficulty in Raising Funds from the Market(DRF 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 16 7.1 7.6 27.6 
Agree 3 55.9 56.9 84.5 
Don't Know .4 3.4 87.9 
'Disagree 7 11.9 12.1 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. E14: Frequency Distribution of Withdrawal of Investment Deposits before Maturity 
(WDBM) 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 15.3 15.5 15.5 
Agree 34 57.6 58.6 74.1 
Don't Know 5.1 5.2 79.3 
Disagree 10 16.9 17.2 6.6 
Strongly Disagree 3.4 3.4 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
Total 59 100.0 
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Table: 7. E15: Frequency Distribution of Lack of Instruments for Liquidity Management (LILM 
re uenc Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 8 13.6 13.8 13.8 
Agree 1 2.5 3.4 7.2 
Don't Know 11.9 12.1 9.3 
Disagree 12 0.3 0.7 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. E16: Frequency Distribution of Large Demand on Islamic Banks' Financing Modes 
(LDIBMI 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 6.8 .9 .9 
Agree 16 7.1 7.6 34.5 
Don't Know 7 11.9 12.1 6.6 
Disagree 31 52.5 53.4 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
9 100.0 
Table: 7. E17: Frequency Distribution of Fighi Restriction on Cash Sale of Debt (FRCSD 
Fre uenc Percent [Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 10.2 10.3 10.3 
Agree 28 7.5 8.3 58.6 
Don't Know 13 2.0 2.4 81.0 
Disagree 11 18.6 19.0 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
TABLE: 7. E18: ANOVA: (Descriptive) Sources of Liquidity Risks of Islamic Banks 
N Mean Std. 
Deviatio 
n 
Std. Error 95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
VD Central bank 21 2.8571 1.0623 . 2318 2.3736 
3.3407 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 2.0714 . 9169 . 2450 1.5420 2.6008 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.4545 . 
8202 
. 
2473 
. 
9035 2.0056 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.1538 . 
8987 
. 
2493 1.6108 2.6969 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 2.2542 1.0601 . 
1380 1.9780 2.5305 1.00 4.00 
MAL Central bank 21 2.2381 1.0911 
. 
2381 1.7414 2.7348 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 1.6429 
. 4972 . 1329 1.3558 
1.9300 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.5455 . 8202 . 2473 . 9944 2.0965 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.0769 . 7596 . 2107 1.6179 2.5359 1.00 4.00 
Total 59 1.9322 
. 8879 . 
1156 1.7008 2.1636 1.00 4.00 
DDD Central bank 21 2.6667 1.0165 . 
2218 2.2039 3.1294 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 14 2.0000 . 5547 . 1482 1.6797 2.3203 1.00 3.00 
Auditors 11 2.0909 . 5394 . 1626 1.7286 2.4533 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.9231 . 
9541 
. 
2646 2.3465 3.4996 2.00 4.00 
Total 59 2.4576 . 8968 . 1168 2.2239 2.6913 1.00 4.00 
LLA Central bank 21 2.7143 1.1019 . 
2405 2.2127 3.2159 1.00 5.00 
257 
Islamic banks 13 2.2308 . 
7250 
. 2011 1.7926 2.6689 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.2727 . 
7862 
. 
2371 1.7445 2.8009 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.3846 . 7679 . 2130 1.9205 2.8487 2.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.4483 . 9017 . 1184 2.2112 2.6854 1.00 5.00 
AIBM Central bank 21 2.2857 . 
8452 
. 
1844 1.9010 2.6704 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.3077 . 
9473 
. 
2627 1.7352 2.8802 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.2727 . 7862 . 2371 1.7445 2.8009 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.3846 . 
6504 
. 1804 1.9916 2.7777 2.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.3103 . 7993 . 
1049 2.1002 2.5205 1.00 4.00 
LLR Central bank 21 2.3333 . 
8563 
. 
1869 1.9435 2.7231 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.6923 . 
8549 
. 
2371 1.1757 2.2089 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.1818 . 
6030 
. 
1818 1.7767 2.5869 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.4615 . 7763 . 
2153 1.9925 2.9306 2.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.1897 . 
8263 . 1085 1.9724 2.4069 1.00 4.00 
Table: 7. E19: ANOVA: (Descriptive) Special Sources of Liquidity Risks of Islamic Banks 
N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Std. 
Error 
95% confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
LSDD Central bank 21 3.1429 1.0623 . 2318 2.6593 3.6264 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.3077 1.0316 . 
2861 1.6843 2.9311 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 3.1818 1.1677 . 
3521 2.3973 3.9663 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.5385 1.1266 . 
3125 1.8577 3.2193 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.8276 1.1261 . 
1479 2.5315 3.1237 1.00 4.00 
MMAL Central bank 21 2.6190 1.0713 . 2338 2.1314 3.1067 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.8462 . 8006 . 2221 1.3623 2.3300 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.0909 . 5394 . 1626 1.7286 2.4533 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.3846 . 
8697 
. 
2412 1.8590 2.9102 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.2931 . 
9178 
. 
1205 2.0518 2.5344 1.00 4.00 
DLPLS Central bank 21 2.0476 . 6690 . 1460 1.7431 2.3522 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.9231 1.0377 . 2878 1.2960 2.5502 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 10 1.5000 . 
9718 
. 3073 . 
8048 2.1952 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.5385 1.1266 . 
3125 1.8577 3.2193 1.00 4.00 
Total 57 2.0351 . 
9630 
. 1275 1.7796 2.2906 1.00 4.00 
UIBMI Central bank 21 1.9524 . 
6690 
. 1460 1.6478 2.2569 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.2308 1.0919 . 3028 1.5709 2.8906 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.1818 . 7508 . 2264 1.6775 2.6862 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.6923 . 8549 . 2371 2.1757 3.2089 2.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.2241 . 
8593 
. 
1128 1.9982 2.4501 1.00 4.00 
ULLR Central bank 20 2.3000 . 
8645 . 1933 
1.8954 2.7046 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.9231 1.0377 . 2878 
1.2960 2.5502 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.3636 
. 
8090 . 
2439 1.8201 2.9072 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.5385 . 7763 . 
2153 2.0694 3.0075 2.00 4.00 
Total 57 2.2807 . 8814 . 1168 
2.0468 2.5146 1.00 4.00 
UISI Central bank 21 2.4762 1.1670 . 2547 1.9450 3.0074 1.00 5.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.3077 1.0316 . 2861 1.6843 2.9311 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.8182 1.1677 . 3521 1.0337 2.6027 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.2308 . 7250 . 
2011 1.7926 2.6689 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.2586 1.0523 . 1382 1.9819 2.5353 1.00 5.00 
DRF Central bank 21 2.0952 . 8891 . 1940 1.6905 2.4999 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.6923 . 
4804 
. 1332 1.4020 1.9826 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.5455 . 
9342 
. 
2817 
. 
9179 2.1731 1.00 4.00, 
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Conventional banks 13 2.5385 . 
9674 
. 2683 1.9539 3.1231 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.0000 . 
8983 
. 
1180 1.7638 2.2362 1.00 4.00 
WDBM Central bank 21 2.6667 1.3540 . 
2955 2.0503 3.2830 1.00 5.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.7692 . 4385 . 1216 1.5042 2.0342 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 2.0909 . 
7006 
. 2113 1.6202 2.5616 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.6154 . 
9608 
. 
2665 2.0348 3.1960 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.3448 1.0522 . 1382 2.0682 2.6215 1.00 5.00 
LILMI Central bank 21 2.5238 1.1233 . 2451 2.0125 3.0352 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.9231 . 
7596 
. 
2107 1.4641 2.3821 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.2727 . 7862 . 2371 1.7445 2.8009 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.7692 . 9268 . 2571 2.2092 3.3293 2.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.3966 . 9722 . 1277 2.1409 2.6522 1.00 4.00 
LDIBM Central bank 21 3.1429 1.1084 . 
2419 2.6383 3.6474 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.4615 . 
8771 
. 2433 1.9315 2.9915 2.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 3.5455 . 9342 . 2817 2.9179 4.1731 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 3.3846 . 
9608 
. 
2665 2.8040 3.9652 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 3.1207 1.0442 . 
1371 2.8461 3.3953 1.00 4.00 
FRCSD Central bank 21 2.2381 . 
8309 
. 
1813 1.8599 2.6163 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.2308 . 9268 . 2571 1.6707 2.7908 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 3.2727 1.0090 . 3042 2.5948 3.9506 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.5385 . 6602 . 1831 2.1395 2.9374 2.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.5000 . 9224 . 1211 2.2575 2.7425 1.00 4.00 
Table: 7. E20: Frequency Distribution of the Level of Liquidity Risk of Islamic Banks Compared to 
Conventional Banks 
re uenc Percent Valid Percent emulative Percent 
Strongly High 11 18.6 19.0 19.0 
High 21 5.6 6.2 55.2 
Moderate 19 2.2 32.8 87.9 
Low 10.2 10.3 8.3 
Very Low 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No- Response 1 1.7 
Total 59 100.0 
Table: 7. E21: ANOVA: (Descriptive) Level of Liquidity Risks of Islamic Banks 
N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error 95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
LRISHCB Central bank 21 2.8095 
. 
9284 
. 
2026 2.3869 3.2321 1.00 5.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.0769 
. 7596 . 2107 
1.6179 2.5359 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.6364 
. 
8090 
. 2439 
1.0928 2.1799 1.00 3.00 
Conventional 
banks 
13 2.6923 
. 
9473 
. 2627 
2.1198 3.2648 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.3966 
. 
9722 
. 1277 
2.1409 2.6522 1.00 5.00 
LRAISHCB Central bank 20 3.2000 1.1965 . 
2675 2.6400 3.7600 1.00 5.00 
Islamic banks 12 1.9167 
. 
9003 
. 
2599 1.3446 2.4887 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.0000 1.2649 
. 
3814 1.1502 2.8498 1.00 4.00 
Conventional 
banks 
13 2.3846 1.0439 
. 2895 1.7538 3.0154 1.00 4.00 
Total 56 2.5000 1.2210 
. 
1632 2.1730 2.8270 1.00 5.00 
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Table: 7. E22: Frequency Distribution of liquidit Ratio of Islamic Banks 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly High 13 2.0 23.2 3.2 
High 21 5.6 7.5 0.7 
Moderate 5 8.5 8.9 9.6 
ow 15 5.4 6.8 6.4 
Very Low .4 .6 100.0 
Total 56 94.9 100.0 
No- Response 5.1 
Total 59 100.0 
Table: 7. F1: Frequency Distribution of the Level of Asset Risk (AR 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 16 27.1 7.6 27.6 
Agree 5 59.3 0.3 87.9 
Don't Know 6 10.2 10.3 8.3 
Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
9 100.0 
Table: 7. F2: Freauencv Distribution of Ability to Repay Deposits(APD 
re uenc Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 21 35.6 36.2 36.2 
Agree 32 54.2 55.2 1.4 
Don't Know .5 8.6 100.0 
Disagree 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Res onse 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
- 
11 
Table: 7. F3: Frequency Distribution of Availability of Sufficient Collaterals (ASC 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 10 16.9 17.2 17.2 
Agree 0 67.8 9.0 86.2 
Don't Know 7 11.9 12.1 8.3 
Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
To-Res onse 58 8.3 100.0 
Strongly Agree i t 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. F4: Frequency Distribution of Maturity of Credits/Investments(MCI 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 8 13.6 13.8 13.8 
Agree 0 67.8 9.0 82.8 
Don't Know 7 11.9 12.1 94.8 
isa gree 5.1 5.2 100.0 
otal 58 8.3 100.0 
stem 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
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Table: 7. F5: Frequency Distribution of Quality of Borrowers (QBR 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 1 35.6 36.2 36.2 
Agree 31 52.5 53.4 89.7 
Don't Know 8.5 8.6 8.3 
Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
No-Response 58 8.3 100.0 
Strongly Agree 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. F6: Frequency Distribution of Subordinate Debt (SD 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 10 16.9 17.2 17.2 
Agree 1 9.5 70.7 7.9 
Don't Know 10.2 10.3 8.3 
Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
Strongly Agree 58 8.3 100.0 
o-Res onse 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
: 7. F7: Freouencv Distribution of Sophisticated Legal Financial and Systems (SLFS 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 10 16.9 17.2 17.2 
_. _ Agree 37 2.7 63.8 81.0 
Don't Know 8 13.6 13.8 4.8 
Disagree 2 .4 3.4 98.3 
Strongly Agree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. F8: Frequency Distribution of Classification of Assets within Group According to 
Assets( CAGR) 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 15 25.4 25.9 25.9 
Agree 32 54.2 55.2 81.0 
Don't Know 10 16.9 17.2 8.3 
Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
No-Response 58 8.3 100.0 
Strongly Agree 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. F9: ANOVA: (Descriptive) Level of CAR of Conventional Banks 
N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Std. Error 95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
LAR Central bank 21 1.9524 . 5896 . 
1287 1.6840 2.2208 1.00 3.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.7692 . 
4385 
. 1216 
1.5042 2.0342 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.7273 1.1037 . 3328 . 9858 2.4688 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.9231 . 4935 . 1369 1.6248 2.2213 1.00 3.00 
Total 58 1.8621 . 
6609 8.678E-02 1.6883 2.0358 1.00 4.00 
APD Central bank 21 1.9048 . 
6249 
. 
1364 1.6203 2.1892 1.00 3.00 
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Islamic banks 13 1.4615 
. 
5189 
. 1439 1.1480 1.7751 1.00 2.00 Auditors 11 1.5455 
. 
8202 
. 
2473 
. 
9944 2.0965 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.8462 
. 
3755 
. 
1042 1.6192 2.0731 1.00 2.00 
Total 58 1.7241 
. 
6154 8.080E-02 1.5623 1.8859 1.00 3.00 
ASC Central bank 21 2.0952 
. 5390 . 1176 1.8499 2.3406 1.00 3.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.7692 
. 
5991 
. 
1662 1.4072 2.1313 1.00 3.00 
Auditors 11 2.0909 . 5394 . 1626 1.7286 2.4533 1.00 3.00 Conventional banks 13 1.9231 
. 
7596 
. 
2107 1.4641 2.3821 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 1.9828 . 6067 7.967E-02 1.8232 2.1423 1.00 4.00 MCI Central bank 21 2.3333 
. 7958 . 1737 1.9711 2.6956 1.00 4.00 Islamic banks 13 1.7692 
. 
4385 
. 1216 1.5042 2.0342 1.00 2.00 Auditors 11 2.0909 
. 
5394 
. 1626 1.7286 2.4533 1.00 3.00 Conventional banks 13 2.0000 
. 
7071 
. 
1961 1.5727 2.4273 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.0862 
. 
6827 8.965E-02 1.9067 2.2657 1.00 4.00 
QBR Central bank 21 2.0000 
. 
5477 
. 1195 1.7507 2.2493 1.00 3.00 Islamic banks 13 1.5385 
. 
5189 
. 
1439 1.2249 1.8520 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.5455 
. 
8202 
. 
2473 
. 
9944 2.0965 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.7692 
. 
8321 
. 2308 1.2664 2.2720 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 1.7586 
. 
6834 8.973E-02 1.5789 1.9383 1.00 4.00 
SD Central bank 21 2.1429 
. 7270 . 1587 1.8119 2.4738 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.6923 . 4804 . 1332 1.4020 1.9826 1.00 2.00 Auditors 11 2.0909 . 5394 . 1626 1.7286 2.4533 1.00 3.00 Conventional banks 13 1.8462 . 3755 . 1042 1.6192 2.0731 1.00 2.00 Total 58 1.9655 . 5913 7.765E-02 1.8100 2.1210 1.00 4.00 
SFLS Central bank 21 2.0952 
. 7003 . 1528 1.7764 2.4140 1.00 3.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.6923 
. 
4804 
. 
1332 1.4020 1.9826 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 3.1818 1.0787 
. 
3252 2.4571 3.9065 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.7692 
. 5991 . 1662 1.4072 2.1313 1.00 3.00 Total 58 2.1379 . 8875 . 1165 1.9046 2.3713 1.00 4.00 IARM Central bank 21 2.1429 . 9636 . 
2103 1.7042 2.5815 1.00 5.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.8462 
. 
3755 
. 1042 1.6192 2.0731 1.00 2.00 Auditors 11 2.2727 
. 7862 . 
2371 1.7445 2.8009 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.0769 
. 
7596 
. 
2107 1.6179 2.5359 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.0862 
. 7788 . 1023 1.8814 2.2910 1.00 5.00 CAGR Central bank 21 2.0952 
. 
8891 
. 1940 1.6905 2.4999 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.8462 . 
6887 
. 1910 1.4300 2.2624 1.00 3.00 
Auditors 11 2.0909 . 5394 . 1626 1.7286 2.4533 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.6923 . 4804 . 1332 1.4020 1.9826 1.00 2.00 Total 58 1.9483 . 7114 9.341E-02 1.7612 2.1353 1.00 4.00 
Table: 7. F1O Frequency Distribution of Adopting Similar Standards of International Standards for 
Calculating CAR for Islamic Banks (ASBA) 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent C umulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 14 3.7 24.1 24.1 
Agree 33 55.9 56.9 81.0 
Don't Know 7 11.9 12.1 3.1 
Disagree 
.8 .9 100.0 Total 58 8.3 100.0 
System 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
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Table: 7. F11 Frequency Distribution of Adopting Risk-weighting Methodology for Calculating CAR 
for Islamic Banks 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 19 32.2 2.8 2.8 
Agree 3 5.9 6.9 89.7 
Don't Know .8 .9 
6.6 
Disagree 3.4 .4 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
System 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. F12 Frequency Distribution of Portfolio Risk for Calculating CAR for Islamic Banks 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 12 20.3 0.7 0.7 
Agree 1 52.5 3.4 4.1 
Don't Know 10 16.9 17.2 1.4 
Disagree 6.8 6.9 8.3 
Strongly Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
System 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. F13 Frequency Distribution of Operational Risks for Calculating CAR for Islamic Banks 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 15 5.4 25.9 5.9 
Agree 35 59.3 0.3 86.2 
Don't Know 7 11.9 12.1 8.3 
Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
System 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. Fi4 Frequency Distribution of Eliminating Moral Hazard 
Frequency ercent Valid Percent C umulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 11 18.6 19.0 19.0 
Agree 37 62.7 3.8 2.8 
Don't Know 8 13.6 13.8 6.6 
Disagree 3.4 3.4 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
System 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. F15 Frequency Distribution Un-availability of Risk Mitigating Instruments 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 15 5.4 25.9 5.9 
Agree 31 52.5 53.4 9.3 
Don't Know 7 11.9 12.1 1.4 
Disagree 
.5 .6 100.0 
otal 58 8.3 100.0 
S stem 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
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Table: 7. F16 Frequency Distribution of Investment Deposit Bearing Investment Risks 
Frequency Percent alid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 10 16.9 17.2 17.2 
Agree 37 2.7 3.8 81.0 
Don't Know 5 8.5 .6 89.7 
Disagree 10.2 10.3 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
System 1 1.7 
9 100.0 
Table: 7. F17 Frequency Distribution of Off -Balance Sheet Items 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 11 18.6 19.0 19.0 
Agree 7 2.7 3.8 82.8 
Don't Know 8.5 .6 1.4 
Disagree 5 8.5 .6 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
System 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. F18 Frecauencv Distribution of Financial and Legal System 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 10 16.9 17.2 17.2 
Agree 37 2.7 3.8 81.0 
Don't Know 8 13.6 13.8 94.8 
Disagree 5.1 .2 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
System 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. F19 Frequency Distribution of Provision to Cover Credit Risk 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 11 18.6 19.0 19.0 
Agree 1 9.5 70.7 89.7 
Don't Know .8 
6.9 6.6 
Disagree .4 .4 
100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
System 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. F20 Freauencv Distribution of Determining the CAR according to Bank-bv-Bank 
Frequency Percent alid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 10 16.9 17.2 17.2 
Agree 9 9.2 50.0 7.2 
Don't Know 10.2 10.3 77.6 
Disagree 12 0.3 20.7 8.3 
Strongly Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
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Table: 7. F21: ANOVA: (Descriptive) Factors determine the CAR of Islamic Banks 
N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Std. Error 95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
ASBA Central bank 21 1.8571 . 
7928 
. 
1730 1.4963 2.2180 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.3846 . 
8697 . 2412 1.8590 2.9102 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.0000 . 
6325 
. 
1907 1.5751 2.4249 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.9231 . 
8623 
. 
2392 1.4020 2.4442 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.0172 . 
8055 
. 
1058 1.8054 2.2290 1.00 4.00 
RMPDFM Central bank 21 1.7619 . 
5390 
. 1176 1.5166 2.0072 1.00 3.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.1538 . 6887 . 1910 1.7376 2.5700 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.4545 . 
8202 
. 
2473 
. 
9035 2.0056 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.8462 . 
8006 . 
2221 1.3623 2.3300 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 1.8103 . 
7122 9.352E-02 1.6231 1.9976 1.00 4.00 
PR Central bank 21 2.1905 1.1233 . 2451 1.6791 2.7018 1.00 5.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.3846 . 
8697 . 2412 1.8590 2.9102 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.0000 . 
6325 . 
1907 1.5751 2.4249 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.0000 . 
7071 . 
1961 1.5727 2.4273 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.1552 . 8945 . 1174 1.9200 2.3904 1.00 5.00 
PRDIP Central bank 21 2.0476 . 
6690 . 
1460 1.7431 2.3522 1.00 3.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.3077 . 
8549 . 2371 1.7911 2.8243 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.0000 . 
6325 
. 
1907 1.5751 2.4249 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.0769 . 
4935 . 
1369 1.7787 2.3752 1.00 3.00 
Total 58 2.1034 . 
6673 8.762E-02 1.9280 2.2789 1.00 4.00 
OPR Central bank 21 1.8095 . 6796 . 1483 1.5002 2.1189 1.00 3.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.0000 . 8165 . 2265 1.5066 2.4934 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.9091 . 7006 . 2113 1.4384 2.3798 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.9231 . 
4935 
. 
1369 1.6248 2.2213 1.00 3.00 
Total 58 1.8966 . 
6673 8.762E-02 1.7211 2.0720 1.00 4.00 
MH Central bank 21 2.1429 . 7270 . 1587 1.8119 2.4738 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.1538 . 
8006 
. 2221 1.6700 2.6377 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.8182 . 
7508 
. 2264 1.3138 2.3225 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.8462 . 3755 . 
1042 1.6192 2.0731 1.00 2.00 
Total 58 2.0172 . 
6880 9.034E-02 1.8363 2.1981 1.00 4.00 
UNHI Central bank 21 2.2381 . 
7684 
. 
1677 1.8883 2.5879 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.2308 1.0127 . 2809 1.6188 
2.8428 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.4545 . 8202 . 2473 . 9035 
2.0056 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.0000 . 7071 . 1961 1.5727 2.4273 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.0345 . 
8577 
. 1126 1.8090 
2.2600 1.00 4.00 
LC Central bank 21 2.0476 . 
9207 
. 
2009 1.6285 2.4667 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.1538 . 
8987 
. 
2493 1.6108 2.6969 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.4545 . 5222 . 
1575 1.1037 1.8054 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.3846 1.0439 . 2895 1.7538 
3.0154 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.0345 . 9170 . 1204 1.7934 2.2756 1.00 4.00 IRSINEH Central bank 21 1.9524 . 9207 . 2009 1.5333 2.3715 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.8462 . 3755 . 1042 1.6192 2.0731 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.8182 
. 
4045 
. 
1220 1.5464 2.0899 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.2308 1.0127 . 2809 1.6188 2.8428 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 1.9655 . 7715 . 1013 1.7626 2.1684 1.00 4.00 
WRID Central bank 21 1.9524 . 7400 . 1615 1.6155 2.2892 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.3846 1.0439 . 
2895 1.7538 3.0154 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.8182 . 4045 . 1220 1.5464 2.0899 1.00 2.00 
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Conventional banks 13 2.3846 . 8697 . 2412 1.8590 2.9102 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.1207 . 
8182 
. 
1074 1.9056 2.3358 1.00 4.00 
OFFBAL Central bank 21 1.9524 . 7400 . 1615 1.6155 2.2892 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.3846 . 
9608 
. 
2665 1.8040 2.9652 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.0909 . 7006 . 
2113 1.6202 2.5616 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.9231 . 
7596 . 2107 1.4641 2.3821 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.0690 . 7917 . 1040 1.8608 2.2771 1.00 4.00 
SFS Central bank 21 2.0000 . 6325 . 1380 1.7121 2.2879 1.00 3.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.0769 . 7596 . 2107 1.6179 2.5359 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.3636 1.0269 . 
3096 1.6737 3.0535 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.9231 . 4935 . 1369 1.6248 2.2213 1.00 3.00 
Total 58 2.0690 . 
7221 9.482E-02 1.8791 2.2588 1.00 4.00 
PCR Central bank 21 1.9524 . 
4976 
. 
1086 1.7259 2.1789 1.00 3.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.7692 . 
4385 . 1216 1.5042 2.0342 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.8182 . 7508 . 
2264 1.3138 2.3225 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.2308 . 
8321 
. 
2308 1.7280 2.7336 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 1.9483 . 
6331 8.313E-02 1.7818 2.1147 1.00 4.00 
CBBB Central bank 21 2.2857 . 
9024 . 1969 1.8750 2.6965 1.00 5.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.3077 1.1094 . 3077 1.6373 2.9781 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 2.5455 1.3685 . 4126 1.6261 3.4648 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.5385 1.0500 . 2912 1.9039 3.1730 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 2.3966 1.0586 . 1390 2.1182 2.6749 1.00 5.00 
Table: 7. F22: Frequency Distribution of different Methodology for Calculating CAR for Islamic 
banks 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 15 5.4 26.3 26.3 
Agree 3 9.0 0.4 66.7 
Don't Know 10.2 10.5 77.2 
Disagree 10 16.9 17.5 94.7 
Strongly Disagree 3 5.1 5.3 100.0 
Total 57 6.6 H 100.0 
No-Response 3.4 
- 159 100.0 I 
Table: 7. F23: Freauencv Distribution of high CAR of Islamic Compared to Conventional banks 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 5 8.5 .1 .1 
Agree 17 8.8 30.9 0.0 
Don't Know 7 11.9 12.7 52.7 
Disagree 26 4.1 7.3 100.0 
Total 55 3.2 100.0 
No-Response 6.8 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. F24: Frequency Distribution of the Need for Higher CAR for Islamic Banks 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 8.5 .1 .1 
Agree 17 28.8 30.9 0.0 
Don't Know 7 11.9 12.7 52.7 
Disagree 6 4.1 7.3 100.0 
otal 55 3.2 100.0 
[No-Response .8 
59 100.0 
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Table: 7. F25: ANOVA : (Descriptive Methodology and Level of CAR for Islamic Banks 
N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
CARISMDC Central bank 20 2.5000 1.2773 . 2856 1.9022 3.0978 1.00 5.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.3077 1.3156 . 
3649 1.5127 3.1027 1.00 5.00 
Auditors 11 1.6364 . 
8090 
. 
2439 1.0928 2.1799 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.7692 1.0919 . 
3028 2.1094 3.4291 1.00 4.00 
Total 57 2.3509 1.2025 . 
1593 2.0318 2.6700 1.00 5.00 
CARISDCB Central bank 20 2.9500 1.0990 . 2458 2.4356 3.4644 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.0769 . 
9541 
. 
2646 1.5004 2.6535 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.7273 1.1037 . 
3328 
. 9858 2.4688 1.00 4.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.5385 1.0500 . 
2912 1.9039 3.1730 1.00 4.00 
Total 57 2.4211 1.1331 . 1501 2.1204 2.7217 1.00 4.00 
CARISHCB Central bank 20 3.5500 . 7592 . 1698 3.1947 3.9053 2.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 2.9231 1.1875 . 
3294 2.2055 3.6407 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 10 2.0000 . 6667 . 2108 1.5231 2.4769 1.00 3.00 
Conventional banks 12 2.9167 1.1645 . 3362 2.1768 3.6566 1.00 4.00 
Total 55 2.9818 1.0800 . 
1456 2.6899 3.2738 1.00 4.00 
Table: 7. Gl: Frequency Distribution of Cash Flow disclosed to the Public 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 26 44.1 4.8 4.8 
Agree 27 5.8 6.6 1.4 
Don't Know 1 1.7 1.7 3.1 
Disagree .8 .9 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. G2: Frequency Distribution of Balance Sheet disclosed to the Public 
re uenc Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 32 54.2 55.2 55.2 
Agree 3 9.0 9.7 4.8 
Don't Know 1 1.7 1.7 6.6 
Disagree 3.4 3.4 100.0 
Total 8 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table: 7. G3: Frequency Distribution of Income Statements disclosed to the Public 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
trongly 1 Agree 0 50.8 51.7 1.7 
Agree 25 2.4 3.1 4.8 
Don't Know 1 1.7 1.7 6.6 
Disagree 3.4 3.4 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
stem 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
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Table: 7. G4: ANOVA: (Descriptive) Information Disclosed to the Public 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
CFS Central bank 21 1.8095 . 
92839 
. 20259 1.3869 2.2321 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.9231 1.03775 . 
28782 1.2960 2.5502 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.3636 . 50452 . 
15212 1.0247 1.7026 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.6154 . 50637 . 14044 1.3094 1.9214 1.00 2.00 
Total 58 1.7069 . 
81668 
. 10724 1.4922 1.9216 1.00 4.00 
BSS Central bank 21 1.8095 . 92839 . 20259 1.3869 2.2321 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.2308 . 
43853 . 12163 . 
9658 1.4958 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.3636 . 
50452 
. 
15212 1.0247 1.7026 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.5385 . 51887 . 14391 1.2249 1.8520 1.00 2.00 
Total 58 1.5345 . 70625 . 
09274 1.3488 1.7202 1.00 4.00 
IS Central bank 21 1.8095 . 
92839 
. 20259 1.3869 2.2321 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.3846 . 50637 . 
14044 1.0786 1.6906 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.3636 . 
50452 
. 15212 1.0247 1.7026 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.5385 . 51887 . 14391 1.2249 1.8520 1.00 2.00 
Total 58 1.5690 . 
70368 
. 
09240 1.3839 1.7540 1.00 4.00 
Table7. G5: Frequency Distribution of Concentration Ratio for Information Disclosed to the 
Supervisors and Board of Directors 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent umulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 31 52.5 53.4 53.4 
Agree 6 4.1 4.8 8.3 
Don't Know 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
otal 58 8.3 100.0 
stem 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table7. G6: Frequency Distribution of Performance Data for Information Disclosed to the 
Supervisors and Board of Directors 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 7 5.8 7.4 7.4 
Agree 8 7.5 9.1 6.5 
Don't Know 3.4 3.5 100.0 
Total 57 6.6 100.0 
No-Response 3.4 
59 100.0 
Table7. G7: Frequency Distribution of Internal Rating Systems for Information Disclosed to the 
Supervisors and Board of Directors 
Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 32 54.2 55.2 55.2 
Agree 22 7.3 37.9 3.1 
Don't Know 2 3.4 3.4 6.6 
Total 2 3.4 3.4 100.0 
No-Response 58 8.3 100.0 
Strongly Agree 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
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Table7. G8: Frequency Distribution of Market Risk and VaR Reports for Information Disclosed to 
the Supervisors and Board of Directors 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 26 4.1 4.8 4.8 
Agree 27 5.8 6.6 1.4 
Don't Know 3 5.1 5.2 6.6 
Total 
.4 .4 100.0 No-Response 58 8.3 100.0 
Strongly Agree 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table7. G9: Frequency Distribution of Credit Risk Reports for Information Disclosed to the 
Supervisors and Board of Directors 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 27 5.8 6.6 6.6 
Agree 28 7.5 8.3 4.8 
Don't Know 1 1.7 1.7 6.6 
Total 2 
.4 3.4 100.0 
No-Response 58 8.3 100.0 
Strongly Agree 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table7. G10: Frequency Distribution of Operational Risk Reports for Information Disclosed to the 
Supervisors and Board of Directors 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 25 2.4 3.1 3.1 
Tree 30 50.8 51.7 4.8 
Don't Know 1 1.7 1.7 6.6 
Total 2 3.4 3.4 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table7. G11: Frequency Distribution of Assessment of Management and Directors for Information 
Disclosed to the Supervisors and Board of Directors 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 23 39.0 0.4 0.4 
Agree 31 52.5 54.4 4.7 
Don't Know 3 5.1 5.3 100.0 
Total 57 6.6 100.0 
o-Res onse 3.4 
59 100.0 
Table7. G12: Frequency Distribution of Investment Objectives and policy Market Risk and VaR Reports Disclosed to the Supervisors and Board of Directors 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 24 40.7 1.4 1.4 
ree 30 50.8 51.7 3.1 
Don't Know 1 1.7 1.7 4.8 
Disagree 5.1 5.2 100.0 
otal 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 11 1.7 
59 100.0 
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Table: 7. G13: ANOVA: (Descriptive) Information Disclosed to the Board of Directors 
N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Std. Error 95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
CRA Central bank 21 1.6190 . 74001 . 
16148 1.2822 1.9559 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.4615 . 
51887 
. 14391 1.1480 1.7751 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.3636 . 
50452 
. 
15212 1.0247 1.7026 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.4615 . 
51887 
. 
14391 1.1480 1.7751 1.00 2.00 
Total 58 1.5000 . 
59971 
. 
07875 1.3423 1.6577 1.00 4.00 
PD Central bank 21 1.7143 . 
71714 
. 15649 1.3878 2.0407 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.6923 . 
85485 
. 23709 1.1757 2.2089 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.3636 . 
50452 
. 
15212 1.0247 1.7026 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 12 1.5000 . 
52223 
. 
15076 1.1682 1.8318 1.00 2.00 
Total 57 1.5965 . 
67770 . 08976 1.4167 1.7763 1.00 4.00 
IRS Central bank 21 1.7619 . 94365 . 20592 1.3324 2.1914 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.4615 . 
66023 
. 18311 1.0626 1.8605 1.00 3.00 
Auditors 11 1.3636 . 
50452 
. 
15212 1.0247 1.7026 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.4615 . 
51887 
. 
14391 1.1480 1.7751 1.00 2.00 
Total 58 1.5517 . 
72963 
. 
09581 1.3599 1.7436 1.00 4.00 
MRR Central bank 21 1.7619 . 
94365 
. 
20592 1.3324 2.1914 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.6923 . 
75107 . 20831 1.2384 2.1462 1.00 3.00 
Auditors 11 1.7273 . 
46710 
. 
14084 1.4135 2.0411 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.4615 . 
51887 
. 
14391 1.1480 1.7751 1.00 2.00 
Total 58 1.6724 . 
73480 
. 
09648 1.4792 1.8656 1.00 4.00 
CRR Central bank 21 1.7619 . 
94365 
. 20592 1.3324 2.1914 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.5385 . 
51887 
. 14391 1.2249 1.8520 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.7273 . 
46710 
. 
14084 1.4135 2.0411 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.3846 . 
50637 
. 14044 1.0786 1.6906 1.00 2.00 
Total 58 1.6207 . 
69655 
. 09146 1.4375 1.8038 1.00 4.00 
LRR Central bank 21 1.7619 . 
94365 
. 20592 1.3324 2.1914 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.5385 . 
51887 
. 14391 1.2249 1.8520 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.7273 . 46710 . 14084 1.4135 2.0411 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.5385 . 
51887 
. 14391 1.2249 1.8520 1.00 2.00 
Total 58 1.6552 . 
68956 
. 
09054 1.4739 1.8365 1.00 4.00 
OPR Central bank 21 1.8095 1.03049 . 
22487 1.3405 2.2786 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.6154 . 
50637 
. 
14044 1.3094 1.9214 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.7273 . 46710 . 14084 1.4135 2.0411 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 12 1.5833 . 51493 . 14865 1.2562 1.9105 1.00 2.00 
Total 57 1.7018 . 
73107 
. 
09683 1.5078 1.8957 1.00 4.00 
AMD Central bank 21 1.7619 
. 
88909 
. 19401 1.3572 
2.1666 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.8462 
. 
89872 
. 24926 1.3031 
2.3892 1.00 4.00 
Auditors 11 1.7273 
. 
46710 
. 14084 1.4135 2.0411 1.00 2.00 Conventional banks 13 1.4615 
. 
51887 
. 14391 1.1480 1.7751 1.00 2.00 Total 58 1.7069 
. 74947 . 
09841 1.5098 1.9040 1.00 4.00 
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Table7. G14: Frequency Distribution of Information disclosed by Mutual Funds/Investment 
Obiectives and Policies 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 19 32.2 2.8 32.8 
Agree 37 2.7 3.8 6.6 
Don't Know 1 1.7 1.7 8.3 
Disagree 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table7. G15: Frequency Distribution of Information disclosed by Mutual Funds/Concentration 
Ratios 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 0 3.9 34.5 34.5 
gree 36 61.0 62.1 6.6 
Don't Know .4 .4 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
Total 59 100.0 
Table7. G16: Frequency Distribution of Information disclosed by Mutual Funds/ Portfolio's Risk 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 20 3.9 4.5 34.5 
Agree 35 59.3 60.3 4.8 
Don't Know 1 1.7 1.7 6.6 
Disagree .4 
3.4 100.0 
otal 58 8.3 100.0 
o-Res onse 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table 7. G17: Frequency Distribution of Information disclosed by Mutual Funds/Internal Controls 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 2 7.3 37.9 7.9 
Agree 2 54.2 5.2 3.1 
Don't Know 6.8 6.9 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
o-Res onse 1 1.7 
oral 59 100.0 
Table 7. G18: Frequency Distribution of Information disclosed by Mutual Funds/Performance Data 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 7 5.8 6.6 6.6 
Agree 7 5.8 6.6 3.1 
Don't Know 2 3.4 3.4 6.6 
Disagree 2 3.4 3.4 100.0 
Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
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Table 7. G19: Frequency Distribution of Information disclosed by Mutual Funds/Qualification and 
Experience of Management and Senior Staff 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 3 9.0 9.7 39.7 
Agree 31 2.5 53.4 3.1 
Don't Know 3.4 3.4 6.6 
Disagree 3.4 3.4 100.0 
Total 8 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table 7. G20: Frequency Distribution of Information disclosed by Mu 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 19 32.2 32.8 32.8 
Agree 2 54.2 55.2 87.9 
Don't Know 5.1 5.2 3.1 
Disagree 
.8 .9 100.0 Total 58 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
59 100.0 
Table 7. G21: Frequency Distribution of Information disclosed by Islamic Banks 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly Agree 8 13.6 13.8 13.8 
Agree 1 52.5 53.4 67.2 
Don't Know .8 
6.9 74.1 
Disagree 13 22.0 2.4 6.6 
Strongly Disagree 2 3.4 3.4 100.0 
Total 8 8.3 100.0 
No-Response 1 1.7 
Total 59 100.0 
Table: 8. G22: ANOVA : (Descriptive) Information Disclosed by Mutual Funds 
Error Interval for Mean 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
IOP Central bank 21 1.7619 . 76842 . 16768 1.4121 2.1117 1.00 4.00 Islamic banks 13 1.6154 . 50637 . 14044 1.3094 1.9214 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.7273 . 46710 . 14084 1.4135 2.0411 1.00 2.00 Conventional banks 13 1.7692 
. 
43853 
. 
12163 1.5042 2.0342 1.00 2.00 
Total 58 1.7241 
. 58619 . 
07697 1.5700 1.8783 1.00 4.00 
CR Central bank 21 1.7143 
. 56061 . 12234 1.4591 1.9695 1.00 3.00 Islamic banks 13 1.6923 . 63043 . 17485 1.3113 2.0733 1.00 3.00 Auditors 11 1.7273 
. 46710 . 14084 1.4135 2.0411 1.00 2.00 Conventional banks 13 1.6154 
. 50637 . 14044 1.3094 1.9214 1.00 2.00 Total 58 1.6897 
. 
53662 
. 
07046 1.5486 1.8308 1.00 3.00 
RFBP Central bank 21 1.7619 
. 76842 . 
16768 1.4121 2.1117 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.6154 
. 50637 . 14044 1.3094 1.9214 1.00 2.00 Auditors 11 1.7273 
. 46710 . 14084 1.4135 2.0411 1.00 2.00 Conventional banks 13 1.8462 
. 
80064 
. 22206 1.3623 2.3300 1.00 4.00 Total 58 1.7414 . 66386 . 08717 1.5668 1.9159 1.00 4.00 
NI Mean I Std. Dev. I Std. 195% Confidence Min. Max. 
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IC Central bank 21 1.6190 . 66904 . 14600 1.3145 1.9236 1.00 3.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.6154 . 
65044 
. 
18040 1.2223 2.0084 1.00 3.00 
Auditors 11 1.7273 . 46710 . 14084 1.4135 2.0411 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.8462 . 
55470 
. 
15385 1.5110 2.1814 1.00 3.00 
Total 58 1.6897 . 59845 . 
07858 1.5323 1.8470 1.00 3.00 
PD Central bank 21 1.7143 . 
95618 . 20866 1.2790 2.1495 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.6154 . 65044 . 18040 1.2223 2.0084 1.00 3.00 
Auditors 11 1.3636 . 50452 . 15212 1.0247 1.7026 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.7692 . 
43853 
. 
12163 1.5042 2.0342 1.00 2.00 
Total 58 1.6379 . 71814 . 09430 1.4491 1.8268 1.00 4.00 
QM Central bank 21 1.8095 . 
92839 
. 20259 1.3869 2.2321 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.6154 . 50637 . 14044 1.3094 1.9214 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.3636 . 
50452 
. 
15212 1.0247 1.7026 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 13 1.9231 . 49355 . 13689 1.6248 
2.2213 1.00 3.00 
Total 58 1.7069 . 70109 . 
09206 1.5226 1.8912 1.00 4.00 
IT Central bank 21 2.0000 1.04881 . 
22887 1.5226 2.4774 1.00 4.00 
Islamic banks 13 1.5385 . 
51887 
. 
14391 1.2249 1.8520 1.00 2.00 
Auditors 11 1.7273 . 
46710 . 14084 1.4135 2.0411 1.00 2.00 
Conventional banks 13 2.0769 . 75955 . 21066 1.6179 2.5359 1.00 4.00 
Total 58 1.8621 . 
80455 . 10564 1.6505 2.7736 1.00 4.00 
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